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 Among the figures of the Scientific Revolution, Galileo was the most influential 
in moving science away from Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation to what 
became Modern science. My primary goal in this thesis is to explicate Galileo’s concept 
of scientific explanation, as well as the metaphysical and methodological underpinnings 
relied upon by Galileo, and to investigate where these depart from Aristotle as well as the 
Aristotelians of Galileo’s time. Galileo’s most revolutionary scientific achievement was 
to advance a new, more practical aim for scientific inquiry: he changed the focus of 
scientific investigations to the measuring, modeling, and predicting of phenomena. In 
order to increase the reliability of his hypotheses Galileo rejected those aspects of 
Aristotle’s account of scientific explanation that could not be rigorously empirically 
justified. The result was that empirical science no longer searched for the essential 
attributes of bodies or for Aristotle’s causes such as the “final” cause. The identified 
contributions and innovations promulgated by Galileo are significant because they 
dictated changes that became formative to contemporary models of scientific explanation. 
I argue that analyses such as the one given in this dissertation can provide a framework 
for better understanding twentieth-century criticisms that argue that Aristotle’s concept of 
scientific explanation contained elements that are indispensable to genuine scientific 
explanations but that are missing from standard contemporary accounts such as Hempel’s 
covering law models. Finally, I conclude that my analysis of Galileo’s contributions to 
scientific explanation suggests that contemporary claims that covering law models should 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
“Please observe, gentlemen, how facts that at first seem improbable will, 
even on scant explanation, drop the cloak that has hidden them and stand 
forth in naked and simple beauty.”  Galileo1
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 I argue that the work of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), besides teaching us about the 
foundations of Modern science, the direct ancestor to contemporary science, still holds 
lessons for contemporary philosophy of science.  Wallace (1972) reports that “Galileo is 
almost universally regarded as the key figure in the foundation of modern science” (p. 
176).  Galileo’s discoveries led to unprecedented scientific progress2 by trying to match 
mathematical models to observational data.3 Galileo advocated that an essential part of 
scientific inquiry was sharing not only his discoveries, but also his philosophy of science, 
which led to these discoveries.4  His philosophy of science was revolutionary5
                                                 
1 Spoken by Galileo’s mouthpiece Salviati in Two New Sciences (1638) translated in Finocchiaro, 2008, 
p.297. 
 and 
resulted in a quantum change in the purpose of scientific inquiry, toward an emphasis on 
2 Butterfield (1957) 
3 Newton (1687) 
4 Galileo also saw his advances in scientific methodology as paramount to his contributions to science. See 
Galileo’s discussion in his preface to the Dialogue (1632); Drake says Floating Bodies (1612) was 
Galileo’s most popular book in his lifetime because he was advocating a new method; Letter to Grand 
Duchess Christina (1623) talks about being careful with reasoning to what is the case. Drake (1957, p. 73f) 
takes pains to say that Galileo is fighting against the philosophers, not about facts but about finding truth. 
Drake portrays Galileo as doing ‘science’ and not philosophy (Drake, 1980). This is anachronistic, but 
perhaps helpful. 
5 Gingerich (1986: 126); Cohen (1985: 135); Butterfield (1957) 
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the applicability of science, which in turn led him to develop a model of scientific 
explanation with greater epistemic justification. 
 Despite all that has been written about Galileo and the Scientific Revolution, there 
remain misunderstandings about Galileo’s contribution to scientific explanation.6  These 
misunderstandings stem from a lack of clarity regarding how Galileo’s concepts of 
scientific explanation departed from his predecessors’, particularly Aristotle’s (384-322 
B.C.E.).  This thesis examines the key differences between Galileo’s concept of scientific 
explanation and Aristotle’s.  I do this to help increase our understanding of the precise 
changes that Galileo brought to scientific explanation and to address some of the 
misunderstandings regarding his influence.  I propose that better understanding Galileo’s 
contribution to scientific explanation will help to establish a framework from which to 
evaluate criticisms of contemporary models of scientific explanation.  I argue that this 
framework can be used to address the specific criticisms that suggest that contemporary 
models of scientific explanation are missing key elements that are present in Aristotle’s 
model.7
 In this chapter, I introduce Aristotle’s and then Galileo’s ideas of scientific 
explanation.  I then briefly introduce some of the misunderstandings about Galileo’s 
precise contributions to scientific explanation before introducing some of the potentially 
relevant criticisms of contemporary scientific explanation models that would benefit from 
a well-explicated discussion regarding the differences between Galileo’s and Aristotle’s 
 
                                                 
6 Segre (1998); Lennox (1986); Drake (1978) 
7 The criticisms made by Brody, 1972; Van Fraassen, 1980; and Salmon, 1984, of the standard 
contemporary model of scientific explanation are discussed below. 
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scientific explanations.  Finally, I briefly outline the remaining four chapters of this 
thesis.  
  
1.2 Aristotle, Galileo, and Key Terms  
 To understand Galileo’s contributions to scientific explanation models, it is 
necessary to understand the major influences on the concept of scientific explanation that 
preceded Galileo.  This will establish the scientific landscape upon which Galileo built 
his philosophy of science.  Aristotle is the scientific standard bearer prior to Galileo’s 
arrival8
 In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle is explicit that scientific knowledge requires 
having the scientific explanation for a given phenomenon or event X (71b9).  For 
Aristotle, having the scientific explanation means knowing why X is the case.  Knowing 
why X is the case means being able to give a demonstration with the proper explanatory 
first principles in the form of a deductive syllogism that answers the question, “Why is X 
the case?”  In Posterior Analytics I.13, Aristotle uses the waxing of the Moon to illustrate 
the difference between a deductive syllogism that merely gives a fact and a deductive 
syllogism that is a scientific demonstration because it answers the ‘why’ question: 
; thus we must first understand some of Aristotle’s science, especially his concept 
of scientific explanation, before we can evaluate Galileo’s achievements.  To this 
purpose, I investigate Aristotle’s ideas of scientific explanation in detail in chapter 2, but 
provide a brief introduction to some of his terms (i.e., scientific explanation, scientific 
demonstration, causation) here in order to start the conversation.   
                                                 





(A) all that waxes is spherical, 
 the Moon waxes, 
thus, the Moon is spherical. 
 
Syllogism A is a proper deduction but it only gives the fact of the matter, namely that the 
Moon is spherical, without answering ‘why’ the Moon is spherical.  By rearranging the 
first premise Aristotle says it is possible to produce a scientific demonstration: 
(B) all that is spherical waxes, 
 the Moon is spherical, 
thus,  the Moon waxes. 
 
Syllogism B is a scientific demonstration, and hence an explanation, according to 
Aristotle because it answers why the Moon waxes, namely, because it is spherical.  
Sphericity is the formal cause of the Moon’s waxing.9
 Answering ‘why’ questions is at the heart of Aristotle’s concept of causation.  
Surprisingly, given how important causation is to Aristotle’s scientific explanations, 
Drake (1981) argues that Aristotle does not define cause:  
 
 
In saying this [that Aristotle does not define cause], I rely on my 
understanding of Causality and Scientific Explanation, a two-volume 
survey published in 1972 by William A. Wallace, who gave the traditional 
meaning of cause as ‘something that exists outside the mind and serves to 
explain, not merely in a logical way, why the thing is as it is.’ Thus the 
notion of external existence of causes was included in any reference to 
them, though the determination of cause was a matter of reason rather than 
of direct observation.  (pp. xxv-xxvi) 
 
                                                 
9 See below for discussion of Aristotle’s “four causes”.  
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Drake (1981) may be right that Aristotle does not define cause in the way that Aristotle 
suggests definitions should be rendered.  However, Aristotle describes his use of 
causation when he explains the four types of answers to ‘why’ questions, for instance, in 
Posterior Analytics II, Physics II, and Metaphysics V.10
 In the Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle explains the “four causes”: material, 
efficient, formal, and final.  The material cause answers questions such as, “Why is the 
statue heavy?” (Because it is made of bronze).  The efficient cause answers questions 
such as, “Why is there a statue?” (Because Lysistratus made it).  The formal cause 
answers questions such as, “Why does the statue look the way it does?” (Because it is 
meant to honor Solon by representing his image).  The final cause answers questions such 
as, “Why is there a statue?” (Because the town wanted to honor Solon).  The final cause 
and formal causes are sometimes the same, or at any rate very closely linked, especially 
in natural kinds.  In sum, for Aristotle, understanding cause is essential to scientific 
explanation.  
   
 Although most of the conversation about Galileo occurs in chapter 4, to begin 
addressing the differences between Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation and 
Galileo’s concept of scientific explanation, I provide here a brief overview of Galileo’s 
concepts in order to introduce some of the key terms that are defined and discussed in 
detail later.  Of Galileo’s many achievements, this thesis examines the one that underlies 
all the others: the advances Galileo made to scientific explanation and the tools he used to 
bring about these advances.  For Galileo, having scientific knowledge of X means having 
                                                 
10 See Hankinson (1998) p. 132 (footnote about Hocutt [1974]). Aristotle says there are four types of 
“aition”, which is usually rendered as ‘cause’, but ‘because’ has also been suggested as a closer translation.   
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a proper scientific explanation of X.  A proper scientific explanation of X results when 
one can demonstrate that a model predicts phenomena (e.g., demonstrating how bodies 
float by giving the ‘proximate’ cause or demonstrating the times squared law of free fall 
by giving a predictive mathematical model).   
 For Galileo, a proximate cause is something such that if it is present, then the 
effect is present and if absent then the effect is absent (Drake, 1981, p.130).11
 Galileo’s definition of cause is not original.  It is similar to the Stoic notion of the 
“containing” cause (aition sunektikon):   
  Of 
Aristotle’s four causes, his efficient cause is the most similar to Galileo’s use of the 
‘proximate’ cause, the difference between the two being that Galileo’s use of the 
proximate cause often identifies a causal event, whereas Aristotle’s efficient cause is 
predominantly an agent.   
 
 . . . causes are said to be containing if, when they are present the effect is 
present, when they are removed the effect is removed, and when they are 
decreased the effect is decreased (thus they say the application of the 
noose is the cause of the strangling).  (Hankinson, 1998, p. 243, trans. of 
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.15).   
 
This Stoic definition of cause described in the above quotation is very similar to 
Galileo’s use of cause, although Galileo is not explicit about the strength or 
degree of effect based on degree of presence of cause. 
 Galileo differs from Aristotle in a fundamental way regarding what the purpose of 
science should be.  More so than can be identified by looking at any single aspect of 
                                                 
11 Galileo does not have a formal means for dealing with the apparent asymmetry problem of being able to 
distinguish between cause and effect, but I take up this question in greater detail in chapter four. 
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Galileo’s method, Galileo departs both from Aristotle and from Galileo’s Aristotelian 
contemporaries by making science about usefulness.  This leads Galileo to move away 
from Aristotle’s view of science as the search for the ultimate first principles of nature.  
Instead Galileo focuses on proximate causes—especially those causes that can be 
quantified—and on finding mathematical regularity in phenomena.  Of course this change 
in the focus of science away from being the search for the ultimate first principles of 
nature toward applicability is not necessarily a matter of all or nothing, but is rather a 
matter of degree.  Nevertheless, this represents a significant shift in focus.  
   Galileo’s interest in the proximate cause (compared with Aristotle’s 
interest in the final cause) reflects an interest in cause only insofar as it is useful in 
making his explanations applicable (e.g., Two New Sciences; Floating Bodies).  
This desire for science to be applicable meant that predictive models (models of 
what happens rather than why it happens) should be generated.  To produce 
predictive models, Galileo dramatically increased the level of quantification in 
science.  This increased the level of epistemic justification (the degree of 
empirical evidence supporting the assertions of the model) in Galileo’s 
explanations because quantification provides a means for judging and refining the 
predictive accuracy of his models.  In contrast Aristotle’s theory of perception 
affirms that human beings are good at categorizing experiences because, “for 
although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals” (Posterior 
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Analytics II.19, Barnes, trans., 1993, 100b).12
 To address this new purpose of scientific explanation, Galileo made substantial 
scientific advancements in applying mathematics to nature and in experimentation.
  Being open to receiving the forms 
of natural objects through observation naturally leads one toward grasping the 
correct universal (Lear, 1988, p. 3).  Hence, Aristotle did not include in his system 
for generating scientific explanations a means for gauging the level of epistemic 




Galileo famously said that the universe is written in the language of mathematics (The 
Assayer [1623], Drake, trans., 1957, pp. 237-8).  Galileo made science more about 
finding ways to manipulate nature to our own ends  (e.g., artillery accuracy, pendulum 
clock, thermoscope, longitude problem, etc.) than Aristotle, who was explicit that 
knowledge and wisdom are about that which is abstract, i.e. not useful (Metaphysics I.1). 
1.3  Galileo’s Accomplishments Mischaracterized  
 Although a lot has been written about Galileo, there remain controversies about 
his contribution to scientific explanation (Wallace, 1972, p. 176).  There are several 
muddled stories that contribute to the popular misunderstanding of Galileo’s scientific 
contributions.  In many ways Galileo is the most prominent figure of the Scientific 
Revolution (Wallace, 1972).  However, as Lennox (1986) points out, because Galileo was 
a transitional figure it is easy to over-exaggerate just how revolutionary his thinking was.  
                                                 
12 “Particulars” refers to the individual bodies that we encounter with our senses (e.g. this thing in front of 
me with leaves), and “universals” refers to the general concepts that we form about the particulars (e.g. 
trees have leaves).  
13 By mathematics, Galileo is primarily thinking in terms of geometry (Machamer, 1998, p. 64). 
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The tendency is to credit Galileo with every modern innovation and to discredit the 
system he helped replace.  Lennox (1986) and Bowler and Morus (2005) further point out 
that assumptions are made to the effect that anything Galileo put forward was first of all 
new and, second, completely contrary to the old system (Koyré, 1978). 
 Previous accounts of what is revolutionary about Galileo’s work tend to 
emphasize one or more of the following: Galileo’s use of mathematics, his use of 
idealization, his writing in Italian, the difference between observation and 
experimentation, rationalism vs. empiricism, and even Galileo’s supposed atheistic 
agenda (Cohen, 1960, p. 201).  A broader approach should look first for Galileo’s 
purpose in order to provide a framework for understanding the various common Galileo 
topics in context. 
 To begin to understand a framework from which to evaluate Galileo’s 
contributions it is useful to examine contemporary commentary regarding Galileo.  In 
general, Galileo is credited with coming up with the law of the pendulum and the law of 
free fall, discovering that the Moon’s landscape is mountainous, providing telescopic 
evidence that the Earth is not the only center of motion, and advancing the systematic use 
of the experimental method, among many other contributions (Drake, 1978).  Some have 
gone as far as to claim that Galileo changed our very conception of nature (Butterfield, 
1957; Koyré, 1978).    
 While Galileo’s contributions to science are unquestionably tremendous, they 
seem to have reached mythic proportions, periodically at the expense of accuracy (Segre, 
1998; Lennox, 1986).  In particular, Galileo’s accomplishments may be exaggerated in 
 
 10 
terms of his introduction of mathematics and experimentation to science, not to mention 
claims that he had a fully developed theory of inertia and mechanical dynamics 
(Lindberg, 1992).    
 At least three myths are propagated about Galileo.  One says that he differed from 
previous thinkers by being an empiricist; that is, all of his scientific advancements 
originated via observation.  Cohen (1960) claims that the moment that changed 
everything was Galileo’s turning the telescope to the heavens.  Cohen says this is when 
Galileo “recognized” planetary motion the way it actually is and that this is what led to 
the Copernican system being adopted.  This perspective is not completely accurate 
because Galileo was convinced of the Copernican solar system model, or at least 
Copernicus’ idea of the multi-fold motion of the earth, approximately fifteen years prior 
to his 1609 telescopic observations.  That Galileo was convinced of these ideas is 
apparent in a letter sent from Galileo to Kepler in 1597 stating that he (Galileo) had 
already been a believer in Copernicus’ ideas for several years (Drake, 1978, p.40).  
Additionally, the suggestion that Galileo’s empiricism accounts for his great advances 
misses the fact that Aristotle was also an empiricist (Barnes, 1995). 
 Another myth is the exaggeration that Galileo originated experimentation (Hall, 
1962).  While this is not an unusual claim, it discounts the fact that prior to Galileo 
experimentation occurred (e.g., Grosseteste, Theodoric; this is described in greater detail 
in chapter 3).  This characterization that Galileo originated experimentation sometimes 
leads to the implication that empirical observation was not important to Aristotle, such as 
in Drake, 1980.  However, empirical observation was fundamental to Aristotle’s science 
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because he believed that all knowledge ultimately comes from observation (Barnes, 1995, 
p. 16).  
 Another exaggeration about Galileo’s contributions is the suggestion that he 
singularly introduced mathematics to scientific explanation.  For instance, Henry (2002) 
does not think that mathematics was used by natural philosophers in any meaningful way 
prior to Galileo:   
 
A simple but essentially accurate way of summing up what took place in 
the Scientific Revolution, then, is to say that the natural philosophy of the 
Middle Ages, which had tended to remain aloof from mathematical and 
more pragmatic or experiential arts and sciences, became amalgamated 
with these other approaches to the analysis of nature. (p. 5) 
 
The implication is that math was not used extensively in the Middle Ages in 
empirical investigation.  However, as will be discussed in chapter 3, from the 
reintroduction of Aristotle and Euclid to the Latin West in the twelfth century, 
mathematics was extensively used by natural philosophers such as Grosseteste, 
Theodoric, Jordanus of Nemore, and Nicole Oresme among others (Dugas, 1998).  
Similarly, this characterization that Galileo originated the use of mathematics in 
science sometimes leads to the implication that mathematics does not play an 
important role in Aristotle’s empirical sciences (Feher, 1982; Annas, 1976; 
Mueller, 1970).  However, such suggestions fail to account for Aristotle’s use of 
mathematics in his discussions of circular motion in Physics IV.14 and planetary 
motion in De Caelo I.1, and in the discussion of meteorological phenomena such 
as the rainbow in Meteorology III, among others. 
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 I bring up these myths, not to suggest that previous scholars have dramatically 
misunderstood Galileo’s contributions, because in general the myths that I describe 
appear to be more exaggerations than complete misunderstandings.  Rather, I bring these 
up to create a starting point for discussion.  Removing the hyperbole and examining the 
actual changes between Galileo and Aristotle permits a better opportunity for 
understanding Galileo’s realistic contributions to scientific explanation, and the value of 
those contributions, which in turn facilitates a better understanding of the roots of 
contemporary models of scientific explanation.  
 
1.4  Purpose of this Thesis 
 To fully appreciate current criticisms and to avoid making the mistakes of the past 
it is necessary to understand the goals of scientific explanation (Cartwright, 1983).  
However, because those goals have changed over time, understanding the most 
significant steps in the progression of science can help shed light on contemporary 
discussions.  I propose that a clearer understanding of the origins of contemporary 
scientific explanation models will help to develop a framework for evaluating new 
meaningful contributions as well as criticisms of contemporary scientific explanation 
models.  To that end, I investigate Galileo’s development of his model of scientific 
explanation. 
 My primary goal in this thesis is to explicate Galileo’s concept of scientific 
explanation and the ways in which it diverged from what came before, most notably 
Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation.  I use the ways in which Galileo diverged to 
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set up a framework for examining the role that his contributions play in contemporary 
discussions about scientific explanation.  I then use the identified contributions to argue 
that the innovations promulgated by Galileo are significant because they dictated changes 
that became formative to the methodology used in contemporary models of scientific 
explanation. 
 Although Modern and contemporary accounts of scientific explanation are far 
removed from Aristotle’s ideas, some contemporary philosophers argue that Aristotle’s 
ideas about causation and essence should be reintroduced to fill in gaps in contemporary 
accounts of scientific explanation (e.g., Brody, 1972; Salmon, 1984).  Van Fraassen 
(1980a) argues that while it may be desirable to reintroduce some of Aristotle’s ideas to 
contemporary models of scientific explanation, it should only be done after understanding 
the repercussions of doing so.  To understand these repercussions, it is helpful to 
understand why and how those elements of Aristotle’s that contemporary models are 
missing were removed from scientific explanation, a removal which I argue occurred at 
the hands of Galileo.  By using the framework created from identifying differences 
between Galileo and Aristotle, I hope to contribute to the understanding of what the costs 
and benefits might be of reintroducing certain elements of Aristotle’s model of scientific 
explanation. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Argument 
 Chapter 2 examines Aristotle’s concepts of scientific demonstration and 
explanation.  This involves comparing Aristotle’s stated methods with a few cases in 
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which Aristotle applies his method (e.g. with his demonstrations concerning the rainbow 
and projectile motion).  Chapter 2 also looks at the various role mathematics plays in 
Aristotle’s science.  Finally, chapter 2 discusses some of the problems of Aristotle’s 
science that set the stage for later thinkers, especially Galileo. 
 Chapter 3 then examines a few key actors during the intervening period between 
Aristotle and Galileo to facilitate understanding Galileo’s development.  This chapter 
looks at the reintroduction of Aristotle’s writings, especially the Posterior Analytics, 
which was translated from Arabic into Latin in the twelfth century.  It further examines 
the concept of scientific explanation for some of Galileo’s contemporaries, and how 
closely their concepts were tied to Aristotle’s ideas of scientific explanation. 
 In chapter 4, I then analyze Galileo’s concept of scientific explanation, which 
illustrates Galileo’s departure from the ideas of his predecessors as well as what is 
revolutionary about his work.  This analysis lays out Galileo’s understanding of scientific 
explanation, showing where it is empirical and where rational.  I also examine the 
relationship between his scientific explanation and his interest in the purpose of science 
in order to evaluate why these changes may have occurred.  Finally, I discuss some of the 
consequences to Galileo’s model of scientific explanation that are attributable to 
Galileo’s interest in increasing empirical justification.  
 Lastly, chapter 5 summarizes the analysis of differences between Galileo and 
Aristotle relevant to discussions of contemporary scientific explanation models.  I then 
use this analysis as a basis for briefly looking at contemporary discussions about 
scientific explanation and ask what light a more thorough understanding of Galileo’s 
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contributions to scientific explanation models can shed on these discussions.  Finally, I 
conclude that my analysis of Galileo’s contributions to scientific explanation models 
suggests that those contemporary proposals that claim that covering law models should 
be more receptive to Aristotle’s ideas of causation and essence (e.g., Brody, 1972; Van 




Chapter 2.  Aristotle’s Concept of Scientific Explanation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation was the foundation, albeit modified 
through the centuries, that the agents of the Scientific Revolution were revolting against.  
Understanding Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation will put us in a better position 
to explicate and evaluate Galileo’s contributions to scientific methodology in general and 
Galileo’s concept of scientific explanation in particular.14
 To understand Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation, this chapter examines  
Aristotle’s explicit statements about scientific explanation as well as specific instances of 
explanation in his corpus, the latter of which will help illustrate how closely he was able 
to follow his own model.  In Posterior Analytics I.9, Aristotle observes that “It is difficult 
to know whether you know something or not” (Barnes, trans., 1993, 76a25).  To 
Aristotle, knowing something about a given natural phenomenon, i.e. having a scientific 
explanation of that phenomenon, means that you can give the scientific demonstration of 
the cause of the given phenomenon.   
 
                                                 
14 Understanding Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation will also be helpful in chapter 5 to the 
analysis of criticisms that claim contemporary accounts of scientific explanation  lack elements that 
Aristotle’s system captured, elements lost in the history of science: the essence and cause of the thing being 
explained (Brody, 1972; Salmon, 1984). Hence, to fully appreciate such criticisms, we first need to 
understand whether Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation does indeed capture the essence and the 
cause of the thing being explained.  If so, then we still need to understand what ‘scientific explanation’ 
means in the Aristotelian sense, and how ‘essence’ and ‘cause’ work within it.  This analysis supports the 
purpose of this dissertation of contributing a more robust understanding of the historical and philosophical 
developments of the change in the concept of scientific explanation from Aristotle to Galileo.  Furthermore, 
I propose that this project may also contribute a clearer framework from which to evaluate what elements 
of the standard model of scientific explanation (e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel 1965; Psillos 
2002) should be kept or changed in light of Brody’s criticisms. 
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 In this chapter, I pay special attention to Aristotle’s use of mathematics in 
scientific explanation (in chapter 3, I turn to the use of mathematics by his intellectual 
heirs).  I do this because a significant portion of the extant scholarship about the changes 
to scientific explanation brought about by the Scientific Revolution focuses on Galileo’s 
purported increased use of mathematics in his scientific explanations (Kuhn, 1985; 
Drake, 1980; Hall, 1962; Cohen, 1960).  Hence, understanding the role that mathematics 
plays in Aristotle’s, as well as Galileo’s, concept of scientific explanation will be helpful 
to evaluating Brody’s suggestion that we should reintroduce elements present in 
Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation that Galileo rejected, and which rejection 
contemporary accounts have inherited. 
 
2.2 Definition of and Criteria for Scientific Explanations 
 To understand Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation it is first necessary to 
understand what he means by science.  Relevant to this dissertation is Aristotle’s use of 
epistêmê to refer to an organized body of knowledge because this sense of epistêmê is 
often understood as ‘science’ or ‘scientific knowledge’.  Ross (1949) defends interpreting 
Aristotle’s use of epistêmê to mean ‘scientific knowledge’:  “Posterior Analytics present 
his theory of scientific knowledge.  This, rather than ‘knowledge’ simply, is the right 
rendering of his word epistêmê; for while he would not deny that individual facts may be 
known, he maintains that epistêmê is of the universal” (p. 51).  Individual facts are 
necessary in Aristotle’s system for acquiring universals; however, individual facts are not 
the objects of scientific knowledge. 
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 Smith (1995) makes the case for a translation of epistêmê that differs from Ross 
insofar as it emphasizes the scale of knowledge epistêmê represents: 
 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, especially its first book, is concerned with 
knowledge in a precise sense, for which he uses the word epistêmê (one of 
several Greek words for knowledge). An epistêmê in this technical sense is 
a body of knowledge about some subject, organized into a system of 
proofs or demonstrations: a good modern equivalent is “science,” 
provided we drop its connotations of reliance on experimental method. (p. 
47, emphasis added) 
 
Smith points out that ‘epistêmê’ refers to a body of knowledge; the organization of this 
precise kind of knowledge is in “proofs and demonstrations.”  Demonstrations, which are 
scientific deductions, provide the explanatory power necessary for a scientific 
explanation by giving the underlying causes of natural phenomena.  Aristotle claims that 
‘understanding’ requires being able to demonstrate the underlying causes of natural 
phenomena.   
 In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle gives two conditions for scientific knowledge: 
“We think we understand something simpliciter when we think we know of the 
explanation because of which the object holds that it is its explanation, and also that it is 
not possible for it to be otherwise” (Barnes, trans., 1993, 71b9).  I follow Barnes’s 
analysis that Aristotle is providing the two necessary conditions for understanding that 
are also jointly sufficient, yielding the definition:  
 
a understands X =def a knows that Y is the explanation of X and 
a knows that X cannot be otherwise (Barnes, 1993, p. 91). 15
 
   
                                                 
15  Not all sets of necessary and sufficient conditions are definitional in Aristotle’s system. 
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Later I consider the question of what it means to know that X cannot be otherwise, but 
here I examine what it means for a to know that Y is the explanation of X.   
 Hankinson (1995) characterizes Aristotle’s scientific explanations as follows: 
 
To have scientific knowledge, then, is to have explanatory understanding: 
not merely to “know” a fact incidentally, to be able to assent to something 
which is true, but to know why it is a fact.  The proper function of science 
is to provide explanations, the canonical form of which is something like 
“Xs are F because they are G.” (p. 110) 
 
The explanations Hankinson refers to are exhibited, according to Aristotle, through 
demonstrations in the form of deductive syllogisms.16
 Aristotle is explicit that knowledge means acquaintance with principles and 
causes.  In Physics I.1 Aristotle says, “When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, 
have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge 
and understanding is attained” (Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 184a10).  In Metaphysics 
I.1, Aristotle further explains how knowledge and understanding come from learning 
causes: 
  These demonstrations have 
explanatory power because they give the cause, or the ‘why’, of a given phenomenon. 
But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather 
than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of 
experience (which implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on 
knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the latter do 
not. (Ross, trans., 1984, 981a23)  
 
Wisdom is a type of heightened knowledge or knowledge of generalities such as causes.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics VI.7, Aristotle adds that, “wisdom [sophia] must be intuitive 
                                                 
16   Hankinson (1995) points out that the importance of syllogisms is stressed in Aristotle’s writings about 
his scientific methodology, but this emphasis is not actually reflected in his science writings. 
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reason [nous] combined with scientific knowledge [epistêmê]—scientific knowledge of 
the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion” (Ross, trans., 
1980, 1141a18).  According to Aristotle, there are four kinds of causes, that is, four kinds 
of answers to ‘why’ questions—material, efficient, formal, and final.  Wisdom is about 
knowing the most important causes that explain why substances are the way they are.  
The most important cause is the telos; this is commonly translated as the final cause.  
Aristotle explains that wisdom requires knowing causes and first principles in 
Metaphysics I.1: 
 
all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the 
principles of things.  This is why, as has been said before, the man of 
experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception 
whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker 
than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of 
the nature of wisdom than the productive.  Clearly then wisdom is 
knowledge about certain causes and principles. (Ross, trans., 1984, 
981b26) 
 
 In the hierarchy of knowledge, abstract, theoretical knowledge is superior to 
practical knowledge.  The pursuit of the highest knowledge is the pursuit of the broadest 
explanatory principles, which are the most abstract and therefore the least pragmatically 
useful: 
 
At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common 
perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was 
something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior 
to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the 
necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally 
always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches 
of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already 
established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities 
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of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have 
leisure. (Metaphysics I.1, Ross, trans., 1984, 981b14) 
 
According to Aristotle, the pure sciences were discovered only after all the necessary 
inventions and technologies had been discovered.  Having attained such a high level of 
human comforts is, according to Aristotle, what allowed us the leisure time necessary for 
developing the sciences.  In defense of his position on the origin of science, Aristotle 
claims in Metaphysics I.1, that, “This is why the mathematical arts were founded in 
Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure” (Ross, trans., 1984, 
981b23).  The connection between academic investigation and leisure time is apparent in 
our diction.  The Greek word for ‘leisure’ is schole, which is the root of the English word 
‘scholar.’ 
 When Aristotle links leisure and discovery, it is due to his belief that all learning 
begins with sensory observation.  A philosopher needs time to observe nature as well as 
time to reason out nature’s first principles, which is to say that for Aristotle scientific 
discovery is grounded in observation. 
 Observations are of particulars; e.g. the leaves of a particular tree at a particular 
date and time.  However, scientific knowledge to Aristotle is not of particulars; it is of 
generalities, i.e. the universals, which are arrived at through observation of particulars.  In 
Posterior Analytics I.31, Aristotle gives the example of what we would know if we could 
observe the Earth during eclipses from the position of standing on the Moon: 
 
We would perceive that it is now eclipsed but not why; for we have seen 
that there is no perception of universals.  Nevertheless, if we observed this 
happening often and then hunted for the universal, we would possess a 
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demonstration; for it is from many particulars that the universal becomes 
plain.17
 
 (Barnes, trans., 1993, 88a2) 
The path of explanation is, however, in the opposite direction of the path of discovery.  
For Aristotle, the path of discovery is from what is more familiar to us, e.g. our particular 
observations, to what is more knowable in itself, e.g. universals.  However, this does not 
mean that explanations are demonstrations from the universal to particular observations.  
Particulars are not elements of demonstrative syllogisms, even though the whole idea is 
for universal conclusions to embrace the particulars.  The path of explanation is from 
higher-order to derivative universals and only then, contingently, to particulars.  Thus, 
even though the universal is what explains the particulars, having knowledge of the 
demonstrations does not entail that someone know all of the particulars that are supposed 
to be explained by the scientific knowledge.18
 In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle lays out six criteria that are the framework for 
demonstrations.  In this framework, demonstrations are a subset of deductions, 
  Knowing what Aristotle thinks are not the 
proper elements of demonstrations is a first step to understanding his concept of 
explanation.  Next I will examine Aristotle’s six conditions of a proper scientific 
demonstration. 
                                                 
17 What Aristotle means by the claim that the universal becomes clear “from many particulars” is 
controversial. Aristotle’s term for this kind of inference is epaĝogê and it is not clear whether Aristotle 
conceives of the move from particulars to universals as induction (in the classical sense), as Crombie 
(1953) suggests, or if epaĝogê is too vague in Aristotle’s corpus to be determined, as Smith (1995) claims, 
or if it is some other non-inferential process that is just a fact about how noûs works, as Hankinson (1995) 
convincingly argues. See discussion below. 
18 Aristotle makes this point in Posterior Analytics I.1: Knowing that all Fs are Gs, i.e. having the 
demonstration that all Fs are Gs, does not entail that someone knows of any given object X, that it is an F 
and hence G, even though she knows that if X is an F, then it is G. 
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specifically, scientific deductions.  These six conditions are necessary and sufficient for a 
deductive syllogism to be a scientific deduction and hence a demonstration:   
 
. . . we say now that we do know through demonstration.  By demonstration I 
mean a scientific deduction; and by scientific I mean one in virtue of which, 
by having it, we understand something.  If, then, understanding is as we 
posited, it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to 
depend on things which are (i) true and (ii) primitive and (iii) immediate and 
(iv) more familiar than and (v) prior to and (vi) explanatory of the conclusion 
(for in this way the principle will also be appropriate to what is being 
proved).  For there will be deduction even without these, but there will not be 
demonstration; for it will not produce understanding. (Barnes, trans., 1984, 
71b18-25, enumeration added) 
 
Aristotle points out that condition (i) is obvious because it is not possible to have 
knowledge of that which is not true.  Conditions (ii) and (iii) are less obvious; at 71b22 
Aristotle lists them as ‘primitive’ (prôtos) and ‘immediate’ (amesos); however, when he 
lists the conditions again in the course of explaining them at 71b27, Aristotle says that 
demonstrations proceed from premises which are ‘primitive’ (prôtos) and 
‘indemonstrable’ (anapodeiktos), which raises the question of the connection between 
these three terms.19
 Ross (1949) and Hankinson (1995) support the view that the terms of conditions 
(ii) and (iii) are coextensive.  Ross (1949) asserts that what Aristotle means by the terms 
  Furthermore, because Aristotle says at 72a8 that he treats primitives 
and principles as the same, it is reasonable to treat Aristotle’s use of ‘primitive’, 
‘immediate’, and ‘indemonstrable’ as coextensive (Barnes, 1993, p. 94).  If Barnes is 
correct, then all three of these terms serve to identify the same premises to be suitable in 
scientific demonstrations.   
                                                 
19 Some translators use ‘primary’ in place of ‘primitive’; these are simply alternative translations of prôtos. 
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‘primitive’ and ‘immediate’ is that they both require premises in demonstrations to be 
indemonstrable.  Hankinson (1995) argues along different lines from Ross, but also 
supports the view that conditions (ii) and (iii) are coextensive:  
 
for a proposition (“all As are Bs”) to be primary is for there to be no 
further propositions of which it is a deductive consequence, and which 
serve to explain why it is the case.  That means (in Aristotle’s terms) that 
there is no middle term C such that all As are Cs and all Cs are Bs (where 
A’s being C explains its being B)—and that is what it is for a proposition 
to be immediate. (pp. 109-10)  
 
By showing that Aristotle’s terms ‘primary’ and ‘immediate’ do the same work in 
Aristotle’s definition of scientific explanation, Hankinson shows that these conditions 
“amount to the same thing.” 
 Condition (iv) requires that the premises of demonstrations be more familiar, i.e. 
knowable than that which is being demonstrated.  Aristotle’s distinction is between that 
which is more knowable to us in the sense of being more apparent to us versus that which 
is more knowable in itself.  Aristotle says that in the search for scientific knowledge we 
begin with what is more familiar or apparent to us, but less knowable in itself, and we 
move from there to what is less well known or obvious to us, but what is most knowable 
in itself (Posterior Analytics I.2, 71b33ff; Metaphysics VII.3, 1029b3-12).  The 
expression “what is most knowable in itself” refers to universals, the higher-order 
generalizations, which have the greatest epistemic warrant.  However, knowledge of 
universals is more remote to us because we cannot experience universals as such, only 
particulars (Posterior Analytics I.31, 87b28-33).  Even though the content of our 
observations and experiences may seem more epistemically certain per se, Aristotle 
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argues that this kind of knowledge cannot be scientific knowledge.  
 In addition to the requirement of condition (iv) that premises be of higher degrees 
of epistemic warrant than the conclusions, Aristotle may also be making a further, 
psychological requirement of the audience of demonstrations. In Posterior Analytics I.2. 
Aristotle says:  
 
Anyone who is going to possess understanding through a demonstration 
must not only get to know the principles better and be better convinced of 
them than he is of what is being proved: in addition, there must be no 
other item more convincing to him or more familiar among the opposites 
of the principles from which a deduction of the contrary error may 
proceed—given that anyone who understands anything simpliciter must be 
incapable of being persuaded to change his mind. (Barnes, trans., 1993, 
72a39-72b3) 
 
Aristotle could be understood to be requiring that audiences also be more convinced of 
the premises of demonstrations in order to be convinced of the conclusions.  This is a 
difficult requirement because it is not clear how we move from being most convinced of 
that which is more familiar to us, such as the particulars that we observe, to becoming 
more convinced of the principles which have greater epistemic warrant, but which are 
more removed from our experience. 
 Conditions (v) and (vi) require that demonstrations proceed from premises that 
are prior to and explanatory of what is being demonstrated.  Although in different places 
he discusses different senses of priority, by ‘prior’ here Aristotle means that the premises 
must be prior to the conclusions in the order of knowledge.  A is prior in knowledge to B 
in the case that in order to know B we must know A, but having knowledge of A does not 
require having knowledge of B (Barnes, 1993).  Hankinson (1995) links the conditions of 
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priority and explanation even more closely:  “some property F is prior to G in this sense 
just in case something’s being G is explained by its being F” (p.110).  Hence, 
demonstrations must proceed from premises that are explanatory of the conclusion 
because, in Aristotle’s system, one cannot have scientific knowledge of P unless one 
knows what explains P.   
 Aristotle claims that there can be a deduction without these six conditions being 
satisfied however, there cannot be a demonstration of scientific knowledge because 
without satisfying the six conditions, there cannot be a scientific explanation.  In 
Posterior Analytics II.16, Aristotle illustrates this point with the phenomenon of 
deciduousness.  Keep in mind that a deduction that is also a demonstration and hence a 
scientific explanation is one where the middle term is properly explanatory of the 
explanandum.  At 98b6 Aristotle gives the following demonstration: 
 
(A) All broad-leaved trees are deciduous 
 All Vines are broad-leaved 
thus, All Vines are deciduous. 
 
Aristotle claims that deduction A is a demonstration, and hence a scientific explanation, 
because it answers a ‘why’ question: Why are all vines deciduous?  Aristotle’s answer is 
that vines are deciduous because they are broad-leaved and broad-leaved trees are 
deciduous.  The middle term ‘broad-leaved’ explains why ‘deciduous’ holds of ‘vines’.  
This means that Aristotle believes that ‘broad-leaved’ must give at least one of the “four 
causes”.  In this case, the fact that vines are broad-leaved is the formal cause of vines 
being deciduous because it is the form of broad leaves that facilitates their activity of 
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shedding.  Aristotle contrasts deduction A with deduction B, which uses the same terms 
rearranged: vines; deciduous, and broad-leaved, but which deduction Aristotle argues is 
not a proper explanation. 
 
(B) All deciduous trees are broad-leaved 
 All Vines are deciduous  
thus, All Vines are broad-leaved. 
 
This is a deduction that proves the fact that vines are broad-leaved, but it is not a 
demonstration of scientific knowledge according to Aristotle because it does not explain 
the explanandum; i.e. deduction B does not explain why vines are broad-leaved.  In other 
words, deduction B does not give one of the four causes.  Aristotle further clarifies the 
distinction between deductions that prove a fact versus deductions that are 
demonstrations of scientific knowledge by showing that one can determine which of the 
possible premises produced from the same terms in a syllogism is explanatory and hence 
prior in the order of knowledge.  Presumably, trees are not broad-leaved because they are 
deciduous; instead, they are deciduous because they are broad-leaved.  Thus, the fact that 
vines are broad-leaved can be deduced from knowing that they are deciduous but not why 
they are broad-leaved.  On the other hand, the explanation for why vines are deciduous 
can be deduced from the knowledge that all broad-leaved trees are deciduous (and that 
vines are broad-leaved).  This also illustrates what Aristotle means by ‘prior’ in the order 
of knowledge (condition v above). 
 Hankinson (1995: 112) points out that deduction A is not really fully explanatory 
either, because presumably there is a further explanation as to why broad-leaved trees are 
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deciduous.  In Posterior Analytics II.16-17, Aristotle gives another example of a 
deduction concerning deciduousness that gives an explanation: 
 
 (C) All sap-coagulators are deciduous 
 All broad-leaved trees are sap-coagulators 
thus, All broad-leaved trees are deciduous. 
 
Like deduction A, deduction C is also a demonstration and hence a scientific explanation, 
according to Aristotle, because it answers a ‘why’ question: Why are broad-leaved trees 
deciduous?  Aristotle’s answer is that broad-leaved trees are deciduous because they are 
sap-coagulators.  If sap coagulation explains why broad-leaved trees are deciduous and 
broad-leaved trees being deciduous explains why vines are deciduous, then it would seem 
that sap coagulation causing deciduousness is prior in the order of knowledge to the 
knowledge that all broad-leaved trees are deciduous, and hence more explanatory 
according to Aristotle.  If the proposition that all sap-coagulators are deciduous is more 
explanatory of why vines are deciduous than the proposition that all broad-leaved trees 
are deciduous, then Aristotle’s example (deduction A) does not meet his own criteria for 
a full scientific explanation.  It looks like Aristotle’s conditions for a scientific 
explanation may be difficult to implement because, although we can make reasonable 
guesses about when a deduction is answering a ‘why’ question, it remains problematic, or 
at least difficult, to know if a particular deduction marks the end of the chain of 
deductions. 
 There are at least two possible ways of addressing the apparent problem of 
whether Aristotle’s example deduction A, given the existence of deduction C, meets his 
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own conditions for a demonstration and hence scientific knowledge.  First, if deductions 
A and C answer different ‘why’ questions, that is, if their explanatory power comes from 
identifying different causes from among the four causes, then there would not be the 
apparent problem of having multiple explanations for the same phenomenon in the same 
context.  Deduction A gives the formal cause of vines being deciduous: they are broad-
leaved.  Aristotle spends less time discussing the example deduction C and it is less clear 
which of the four causes it gives.  In one sense deduction C is identifying a material cause 
because sap is the material in leaf stems that freezes and breaks.  On the other hand, 
deduction C might give the efficient cause of deciduousness because leaf falling occurs 
as a result of the event of freezing, or freezing and breaking. 
 The second possible answer to the question of what effect deduction C has on 
whether deduction A is a full scientific explanation, according to Aristotle, is that 
deduction A is not fully explanatory.  Although Aristotle proposes deduction A as an 
example of a scientific explanation, if deduction C does explain deciduousness further 
(i.e. rely on knowledge prior to the knowledge necessary for deduction A, then once we 
are aware of deduction C, we must retract the claim that deduction A satisfies Aristotle’s 
conditions.20
  A partial remedy for the difficulty of satisfying the conditions of scientific 
explanations in the Posterior Analytics may be found in Topics I.1, where Aristotle 
  
                                                 
20 There may be a third possibility. In Posterior Analytics II.17 Aristotle asks, “What is shedding leaves? – 
The solidifying of the sap at the connection of the seed” (Barnes, trans., 1993, 99a26).  Hence, while in one 
sense deduction C seems to be a demonstration about deciduousness that relies on a universal prior in the 
order of knowledge, there is another sense in which deduction C, by supplying the definition for the key 
term “deciduousness” may be thought of as relying on a universal that is neither prior nor posterior to the 
knowledge necessary for deduction A. 
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claims, “It is a demonstration, when the premises from which the deduction starts are true 
and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through 
premises which are primitive and true” (Pickard-Cambridge, trans., 1984, 100a27).  Thus, 
in the Topics, Aristotle is clearer that every demonstration need not come from a 
science’s first principles directly, as long as the principles that are used in the premises of 
the demonstration are the explanatory first principles of the phenomena being explained 
within a particular science.  It is some evidence, but perhaps not much, for this second 
interpretation that Aristotle gives as an example of a demonstration deduction A, above.  
 Elucidating Aristotle’s discussion of his conditions for scientific explanations is a 
first step, to further understand Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation it will be 
helpful to examine some of Aristotle’s actual scientific explanations.  Next I turn to 
examining two cases from Aristotle’s science writings in order to further understand his 
methodology and to see how closely he applies that methodology to his own 
investigations, which will give some insight into the potential difficulties of Aristotle’s 
theory. 
 
2.3 Two Case Studies: Violent Motion and the Rainbow 
 
Violent Motion 
 The case study of violent motion illustrates Aristotle’s concept of scientific 
explanation through examining Aristotle’s views of locomotion—natural and unnatural.  
Aristotle says in Physics VII.1 that “Everything that is in motion must be moved by 
something” (Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 241b34).  Aristotle claims that every object 
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in motion either has a source of motion within itself, as natural bodies do, or is moved by 
something else.  Self-movers can stay in motion as long as they have a principle of 
motion within them and are not impeded, but non-self-movers must necessarily stop 
moving when the thing that is moving them stops moving (Physics VIII.4, 255b12).  
 Aristotle’s distinction between self-movers and non-self-movers does not divide 
the world into two distinct groups: objects may be self-movers in one direction or one 
respect, but non-self-movers in another.  The four terrestrial elements of earth, air, fire, 
and water offer simple examples of this in Aristotle’s system.  For example, when fire 
moves upward, it is because it is a self-mover; it has the principle of moving upward and 
actualizes it.  Upward motion is natural for fire and so will occur whenever not impeded 
from doing so by an external object or agent (Physics VIII.4, 256a2).  However, fire is a 
non-self-mover in the downward direction so if fire is made to move downward, it will 
stop moving downward when the thing that is moving it downward stops doing so. A 
more common example of non-self-movement is that any heavy object, such as a ball or 
stone, being projected upward contrary to its natural motion, which is down. 
 The way Aristotle presents his ideas about non-self-movers could be taken as an 
empirical claim that non-self-moving objects always stop moving when their movers stop 
moving them.  To understand this claim, we would have to be able to distinguish between 
self and non-self-movers, and when a given body stops moving, we would have to be 
able to determine whether it was because an external mover had stopped moving it or 
rather because the body was a self-mover that was being impeded by an external body.  
Being able to distinguish these traits and causes is what would allow  someone to make 
 
 32 
the observations necessary to come to Aristotle’s conclusion about the causes of motion 
in bodies. 
 However, the extreme difficulty of making these kinds of empirical observations 
suggests that Aristotle came by another route to his conclusion that everything either 
moves itself or is moved by something else.  Aristotle argues that any object that is in 
motion that is not moving itself must be being moved by something else.  Aristotle’s 
reasoning is that if a body does not move itself and nothing else moves it, then it would 
not be in motion.  However, this line of reasoning is based on the assumption, either 
explicit or perhaps implicitly made as a part of one’s worldview, that there is necessarily 
a cause to the motion of a body because the default state of bodies is rest.  If there were 
one or some bodies that were in motion by nature, Aristotle’s assumption that rest does 
not need explaining but motion does would not be justified.  Aristotle’s assumption may 
appear to be an empirically grounded one; however, it is no easier to empirically test the 
hypothesis that rest is primary than it is to test the hypothesis that motion is primary.  It 
would be a mistake to assume that whatever seems more intuitive is thereby empirically 
based.  We have intuitions based on false understanding of the physical world and 
incorrectly interpret physical phenomena with great ease.  The great difficulty Aristotle 
has explaining why heavy objects continue to move unnaturally after they have left the 
thrower’s hand reveals the problematic nature of Aristotle’s assumption. 
 To further shed light on Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation it is helpful 
to examine how Aristotle uses the idea that everything that moves is either moved by 
itself or by something else as a fundamental principle upon which other demonstrations 
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can be based.  For example, by using Aristotle’s definition of first principles we can 
evaluate whether his idea of the causes of motion is indemonstrable, or if instead, 
perhaps, there is another more primitive principle of Aristotle’s theory of motion (e.g. the 
Prime Mover—that which moves others without being moved itself).  Aristotle’s theory 
of motion addresses the question of the origin and role of the Prime Mover, which is 
particularly useful for highlighting some of Aristotle’s trouble in applying his own 
scientific method.   
 Understanding the role of the Prime Mover is critical because if it is a first 
principle that everything moved is moved by something else, then Aristotle’s reductio in 
Physics VII.1 is valid.  Aristotle argues that an absurdity results from assuming that there 
is not a prime mover because in that case there would be an infinite regress of bodies 
being moved by other bodies (242b15).  This argument by itself does not yield a single 
prime mover, but it does produce at least one and allows for any number of unmoved 
movers.  However, this argument would be different if Aristotle were first committed to 
the existence of the Prime Mover and only secondarily asserted that everything moved is 
moved by something in order to justify his having posited the existence of the Prime 
Mover, because then the Prime Mover would be a straightforward logical necessity.21
                                                 
21 Sorabji (1988) argues that Aristotle might be committed to the Prime Mover before he is committed to 
his principle of the causes of motion. This alternative view of the role of the Prime Mover is discussed 
below. 
  If 
the theory were that all motion is caused by an external mover, then the Prime Mover 
would be a logical necessity in order to prevent an infinite regress.  However, once 
Aristotle allows for self-movers, the picture becomes less clear.  For instance, it is less 
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clear why a Prime Mover is needed if every natural object is a self-mover.  This might 
support the idea that Aristotle is first committed to the existence of the Prime Mover and 
then to his theory of motion secondly. 
 Another possibility that might suggest that the Prime Mover serves a logical 
necessity instead of being a primary commitment of Aristotle’s can be seen in Aristotle’s 
definition of motion in Physics III.1 as the actuality of potentiality as such (201a11).  
Within this definition, motion means that something with the potential to move is 
actualizing that potential.  Since actuality must logically but not temporally precede 
potentiality, all things that move have potentiality, and so there must be something that is 
purely actual at which they aim or nothing could ever move.  Hence, the Prime Mover is 
pure actuality. 
 Aristotle encounters a problem to his theory of motion when he considers 
projectile motion.  Again, Aristotle’s view is that objects that move themselves (i.e. self-
movers) are natural objects and can only move themselves according to their nature.  In 
Nicomachean Ethics II.1, Aristotle says that whatever is by nature cannot be habituated 
against its nature.  He uses an example of a stone.  If one were to throw the stone upward 
(contrary to its natural motion) 10,000 times, the stone would never move by its own 
impetus in any direction but downward.  The fact that self-movers can only move 
themselves according to their nature creates the following problem: Aristotle cannot use 
the explanation that the javelin is a self-mover to explain why the javelin continues to 
move horizontally or upward (both are contrary to its nature) after the javelin has left the 
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hand of the Olympian.  Although the javelin is still in motion after leaving the hand of the 
Olympian, it is always slowing down along the component of unnatural motion. 
 In Physics V.6, Aristotle tries to address this problem by saying, “But what is 
coming to a stop moves ever faster, while that which is moving unnaturally moves ever 
slower” (Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 230b21).  The phrase “what is coming to a stop” 
refers to natural bodies moving by locomotion towards their natural places, such as 
earthen objects falling toward the center of the universe.  For example, heavy objects 
accelerate as they move downward, but when thrown upward they continually decelerate 
until they stop moving unnaturally, then they accelerate continually in their natural 
direction until they are impeded by something keeping them from moving lower, or until 
they arrive at their natural place. 22
                                                 
22 It is less clear what Aristotle thinks about heavy objects moving horizontally.  Presumably horizontal 
here means parallel to the ideal earth’s surface.  One possibility is that horizontal motion is not actively un-
natural for a heavy object—in other words, since horizontal motion is not exactly contrary to downward 
motion, it is neutral with respect to heavy bodies. Another possibility is that Aristotle thinks that any 
motion other than an object’s natural motion is unnatural motion.  In this case, horizontal motion as well as 
upward motion Aristotle would consider unnatural motion.  In De Caelo I.2. Aristotle says, “By constraint, 
of course, it may be brought to move with the motion of something else different from itself, but it cannot 
so move naturally, since there is one sort of movement natural to each of the simple bodies.  Again, if the 
unnatural movement is the contrary of the natural and a thing can have no more than one contrary, it will 
follow that circular movement, being a simple motion, must be unnatural, if it is not natural, to the body 
moved.  If then the body whose movement is circular is fire or some other element, its natural motion must 
be the contrary of the circular motion.  But a single thing has a single contrary; and upward and downward 
motion are the contraries of one another” (Stocks, trans., 1984, 269a7-13).  Since Aristotle knows the earth 
is spherical, he might accept that horizontal motion is circular motion and is thereby unnatural for heavy 
bodies.  However, there is no reason to think that Aristotle viewed horizontal motion this way, so it is just 
as likely that Aristotle regards horizontal motion as neutral to heavy bodies as it is that he thinks horizontal 
motion is unnatural. Although this is controversial, Aristotle appears to occasionally use ‘unnatural’ to 
mean simply ‘not natural’ for the body in question’ but not necessarily contrary to its nature: cf. De Caelo 
III.2, 300a20-7; Simplicius in his commentary makes use of the distinction on Aristotle’s behalf – see his 
commentary on Cael. I.2 (Hankinson, personal communication, 2009). 
  Aristotle’s explanation for why heavy objects 
decelerate as they move upward is that this kind of motion for these kinds of objects is 
unnatural.  But, given that the motion is unnatural, the question arises of why objects 
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continue moving contrary to nature at all when they are no longer being propelled by an 
external mover. 
 In Physics IV.8, Aristotle attempts to address how objects can move contrary to 
nature when he argues that any body in motion must be moving through some medium, 
(i.e. there cannot be a separately existing void).  Aristotle says that all media resist bodies 
to some extent (Physics, IV.8).  Aristotle claims that the speed with which a body travels 
is proportional to the ratio between the motive force or impulse and the weight or 
thickness of the medium (215b1).  Aristotle further argues that one of the impossibilities 
that would result if there were a void is that a body unimpeded would continue moving 
forever.  “Further, no one could say why a thing once set in motion [in a void] should 
stop anywhere; for why should it stop here rather than here? So that a thing will either be 
at rest or must be moved ad infinitum, unless something more powerful gets in its way” 
(Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 215a19-21).23
 Aristotle offers several arguments for the impossibility of void.  One such 
argument claims that motion is impossible in a void because, since a void is unchanging 
and is everywhere the same, objects in that void could not change with respect to the 
void—changing with respect to a frame of reference is what motion is—hence no motion 
in a void (214b30).  Another argument for the impossibility of void says that if there were 
a void, then motion in the void would necessarily be instantaneous because there would 
be zero resistance against the motion (215b23).  However, the idea of instantaneous 
   
                                                 
23 It is historically interesting that Aristotle seems to be arguing from something like the impossibility of 
inertia because it is the concept of inertia developed in the 17th century, as codified by Newton, that fully 
resolves the javelin problem. 
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motion is absurd; Aristotle calls it an impossibility, thus, by modus tollens, there cannot 
be void.  So we see that Aristotle’s understanding of motion requires that bodies can only 
move while a motive force is acting, and motion is only possible in the presence of a 
resisting medium. 
 Returning to the example of the javelin, in Physics IV. 8, Aristotle sets up a 
dichotomy between what he sees as the two possible explanations for the unnatural 
movement of the javelin: “Projectiles in fact continue to move when that which propelled 
them is no longer in contact with them, either by virtue of mutual replacement, or 
because the air propelled behind them propels them with a movement quicker than their 
natural movement to their own place” (215a14).  “Mutual replacement” refers to the idea 
of antiperistasis.24
 The second possible explanation that Aristotle considers is that the air is briefly 
endowed with the ability to impel the projectile by the same impetus that initially pushed 
the projectile (Physics, VIII.10, 267a5).  Aristotle draws an analogy to how magnets give 
magnetic properties to metal objects (Physics, VIII.10, 267a2).  A piece of metal 
touching a magnet will act as a magnet to a second piece of metal as long as the first 
piece of metal is touching the magnet. The analogy falls short, however, if we consider 
that the magnet is constantly acting on the first magnetized object, which is attracting the 
  The dynamic sense of antiperistasis that Aristotle is concerned with 
here is the idea that air being pushed out of the way by a projectile rushes to fill the space 
behind the projectile and in doing so pushes the projectile.   
                                                 
24 There are two distinct notions of antiperistasis:  One sense is merely meant to explain how motion is 
possible in a plenum, but it does not give a dynamic cause of motion. The second sense, which Aristotle is 
concerned with here, is meant to give a dynamical explanation of unnatural motion. The idea here of the 
latter is that the medium actually imparts impetus to the projectile.   
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second piece of metal.  The analogy falls short because, in the case of the magnet chain, 
the first magnet is always working through whatever it is touching.  This is not the case 
with the javelin.  Once the Olympian has released the javelin, the Olympian (or 
Olympian’s arm) can no longer be doing any work on the javelin in Aristotle’s system.  A 
preferable analogy might be one where the first mover imparts the ability to move for a 
short time after the first mover has stopped moving.  Perhaps an object fixed to a loaded 
spring is a closer analogy. 
 In his demonstration, Aristotle treats antiperistasis and the air becoming a mover 
as the only two possible resolutions of the problem of unnatural motion.  If this were an 
exhaustive list as Aristotle implies, Aristotle would only need to show that one possibility 
is false in order to demonstrate the veracity of the other possible explanation.  This kind 
of disjunctive syllogism is often used by Aristotle.25
                                                 
25 For example see the discussion below of Aristotle’s explanation for the cause of thunder in Meteorology 
II.9, where Aristotle argues for his theory by eliminating what he assumes are the only two possible 
alternatives. 
  However, if another possibility 
exists, then Aristotle’s argument fails because he fails to account for all possibilities, i.e. 
the disjunction will not be exhaustive.  For instance, another possibility is that, rather 
than the Olympian imparting the quality of being a mover to the air behind the javelin, 
the Olympian imparts the property of being a mover directly to the javelin, which then 
becomes a self-mover for a time.  Since the javelin is by nature a self-mover downward, 
the Olympian would briefly impart the ability to be an upward self-mover to the javelin.  
This possible explanation for the javelin continuing to move unnaturally after leaving the 
hand of the Olympian maintains the same basic form of Aristotle’s solution (that the air 
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behind the projectile becomes a mover):  both explanations consist of transference of self 
-motive capacity from the Olympian to something else.  This possibility that Aristotle 
does not consider would seem to be a neater resolution than Aristotle’s because it is more 
direct, giving the self-moving ability directly to the javelin instead of to the air, a third 
thing that has to keep moving the javelin.  Another advantage of this possibility not 
considered by Aristotle is that it would not be susceptible to Philoponus’ 
counterargument.26
 John Buridan (1300-1358 C.E.) raises the question of why Aristotle did not 
consider the apparent problem that under his system, air both resists and propels bodies: 
air resists insofar as it is dense, as all media resist motion, and propels insofar as the 
property of being a mover of javelins is transferred to it by the Olympian’s arm (Dugas, 
1998).  The implication of this is that when the air becomes a self-mover of the javelin, it 
must push the javelin against itself, i.e. more air.  Aristotle may begin to address this 
concern in De Caelo III.2, where he explains how it is that air helps move things both up 
and down.  “For air is both light and heavy, and thus qua light produces upward motion, 
being propelled and set in motion by the force, and qua heavy produces a downward 
motion” (Stocks, trans., 1984, 310b23).  In his discussion about how the Olympian 
imparts to the air the ability to continue to move the javelin unnaturally, Aristotle does 
  Philoponus’ counterargument to Aristotle rests on the common 
experience of the inability of people to push air fast enough to generate the kinds of force 
necessary to propel a javelin or other projectiles at great speed. 
                                                 
26 John Philoponus (c. 490-570) commentated on Aristotle’s Physics and articulated impetus theory, which 
claims that the thrower temporarily imparts the ability to be a self-mover to the javelin.  Impetus theory was 
a precursor to the 17th century theory of inertia (Drake, 1970). 
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not explain just what it is about air that gives it the potential to become a mover of 
javelins.  Aristotle speaks in general terms about the problem of unnatural motion, so it 
seems very likely that it is not a property of air as such that allows it to become a mover, 
but that air is a medium through which objects move.  Water must also work the same 
way that air does.  Air helps things move up and down because it is heavy and light.   
 The root of the problem Buridan points out may also be the solution to another 
apparent problem: if the air becomes a mover of the javelin, why does the air stop 
moving the javelin, i.e. why does the javelin slow down?  If Buridan is right that in 
Aristotle’s system the air is ultimately pushing against itself, then perhaps this is why the 
javelin slows down along the unnatural direction of motion.  The air is losing its ability to 
move the javelin because it is working against itself.  
 
The Rainbow 
 Evaluating Aristotle’s treatment of meteorological phenomena provides additional 
insight into his concept of scientific demonstration.  Aristotle says that each of the 
phenomena—halos, rainbows, mock suns, and rods—is a reflection.  Although these 
phenomena are all reflections, they exhibit differences which Aristotle accounts for 
through the different natures of different reflecting surfaces and the different bodies being 
reflected.  In Meteorology, III.2, Aristotle claims that: 
 
We must accept from the theory of optics the fact that sight is reflected 
from air and any object with a smooth surface just as it is from water; also 
that in some mirrors the shapes of things are reflected, in others only their 
colours.  Of the latter kind are those mirrors which are so small as to be 




This quotation introduces Aristotle’s first premise: vision is reflected from smooth 
surfaces such as air and water.27  This is an example of how Aristotle relies on facts from 
other sciences as principles in later investigations; here optics is the prior science.  So, 
from optics we accept that smoothness is responsible for reflection.  However, it is not 
clear that optics gives us mirrors “indivisible for sense.”  If Aristotle could prove the 
existence of tiny mirrors, then his argument would be sounder.  “Indivisible for sense” 
means something like undetectable by the senses—invisible.  The idea is that the mirrors 
are so small as not to present a surface which can be registered as being divisible by sight 
(if I see an ordinary mirror, I see its left side and its right side).  The existence of an 
invisible thing is not easily proven directly.  So it seems that Aristotle has derived or 
inferred the existence of invisible mirrors from the phenomena he is attempting to 
explain.28
                                                 
27 It is helpful to note that Aristotle’s theory of vision is not based on the idea that light, such as sunlight, is 
reflected off objects to the observer.  Instead, Aristotle has some other idea of what is transmitted between 
the object and the observer that gives one the mental images of objects. See De Anima II.6 and III.1. 
  Aristotle might be on firmer ground if he were to begin arguing for the 
existence of invisible mirrors based on the phenomena of rainbows, halos, etc. than he is 
when arguing for the existence of these phenomena based on the postulated fact of 
invisible mirrors.  We can hypothesize that Aristotle came to posit invisible mirrors by 
reasoning from the phenomena using something like evidence to the best or most 
28 The form of the argument here is the following: We observe some phenomenon F; we reason that F could 
only be the case if nature is G; hence, nature must be G.  This kind of argument can introduce error 
especially when there is no independent test that can corroborate nature’s being G.  We will see this kind of 
error elsewhere in Aristotle, Ptolemy, and the Aristotelians of Galileo’s time.  Moving away from this kind 




 In Meteorology, III.2, Aristotle argues: 
  Then in the Meteorology, we are given the demonstration of 
the phenomena, which proceeds in the opposite direction from the path of discovery.  For 
instance, Aristotle gives a mathematical demonstration of why halos are circles or 
segments of circles in Meteorology III.3 (373a2-a17) and a demonstration of why 
rainbows can never be greater than semicircles in III.5.  In these demonstrations nature is 
assumed to follow geometrical space; in other words, geometry is a prior science to the 
physical sciences. 
  
It is impossible that the shape of a thing should be reflected in them; for if 
it is the mirror will seem divisible—for every shape is at once a shape and 
divisible.  But since something must be reflected in them and shape cannot 
be, it remains that colour alone should be reflected. (Webster, trans., 1984, 
372b1) 
 
Here we are given the second premise of Aristotle’s argument: some mirrors, those 
indivisible for sense, reflect only color and not shape.  Aristotle concludes from the fact 
that they are mirrors and by definition must reflect something, but cannot reflect shape 
that they reflect color.  But Aristotle cannot intend this to be his argument because this 
line of reasoning would violate Aristotle’s requirement that explanations proceed from 
broader explanatory principles than the conclusion.  The indivisible mirrors do not reflect 
color because they must reflect something and cannot reflect shape.  The indivisible 
mirrors only reflect shape because they cannot reflect both color and shape the way 
divisible mirrors do.  Aristotle reasons from the geometrical fact that shapes are divisible 
                                                 
29 This process is very closely akin to analysis, which will be discussed at length below. 
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to the conclusion that if a shape is reflected then the reflecting surface must also be as 
divisible.    
 In Meteorology, III.2, Aristotle adds another component of reflections: 
 
The colour of a bright object sometimes appears bright in the reflection, 
but it sometimes, either owing to the admixture of the colour of the mirror 
or to weakness of sight, gives rise to the appearance of another colour. 
(Webster, trans., 1984, 372b6) 
 
Brightness now seems to be a third property that is reflected; it is reflected along with 
color.  Furthermore, Aristotle seems to be treating brightness as if it is itself another 
color, which would serve to explain why he does not treat it as a distinct property.  If it 
were just the intensity of the color that was reflected (that is, if the color of the incidence 
ray were always the same as the color of the reflected ray), it would not seem to be a third 
reflected property.  However, Aristotle claims that even though the brightness is 
reflected, sometimes the color of a bright object may be reflected as a different color.  
Aristotle attempts to account for the change in appearance of colors as being dependent 
on the amount of vapor causing the reflection; for example, “white color on a black 
surface or seen through a black medium gives red” (374b10).30
 
 
Since each of the mirrors is so small as to be invisible and what we see is 
the continuous magnitude made up of them all, the reflection necessarily 
gives us a continuous magnitude made up of one colour, each of the 
mirrors contributing the same colour to the whole. (Webster, trans., 1984, 
373b25)  
 
                                                 
30 Presumably Aristotle was also familiar with the phenomena of colored mirrors; however, he does not 
suggest that colored vapor is what causes the phenomena being considered here. 
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This gives us the conclusion to Aristotle’s argument: the rainbow is a reflection of 
sunlight in indivisible mirrors of water vapor or mist, each reflecting only a particular 
color, but the whole of which produces the rainbow’s arch and colors.  This explanation 
satisfies Aristotle’s requirement that there be no obvious impossibilities when explaining 
phenomena that are difficult to observe, a requirement he cites in Meteorology I.7: “We 
consider a satisfactory explanation of phenomena inaccessible to observation to have 
been given when our account of them is free from impossibilities” (Webster, trans., 1984, 
344a5).  However, Aristotle’s explanation of the rainbow does not exactly proceed by 
rigorous deductions and demonstrations as he describes in the Posterior Analytics. 
 Aristotle briefly addresses the colors of the rainbow.  He says there are three: red, 
green, and violet (374b30).  He adds that yellow can appear between the red and the 
green but this is just due to the contrast between red and green.  The reason the colors are 
in the order they are is, according to Aristotle, because of the impact the distance has on 
our sight, but this is not rigorously explained.  In Meteorology III.4 Aristotle appears to 
be suggesting that distance influences visions ability to detect color because colors that 
are farther away are fainter and cannot as easily penetrate brighter colors that are nearer 
to the observer. 
 In his discussion of the halo, Aristotle further explains how vapor reflects 
differently to produce different phenomena. 
 
Sight is reflected in this way when air and vapour are condensed into a 
cloud and the condensed matter is uniform and consists of small parts. 




The more mist the darker the halo; this is why halos around the Moon are more common 
than halos around the sun, namely, because the Sun evaporates more of the vapor near it 
because of its greater heat.  Since Aristotle does not think any of the four terrestrial 
elements reside in the vicinity of the heavenly bodies, the actual location of halos must be 
between the heavenly bodies and the observers on the ground.  However, the mist or 
vapors are close enough to the heavenly bodies to be affected by the heat of heavenly 
bodies. 
 One potential problem with Aristotle’s idea about halos is that, if the only factor 
contributing to the amount of mist around a heavenly body were how little heat it has, 
then we might expect even more mist, and thereby even darker halos around the stars 
than the Moon.  However, Aristotle says about stars that “the condensation they imply is 
so insignificant as to be barren” (373a27).  Apparently, heavenly bodies dissipate 
condensation both according to size and heat.  Presumably distance is also a factor, 
because halos cannot be proximate to heavenly bodies.  Aristotle may have a tacit idea of 
heat dissipation over distances.  It is not surprising that Aristotle would assume 
correlations among size, brightness, and heat.  This would capture why the stars have 
insignificant heat: compared to our observations of the Moon, they are of insignificant 
relative size.  Furthermore, condensation cannot just be due to relative distance either 
since the Sun is further away.31
                                                 
31  This case exemplifies the critical role that one’s theoretical framework plays in understanding 
observations. Aristotle’s demonstration of the effects that the heat of heavenly bodies has on 
meteorological phenomena such as rainbows and halos relies heavily on his beliefs about the composition 
of heavenly bodies, their distances and sizes, and heats, all of which are qualities that are difficult if not 
impossible to observe. The relationship between theoretical framework and observation is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
  This exemplifies both Aristotle’s reliance with 
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observation and the problem with relying on observation.  Relying solely on our 
observations is not perfect, however, because to the naked eye, the Sun and Moon appear 
to have equal diameters, although they do not give off the same amount of heat.  Hence 
there must be more factors in determining the heat of celestial bodies.   
 Aristotle argues that the reflecting body is condensed air and vapor.  These kinds 
of mirrors indivisible to sense have a rough composition and so they reflect only color.  
On the other hand, in Meteorology III.4, in his description of the reflective properties of 
smooth things, Aristotle says that air itself can be reflective, as in the case of the man 
whose sight is so weak that he always sees his own shape in front of him. 
 
Air must be condensed if it is to act as a mirror, though it often gives a 
reflection even uncondensed when the sight is weak.  Such was the case of 
a man whose sight was faint and indistinct.  He always saw an image in 
front of him and facing him as he walked.  This was because his sight was 
reflected back to him.  Its morbid condition made it so weak and delicate 
that the air close by acted as a mirror, just as distant and condensed air 
normally does, and his sight could not push it back. (Webster, trans., 1984, 
373a35-b10) 
 
Aristotle implies here that vision literally penetrates air, so the vision of healthy people, 
cuts through the air near them and nothing is reflected back.32
                                                 
32 Aristotle appears to be relying on some sort of visual ray theory here, but it is not clear that this is 
consistent with his more developed account of sight in De Anima II.6 and III.1 because there he claims that 
vision is not a matter of the eyes emitting something that is reflected back to them. 
  However, for the very 
weak-sighted man, even the thinnest air acted partly as a wall upon which his vision 
would bounce back at him.  Since this man is seeing a shape, these are not the same 
mirrors that cause the atmospheric phenomena Aristotle is talking about, which reflect 
 
 47 
only color and not shape.33
 Aristotle continues his halo discussion by stating that halos are reflections of light 
from the mist that forms around the heavenly bodies, or more accurately around the 
image we see of a heavenly body far removed from the body itself.  That we apparently 
see halos around heavenly bodies explains why halos are circular and not seen opposite 
the Sun the way rainbows are.  Aristotle’s demonstration of why the halo is circular is 
mathematical in form: 
 
 
Since the reflection takes place in the same way from every point the 
result is necessarily a circle or a segment of a circle; for if the lines start 
from the same point and end at the same point and are equal, the points 
where they form an angle will always lie on a circle. (Webster, trans., 
1984, 373a2) 
 




                                                 
33 Likewise, when calm, water reflects both color and shape, as it does in a pond.  When the water surface 
is calm, each point of water is even with or, in a sense, continuous with, every other point.  Only when 
water is rough or the medium is a combination of water and air, as it is in mist, are the conditions able to 
produce the right type of reflective objects for rainbows and halos. 
Observer     
Halo     
Moon   
Figure 2.1 
The dashed line represents light that travels straight from the Moon to the Observer. The Moon’s 
heat evaporates the mist directly in the path of the dashed line, giving the halo its washer shape. 
The solid lines represent oblique light from the Moon that is reflected by Mist back to the Observer. 
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Aristotle’s explanation for the circularity of halos hinges on his being able to apply the 
geometrical definition or construction of a circle to physical observations.  Insofar as any 
halo is circular, then, it will have all the geometrical properties of circles.  Thus, we will 
be able to construct demonstrations about its properties (conditional upon how closely it 
approximates a circle).  
 Aristotle also uses observations about the dispersal effect that wind has on halos 
as evidence for the composition of halos and the other reflective phenomena.  Aristotle 
reports that when the wind comes from the direction of the observer to the halo, the wind 
is felt before the halo is dispersed; when the halo disperses first, the observer is sure to 
feel a wind coming from the direction of the halo soon.  Aristotle argues that the 
connection between wind and halos is strong enough to enable an observer to predict the 
rain based on what happens with a halo: 
 
Hence it is a sign of rain, but if it fades away, of fine weather, if it is 
broken up, of wind.  For if it does not fade away and is not broken up but 
is allowed to attain its normal state, it is naturally a sign of rain since it 
shows that a process of condensation is proceeding which must, when it is 
carried to an end, result in rain.  (Webster, trans., 1984, 372b15) 
 
Aristotle demonstrates that halos are closer to us than they are to the heavenly bodies 
that, from our perspective, due to the higher wind at higher altitudes, they appear to 
encircle.  Aristotle’s reasoning is that since wind disperses halos, halos must appear 
nearer to the ground, where the wind is calmer.  What is not clear is the order of 
explanation for these two phenomena: either Aristotle knows first that the wind is calmer 
nearer the ground and so this must be where halos are formed, or Aristotle knows first 
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that halos appear near the ground (for instance because mist is both air and water, and 
since water’s natural place is down, it could not be too far away), and so we know the 
winds are calmer closer to the ground because that is where halos are. 
 To envision the account that Aristotle gives about the appearance that halos 
encircle heavenly bodies though they are in fact much closer to us, imagine the rings of 
Saturn removed to a spot halfway between Saturn and the Earth but oriented such that 
they circumscribe the image of Saturn.  This model for the geometry of a halo is 
consistent with Aristotle’s account, but the problem with this representation of the halo is 
that the reflecting part of the mist would then have to be equidistant from both the 
observer and the object it appears to surround.  Furthermore, the reflecting mist-mirrors 
would need to be oriented perpendicular to the Earth’s surface which would work for the 
Moon, on Aristotle’s cosmic architecture, but not for anything else.  The point is that 
Aristotle’s mathematics is suggestive of an explanation, but ad hoc, and inconsistent with 
Aristotle’s own physical model of the heavens, which requires that the celestial bodies 
are much further away from Earth than twice as distant as the highest mist.34
 The meteorological phenomena discussion provides an example of Aristotle’s 
application of his theory of scientific demonstration.  One key feature to note is the way 
in which, in addition to relying on observation and inference, Aristotle’s demonstration 
relies on mathematics.  Specifically, in Aristotle’s demonstration of the properties of the 
halo the mathematical argument he applies is ad hoc because it does not apply to any of 
 
                                                 
34  Aristotle’s physics posit that the elements are arranged in a hierarchy with earth at the bottom, followed 
by, in equal parts, water, air, fire, and finally the ether. Mist is watery air, so it must be much closer to the 
surface of the Earth than the ethereal celestial bodies are to the mist. 
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the other similar meteorological phenomena nor even to other halo conditions (e.g. the 
angle of orientation to the heavenly bodies other than the Moon).  
 Consider Aristotle’s use of mathematics in his explanations about the properties 
of the rainbow: Aristotle argues that the greatest arch a rainbow can be is a semicircle 
when the Sun is at the horizon and only less than a semicircle when the Sun is above the 
horizon (371b26; 375b26).35
 Aristotle is right about the inverse correlation between the height of the Sun and 
the size of the arch of the rainbow.  However, without stating it, Aristotle’s 
demonstration of the cause of the angle measure of the rainbow tacitly assumes the law of 
  By demonstrating this proposition, Aristotle thinks he has 
shown why the rainbow cannot be greater than a semicircle.  Applied to the rainbow, the 
given ratio is comprised of the lengths from the Sun to the rainbow and from the rainbow 
to the observer.  As the Sun moves, this ratio remains constant and describes a circle.  
The circle described by this ratio is formed by a cone with the Sun at the apex.  One side 
of the cone connects the Sun to the observer; the other side of the cone connects the Sun 
to the circumference of the rainbow.  The first side of the cone also creates the diameter 
of the circle.  When the Sun is at the horizon, the lower side of the cone is the same line 
as the horizon line, so exactly half of the circle described by the rainbow is visible.  As 
the Sun moves, the diameter of the circle dips below the horizon line and thus the visible 
part of the circle described by the rainbow is less than a semicircle.  When the Sun is at 
the meridian, no rainbow is visible. 
                                                 
35 Heath (1949) claims that this proposition, which is not in Euclid but easily derivable from Elements  
VI.3, appeared in a now-lost treatise by Apollonius.  Apollonius’ proposition, recorded by Eutocius, says, 
“Given two points in a plane and a ratio between unequal straight lines, it is possible to describe a circle in 
the plane such that the straight lines inflected from the given points to the circumference of the circle shall 
have a ratio the same as the given one” (Heath, trans., 1949, p.181). 
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reflection—that the angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection.  This is what allows 
the exact inverse correlation in Aristotle’s model between the height of the Sun and the 
size of the arch of the rainbow.  Without this assumption, the demonstrated proposition 
above would not necessitate that the interaction between light and mist behave the way 
Aristotle requires.36
 Aristotle’s discussion of the rainbow also further reveals Aristotle’s practice of 
combining elements from different sciences in the mixed sciences including, of course, 
mathematics.  To learn about properties of the rainbow’s arch, it is possible that Aristotle 
began by observing the properties of this particular geometrical proposition
 
37
 Greater insight into Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation is gained by 
further examination of the role of mathematics in his scientific explanations.  Evidence 
for this claim comes from the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle 
argues that scientific knowledge is exhibited through successive deductive syllogisms, 
which meet the criteria for demonstrations, as discussed above. 
 and thereby 
inductively discovered the theorem that rainbows are never greater than semicircles and 
change inversely with the height of the sun.  It is more likely, however, that Aristotle 
knew the geometrical proposition first and then applied it to his observations because he 
would have already been aware of the geometrical proposition (Heath, 1949).     
                                                 
36 This broaches a question fundamental to scientific explanations, which Aristotle does not explicitly 
address.  Because the law of reflection cannot be determined a priori, Aristotle’s demonstration about the 
rainbow cannot have a greater level of epistemic justification than is warranted by the accuracy of the 
empirically determined law of reflection.  By not taking into account the relative levels of justification, 
Aristotle introduces a source of error.  This topic is discussed later in chapter 2 and in chapter 5. 
37 This refers to the proposition given, above, that enabled Aristotle to demonstrate the relationship between 
the angle of the Sun and the degree measure of the rainbow: “Given two points in a plane and a ratio 
between unequal straight lines, it is possible to describe a circle in the plane such that the straight lines 
inflected from the given points to the circumference of the circle shall have a ratio the same as the given 




All teaching and all learning of an intellectual kind proceed from pre-
existent knowledge.  This will be clear if we study all the cases: the 
mathematical sciences are acquired in this way, and so is each of the other 
arts. (Barnes, trans., 1993, 71a1,)38
 
  
So we see that there is an important connection between the study of mathematics and the 
other the sciences.  Smith (1995) highlights the connection. 
 
Aristotle’s model for a science was the mathematical disciplines of 
arithmetic and geometry, which in his time were already being presented 
as systematic series of deductions from basic first principles. (p. 47) 
 
In some cases epistemically certain first principles can be borrowed from the 
mathematical sciences, but of course, the empirical sciences will still need empirical 
input.  To better understand Aristotle’s concept of scientific demonstration, the next 
section more closely examines Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, in particular the 
way in which mathematics can inform demonstrations of scientific knowledge in 
Aristotle’s empirical sciences. 
 
2.4 Philosophy of Mathematics: How Mathematical Propositions Inform
 Demonstrations in the Empirical Sciences 
 
 The general question in this chapter is what constitutes a scientific demonstration 
for Aristotle.  In particular, we are interested in what counts as a demonstration in the 
empirical sciences, as opposed to the purely mathematical sciences.  Because Aristotle 
                                                 
38 As the opening lines of Posterior Analytics this grand statement is characteristic of Aristotle’s exordia.  
See the beginning statements of the Physics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics among others. 
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holds up the mathematical sciences as a paradigm for demonstrating scientific 
knowledge, it is important to consider what the differences are between studying 
mathematics and studying nature.  This will help address the question of how 
demonstrations of natural phenomena might need to be different from mathematical 
demonstrations.  Although, in Aristotle’s system, all sensible, and some non-sensible, 
objects are the combination of form and matter, the nature of this combination in 
mathematical objects is different from that of the objects of the empirical sciences. 
 
The next point to consider is how the mathematician differs from the 
student of nature; for natural bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines 
and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics. (Physics II.2, 
Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 193b23) 
 
There is a sense in which the material cause of ‘triangle’ is ‘plane figure’, and in this 
sense the mathematician is concerned with the matter of mathematical objects and how 
they are formed.  However, since experience implies sensation, it is apparent that we can 
only experience mathematical objects that are instantiated in the same matter that 
comprises all terrestrial objects: earth, air, fire, water.  However, this kind of matter is 
only incidental to mathematical objects, all that matters for geometrical objects is 
extension; this is not the case with the objects of the empirical sciences. 
 Students of nature, on the other hand, are concerned with change.  This is 
apparent, for instance, in the Physics where Aristotle says that the study of nature is 
primarily the study of change, in particular, though not exclusively, motion.  Change is 
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only possible in matter.39
 
 Thus, the fact that natural objects are a combination of form 
and matter is essential to studying them. 
How far then must the student of nature know the form or essence?  Up to 
a point, perhaps, as the doctor must know of sinew or the smith bronze 
(i.e. until he understands the purpose of each); and the student of nature is 
concerned only with things whose forms are separable indeed, but do not 
exist apart from matter. … The mode of existence and essence of the 
separable it is the business of first philosophy to define. (Hardie and Gaye, 
trans., 1984, 194b10-15) 
 
Aristotle is drawing a distinction here between the way the forms of mathematical objects 
on the one hand and the forms of objects in nature on the other are instantiated in matter.  
Aristotle says that there is a sense in which mathematical objects can be separated in 
thought from their physical material, i.e. earth, air, fire, water—without causing an error.  
The error avoided is one of leaving out something essential to an object being 
investigated.  This is not true of natural objects, which essentially involve their particular 
combinations of matter, even in thought, because they necessarily involve change.  The 
distinction is difficult to articulate because it is also true that every particular 
mathematical object does in fact inhere in physical matter as do natural objects.  That is, 
any time we see a shape and call it, say, a triangle, that triangle inheres in whatever 
material it is made of, whether it is the steel beams of a bridge support or the chalk on a 
blackboard proof.  One hint about the difference that Aristotle is trying to draw is 
apparent in our use of the expression ‘instantiated in’.  It makes sense to us to talk about 
the same mathematical objects being instantiated in different matter, but it makes less 
                                                 
39 This is in fact a logical requirement—matter just is what persists through change (Physics I.7).   
 
 55 
sense to say that the same animal is instantiated in different matter.  Although knowledge 
of mathematics and knowledge of natural science are both about forms (e.g. universals 
about triangles, circles, bears, eclipses, etc.), the difference is that it is not possible to 
understand the essence of a bear without including that bears are essentially in specific 
kinds of matter as opposed to mathematical objects, which Aristotle says are only 
incidentally in physical matter.  It is still the case that mathematical objects essentially 
involve matter in the sense of extension.  The difference is that even though both kinds of 
objects are only found in physical matter, only natural objects cannot be understood 
without their physical matter.  
 An analogy can be drawn between the definitions of different kinds of attributes 
and the relationships between natural objects and their physical matter versus 
mathematical objects and the physical matter they are instantiated in. 
 
This becomes plain if one tries to state in each of the two cases the 
definitions of the things and of their attributes.  Odd and even, straight and 
curved, and likewise number, line, and figure, do not involve motion; not 
so flesh and bone and man—these are defined like snub nose, not like 
curved. (Physics II.2, Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 193b23) 
 
Some attributes can be defined independently of the things they inhere in; for example, 
curved, white, odd, and even.  However, this is not the case with attributes such as snub.  
Aristotle points out that snub can only be defined with reference to what is snubbed, i.e. 
noses, such as Socrates’ snub nose.  This difference between these two kinds of attributes 
is analogous to the difference between mathematical objects and natural objects.  
Mathematical objects can be defined without reference to their physical matter because 
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their definitions are independent of motion.  However, objects of the empirical sciences, 
such as the examples Aristotle gives: flesh, bone, and man, all require reference to their 
specific kinds of physical matter, which are the material causes of their motions.  
Aristotle further illustrates this with his description of what it is to be an axe: an axe 
necessarily has to be able to take an edge, which only certain combinations of elements 
can facilitate (Physics II.9; Metaphysics VIII.4). 
 The forms of objects in nature involve their motion, e.g. their coming to be, 
locomotion, degradation, etc.  This means that while the student of mathematics is 
primarily concerned with the forms of mathematical objects insofar as they are separable 
from the material they inhere in, the student of nature is concerned with the forms of 
objects as necessarily embodied in matter of determinate types.  Next we will consider 
Aristotle’s other uses of mathematics in the study of nature, namely how mathematical 
objects can be used to represent empirical objects, and how mathematical propositions 
can serve as axioms in demonstrations about natural objects. 
 Some contemporary accounts claim that mathematics does not play a significant 
role in Aristotle’s empirical sciences (Fehér, 1982; Gaukroger, 1978; Annas, 1976; 
Mueller 1970).  Evidence for this position includes reference to a definition for motion 
broadly construed, where motion is any form of change, in Physics III.1 as the actuality 
of potentiality as such (201a11).  In such a definition there is no place for mathematics 
that could serve any explanatory role.  In Metaphysics VIII.3 Aristotle says, “we find 
greater exactness where there is no magnitude, and the greatest exactness where there is 
no motion” (Tredennick, trans., 1935, 1078a9).  This suggests that Aristotle thinks that 
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where there is need for measurement, there is inaccuracy and that demonstrations that 
rely on measurements are less accurate or less explanatory than demonstrations that do 
not.  Aristotle’s claim is taken as evidence that Aristotle thinks one should eliminate the 
mathematical as far as possible in order to get at the essences or definitions of objects of 
nature, implying that nothing in those essences is mathematical as such—although it will 
on occasion involve loose quantitative notions (‘the more and the less’).40  This view of 
Aristotle’s empirical sciences suggests that the non-mathematical definition of motion, 
given above, is evidence that even if mathematics is necessary for measuring particular 
motions, mathematics is not essential to understanding motion and hence is not essential 
to understanding nature, because the science of nature is the science of motion or change 
(Physics II.1).41
 However, the view that mathematics is only incidental to Aristotle’s 
understanding of empirical scientific investigation fails to account for cases where 
fundamental mathematical properties do seem to carry explanatory power for Aristotle.  
We get clues of this in examples such as a discussion about the kinds of motion, found in 
the Physics and in De Caelo.  Circular motion is the simplest, purest, most godlike and 
best because of the properties of circles: circles are everywhere the same and they return 
 
                                                 
40 The view that Aristotle’s empirical science investigations do not hold a significant place for mathematics 
will be sharply contrasted below in the discussion of the importance of quantitative measurement to 
Galileo’s method.   
41 If this were Aristotle’s view, it could be criticized from a contemporary perspective for not seeing the 
value in relating the definitions of the elements of the science to the function of the science.  This idea is 
something like what Bridgman (1927; 1936) has in mind by “operationalizing” physical concepts. 
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on themselves without change.42
 There are different ways that mathematics can enter Aristotle’s explanations: one 
way is through appeal to qualitative mathematical properties (e.g. superiority of circular 
motion over straight motion in De Caelo, I.1); another way is by appeal to ratios.  For 
instance, Aristotle says in Physics III.4, “The science of nature is concerned with 
magnitudes and motion and time” (Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 202b30).  Because 
Aristotle neither talks about nor uses quantitative measurements in his scientific 
demonstrations, “magnitudes” in the quotation above should be thought of as qualitative 
differences in ratios.  In this sense, Aristotle is saying that the science of nature is 
concerned with measurement.  For instance, as discussed above, in the explanation of the 
greatest possible arc measure of the rainbow, Aristotle uses a geometrical proposition to 
determine the ratio between the height of the Sun and the angle measure of the rainbow’s 
arch. 
  This is significant because it suggests that mathematics 
can serve essential roles in Aristotle’s science. 
 Some further evidence of Aristotle’s use of mathematics in scientific explanations 
may come from the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Mechanics.  Although Aristotle did not 
write the Mechanics, it may still serve as a very close, at least temporally, interpretation 
of Aristotle’s views on mechanics.43
                                                 
42 See Physics IV.14; De Caelo I.1. 
  We are also told explicitly in the Mechanics that 
mathematical truths can provide an answer to the why question in physical problems:  
“They [mechanical problems] have something in common with Mathematical and with 
43 It is of historical interest to note that during Galileo’s time the author of the Mechanics was still 
uncontroversially thought be Aristotle.  
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Natural Speculations; for while Mathematics demonstrates how phenomena come to pass; 
Natural Science demonstrates in what medium they occur” (Forster, trans., 1984, 
847a26).  The heart of the Mechanics is to explain the various phenomena associated 
with the lever: “The original cause (tês aitias tên archên) of all such phenomena is the 
circle” (Forster, trans., 1984, 847b16).  Properties of the circle are used to explain (dêloô) 
how the lever does what it does.  The questions relevant to our investigation here are: 
What is the set of relevant mathematical objects, properties, facts and truths applicable to 
demonstrations about nature?  What exactly is the status of these mathematical objects?  
And, how exactly do these mathematical objects causally explain natural phenomena?  
 If Aristotle wants mathematical truths to serve as the axioms in demonstrations 
about natural phenomena, then he must be able to show that mathematical propositions 
satisfy his six requirements for scientific axioms, as discussed in chapter 2.2 above.  
Unfortunately, in his explanation of the six requirements, Aristotle does not offer 
mathematical examples for all of them.  He does, however, begin with one: “Now they 
must be true because one cannot understand what is not the case—e.g. that the diagonal is 
commensurate” (71b26).  Aristotle probably started with the truth condition because it is 
the least controversial; it would be hard to doubt the criterion that demonstrations need be 
based on true propositions and so the mathematical example cannot illustrate anything 
particularly mathematical about the requirement.  Nor is it controversial, that given things 




What is interesting about this mathematical example is revealed when we 
question the way in which these mathematical things are given.  If it is true that, for 
instance, F holds of G, then at least one of the following is implied: (i) either this 
statement entails that there are such things as Fs and Gs, or (ii) this proposition entails the 
conditional—if there are such things as Fs and Gs, then Fs hold of Gs.  In terms of 
mathematics the conditional would be expressed, e.g., as: if there are such things as 
squares and diagonals, then they are not commensurate.  What follows from this is that 
either Aristotle needs to hold that mathematical objects exist in some way that supports 
their properties being used in propositions in demonstrations, or Aristotle needs to hold 
that conditionals can serve this purpose.  If the latter, then there would be a strange 
conditionality to demonstrations involving math about the physical world that Aristotle 
does not suggest.  For instance, when he demonstrates the greatest angle measure of the 
rainbow, Aristotle does not say that there is anything conditional about the demonstration 
or that the demonstration only holds if there are semicircles.  In fact, it is a part of the 
structure of demonstrations that their axioms are not conditional—they cannot be 
otherwise.  An implication of Aristotle’s account of universals is that they are not merely 
quantified conditionals—they have ‘existential import’.44
 Lear (1982) argues that the bulk of Aristotelian scholarship has erred by giving a 
lower ontological status of mathematical objects than Aristotle gives them in the 
Metaphysics.  Lear supposes that the reason for the misrepresentation of the status of 
mathematical objects comes from Aristotle’s strong anti-Theory of Forms language in his 
   
                                                 
44  This is a consequence of what Aristotle takes to be valid moods, e.g. Darapti in the 3rd figure—all As 
are Bs, All As are Cs, so some B is C. (Prior Analytics I.6)   
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scientific works.  Lear (1982) points to the following passage from the Metaphysics to 
support his claim about the ontological status of mathematical objects in Aristotle’s 
corpus:  
 
…so this is also true of geometry. If the things of which it treats are 
accidentally sensible although it does not treat of them qua sensible, it 
does not follow that the mathematical sciences treat of sensible things—
nor, on the other hand, that they treat of other things which exist 
independently apart from these. (Ross, trans., 1984, 1077b21-25)   
 
The implication of this passage relevant to our understanding Aristotle’s concept of 
scientific explanation is that geometry studies objects that are tied to physical objects, 
even though it does not study them qua sensible.  Hence, we may yet be able to use 
mathematics as a model for explanations in the empirical sciences because they also treat 
objects as tied to physical objects.  (The connection between empirical science and 
physical objects is more straightforward.)  
 Lennox (1986) points to optics, mechanics, astronomy and harmonics as 
essentially involving mathematics for Aristotle.  This does not mean, however, that 
mathematical objects inform empirical investigation for Aristotle in the same manner that 
they do for Galileo or for contemporary scientists.  Even if mathematics are essential in 
the areas of natural science Lennox mentions, the mathematics might still only be used by 
Aristotle to help explain qualitative properties in those sciences, such as the preference 
for circular motion because it is more perfect than rectilinear motion.  For example, the 
fact that in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Mechanics, the circle is said to be the essence 
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of the lever does not obviously lend itself to applying mathematics to make further 
(empirical) discoveries.   
 Lennox (1986) is trying to show that Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation 
relies profoundly on mathematics.  
 
In the areas that most fascinated Galileo and his contemporaries—optics, 
mechanics, astronomy, and harmonics—Aristotle’s philosophy of science 
insisted upon the use of geometrical and arithmetical principles. …The 
relevant claim of Aristotle’s, which it will be my task to understand and 
make clear, is that there are certain sciences—optics, harmonics, 
mechanics, and astronomy—that involve both empirical observation and 
mathematical demonstration. (p. 31)  
 
Lennox adduces five examples intended to reveal and explicate Aristotle’s reliance on 
mathematics in demonstrations: Physics II.2 (193b23), Metaphysics XIII.3 (1078a14), 
Posterior Analytics I.10 (76a10—25), and Posterior Analytics I.13 (78b35—79a15).  The 
persuasiveness of Lennox’s claim in the quotation above varies with the different fields 
of study it is applied to because Aristotle treats the four different fields differently with 
regard to mathematics.  The claim that optics is mathematical, for instance, is not 
controversial because in Posterior Analytics I.14, Aristotle gives three examples of 
mathematical sciences: “arithmetic and geometry and optics” (79a16).  This leaves the 
question about the status of the remaining sciences mentioned: mechanics, astronomy and 
harmonics. 
 In footnote 7, Lennox (1986) supports his claim that mathematics is essential to 
Aristotle’s science by citing several passages from Aristotle.  The first is from Physics 
II.2, where Aristotle says “…the more natural of the branches of mathematics, such as 
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optics, harmonics, and astronomy” (Hardie and Gaye, trans., 1984, 194a7).  Taken with 
the passage from Posterior Analytics, this passage from Physics could be understood to 
mean that Aristotle thinks that arithmetic, geometry, optics, harmonics, and astronomy, 
just are mathematical sciences; but, it is made less clear by calling them ‘natural’.  They 
are tied both to the natural world and to mathematics, but this passage does not do the 
clarifying work that Lennox would like.  The Greek text translated by Hardie and Gaye as 
“the more natural of the branches of mathematics” is “ta phusikôtera tôn mathêmatôn”.  
‘Branches’ is an over-translation; it should not be inferred from this passage that these 
sciences are ‘branches’ of mathematics in the same way that geometry and arithmetic are. 
 Lennox needs to clarify exactly how the empirical content is introduced and combined 
with mathematical propositions in the mathematical empirical sciences. 
 The second passage Lennox (1986) cites is Metaphysics XIII.3: 
 
Thus a science which abstracts from the magnitude of things is more 
precise than one which takes it into account; and a science is most precise 
if it abstracts from movement, but if it takes account of movement, it is 
most precise if it deals with the primary movement, for this is the simplest; 
and of this again uniform movement is the simplest form.  The same 
account may be given of harmonics and optics for neither considers its 
objects qua light-ray or qua voice, but qua lines and numbers; but the 
latter are attributes proper to the former.  And mechanics too proceeds in 
the same way.  Thus if we suppose things separated from their attributes 
and make any inquiry concerning them as such, we shall not for this 
reason be in error, any more than when one draws a line on the ground and 
calls it a foot long when it is not; for the error is not included in the 
propositions. (Ross, trans., 1984, 1078a14) 
 
This again claims that harmonics and optics are mathematical; however, in this case it is 
clearer how empirical observation plays a role.  The objects of optics and harmonics are 
 
 64 
rays and sounds, but not qua rays and sounds, instead rays and sounds qua lines and 
ratios.  In the Posterior Analytics I.10, Aristotle says that “harmonical theorems are 
proved through arithmetic” (76a10-25).  It could be extrapolated from this that some of 
the objects of mechanics are the abstracted properties of bodies capable of movement.   
 Lennox (1986) summarizes the position he thinks is based on common 
misconceptions or incorrect assumptions about Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, 
which he later criticizes: 
 
(i) Aristotle holds that physical objects do not perfectly instantiate 
mathematical properties.  (ii) Therefore, he [Aristotle] holds that the 
objects of mathematics are abstractions, things apart from the changing 
physical world.  (iii) But if so, physics and mathematics study two distinct 
kinds of objects.  (iv) Therefore, in Aristotle’s philosophy of science, 
neither can serve as the source of explanatory principles for the other. … 
Convinced by this argument, one might very well see Aristotle’s 
discussion of the mixed sciences (our term, not his) as fundamentally 
inconsistent with this philosophy of science. (p. 32)   
 
Lennox claims that the argument in the quotation fails because he believes that Aristotle 
would reject the first premise.  Lennox does not immediately support this assertion, so we 
will look further for his argument. 
 Lennox’s approach to explain Aristotle’s distinction between things that are 
properly separable in thought and things that are not, is in terms of essences.  Lennox 
suggests that the difference lies in the fact that circles, for example, are not essentially 
bronze or silver or wooden, etc., whereas presumably souls are essentially linked to 
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bodies for Aristotle, such as human and animal souls.45
 
  Lennox (1986) explains the 
difference between bronze circle and souled animal:  
A common suggestion is that circles, being abstract objects, are only 
incidentally found in various materials...I would like to offer a different 
reading.  Circles are not essentially bronze (or silver, or chalk, or flesh).  
Aristotle insists that circles must be of some material or other, but not that 
they are essentially of a specific material. (p. 34)   
 
If Lennox is right about Aristotle’s distinction, then Aristotle is saying that circles are 
necessarily embodied, but that circles are only contingently embodied in any particular 
material.  This is not true with animals for instance.  The same animal could not be made 
out of fire as the one made out of earth, water, air, and fire in the right mixture to produce 
bones, flesh, etc. 
 Lennox is trying to express that there is a difference in the way the form of 
mathematical objects inheres in material from the way souls inhere in material.  The 
difference is that one cannot understand an animal without including an account of the 
animal’s perceiving, changing, etc. according to its function, and that this understanding 
is only possible because of the animal’s matter.  Mathematical objects, on the other hand, 
do not have functions, they certainly do not change; furthermore, they do not change 
precisely because their matter is only incidental to them even though every circle exists in 
some material and every soul exists concomitantly with some material.  
 We have been trying to get at how mathematical propositions (or objects) can 
inform the empirical sciences in Aristotle’s system.  Aware that there seem to be 
                                                 
45 cf. De Anima. 
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exceptions to almost every rule in nature, Aristotle says that scientific generalizations are 
true “always or for the most part.”  The question is – where does the indeterminacy enter 
and why in the physical sciences?  Mathematics is a desirable paradigm for the sciences 
in no small part because there are not exceptions to proven propositions in mathematics.  
Perhaps the reason for this and the reason that math can serve to inform the empirical 
sciences is that, as Aristotle claims, change is only possible in matter, but mathematical 
objects are not essentially tied to any specific material.  Since we encounter mathematical 
forms, for instance when we see a bronze sphere, it is clear that mathematical objects 
exist in some sense in nature for Aristotle.  Since mathematical objects are not inherently 
tied to a particular material, what is true of an instantiated mathematical object of bronze, 
must also apply to instantiated mathematical objects of wood.  So what the 
mathematician works on is the immutable, eternal truths about the forms of mathematical 
objects.  This is just the same in empirical scientific investigation; for instance, the 
biologist is also trying to learn about the immutable forms of her subject.  Aristotle is 
attempting to achieve the level of epistemic justification in mathematics in the empirical 
sciences.  It could work in the following way: if a mathematical object is instantiated in 
nature, then the properties that are true of the form must be true of the material it is in to 
the extent to which it does in fact inhere in the material.  So, a particular sphere is not 
eternal insofar as it is a bronze sphere, for instance, but it is round say insofar as it is a 
sphere.  Further, insofar as it is a sphere we can know that it only touches a flat surface at 
one point, or we could say the closer the sphere approximates to the form of sphere the 
closer it will be to touching at only one point.  
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 So, if Aristotle can demonstrate that the rainbow is the instantiation of an arch, 
which has a semicircle as its upward measure limit, then we can be as epistemically 
justified that rainbows cannot be greater than 180 degrees as we are certain that the 
rainbow is an instantiation of such an arch.46
 So far we have looked at Aristotle’s formal account of his concept of scientific 
explanation, two case studies from Aristotle’s science writings, and the role of 
mathematics in Aristotle’s scientific explanations.  Next we will give a broader analysis 
of how Aristotle generates new scientific explanations.  We will also highlight some of 
the inherent problems in Aristotle’s system, which will make Galileo’s methodological 
departures from Aristotle clearer in the chapter 4 discussion below. 
 
 
2.5 Analysis of Method for Generating Scientific Explanations 
 Crombie (1953) describes Aristotle’s scientific method as a two-part process: 
inductive and deductive.  Induction here refers to the process of forming generalizations 
based on an unspecified size set of particular observations.47
                                                 
46 It is more cumbersome, but perhaps more accurate to say that Aristotle’s challenge is to demonstrate that 
the rainbow is the instantiation of the cross-section of a cone, which itself is cut by the horizon, and the 
maximum measure of the arch of the visible conic section is 180 degrees. 
  Deduction refers to logical 
entailment from premises that are a mix of generalizations and empirical facts about 
particulars.  Crombie’s view of Aristotle’s scientific method is that students of nature 
47 My summary here of the historical understanding of induction follows Vickers (2006): “until the middle 
of the previous century induction was understood to be what we now know as enumerative induction or 
universal inference; inference from particular instances: a1, a2,…, an are all Fs that are also G, to a general 
law or principle all Fs are G” (p. 1).  However, the bigger question for evaluating Aristotle’s method is 
whether he intends his generalizing mechanisms to be inferential at all.  Hankinson (1998) argues that what 
appear to be inductive steps for Aristotle are not really meant to be inferential (p. 168).  This would be a 
significant problem for Crombie’s account of Aristotle’s method, because Crombie implies that Aristotle’s 
process of discovery is inductive in the classical sense of induction.  
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begin with sensory observations and then “ascend by induction to generalizations or 
universal forms or causes” that are more remote from experience.  They then “descend 
again by deduction from these universal forms to the observed facts” (1953, p. 25).  If 
Crombie’s two-step process is correct, then there is a problem for Aristotle’s method—
specifically in the demonstration of new knowledge—because a successful deduction 
from assumed hypotheses does not prove that the assumed hypotheses are true.48
 One potential problem for Crombie’s account of Aristotle’s method concerns 
whether Crombie is correct to call Aristotle’s first step ‘inductive’.  Crombie (1953) 
explains his understanding of Aristotle’s process: 
 
 
Of the inductive process by which the investigator passed from sensory 
experience of particular facts or connexions [sic] to a grasp of the prior 
demonstrative principles that explained them, Aristotle gave a clear 
psychological account.  The final stage in the process was the sudden act 
by which the intuitive reason or noûs, after a number of experiences of 
facts, grasped the universal or theory explaining them, or penetrated to 
knowledge of the substance causing and connecting them. (p. 27) 
 
Crombie’s phrase “after a number of experiences” in the excerpt above comes from 
Aristotle’s claim in Posterior Analytics I.31, that “it is from many particulars that the 
universal becomes plain” (Barnes, trans., 1993, 88a2).  What Aristotle means by the 
claim that the universal becomes clear, “from many particulars” is not immediately 
obvious.  “After a number of experiences” could mean that Crombie thinks Aristotle 
requires a certain number of experiences in order to be justified in claiming the universal.  
This interpretation of Crombie’s account would explain why Crombie calls the process of 
                                                 
48 For a simple illustration consider the following valid but unsound argument that has a true conclusion:      
P1. Socrates is a philosopher; P2. All philosophers have legs; Therefore C1. Socrates has legs.  
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moving from experiences of particulars to universals ‘induction,’ in the classical sense. 
 The problem is that Aristotle is not thinking in terms of induction; that is, 
Aristotle does not think the validity of the move from particulars to universals is 
systematically based on the number or quality of the observer’s experiences. 
 Aristotle does not explain how we can be certain of universals reached from experiences 
of particulars, but Aristotle does seem to think that this is what it means to have an 
intuitive intellect, i.e. nous: humans just are good at coming to understand the form, i.e. 
the universal, from encounters with particulars.  Some evidence for the claim that 
Aristotle’s process here is not inductive, in the classical sense, is that he never discusses 
how many experiences are necessary to know a universal nor does he say that more 
experiences will lead to greater epistemic certainty or better understood universals.49
 In Crombie’s characterization of Aristotle’s system, the generalizations reached 
by induction serve as the premises from which the particulars that we observe are 
supposed to be ultimately derivable.
   
50
 
  Crombie (1953) explains that this is the second 
part of Aristotle’s method: 
The second process in science was to descend again by deduction from 
these universal forms to the observed facts, which were thus explained by 
being demonstrated from prior and more general principles which were 
their cause. (p. 25)  
 
By Crombie’s account of Aristotle’s method, Aristotle uses the fact of a successful 
                                                 
49 Aristotle is not worried about the epistemology of universal acquisition the way Modern and 
contemporary thinkers are. He is not worried about proving whether or not he has the right universal or 
qualifying explanations based on his level of certainty.  For instance, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
criticizes what he calls the haphazardness of Aristotle’s epistemology; see discussion in chapter 4.6. 
50 This is why Crombie says that Aristotle’s process of scientific discovery is inductive.  
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deduction from the universals he is trying to discover to lower level universals and 
ultimately empirically observed particulars as evidence for the veracity of those 
universals.  However, this constitutes a logical problem for Aristotle’s demonstrations.  
For something properly to be called knowledge, it must be demonstrable from known 
premises.  Given a valid deduction, if the deduction leads to something known to be false 
or impossible, then we can know that at least one of the premises is false since it is not 
possible to deduce a false proposition from true premises through valid reasoning.  
Hence, from an unsuccessful deduction we have the potential to learn a negative fact.  
However, if the deduction does not obviously fail then we still cannot be sure of the truth 
of the premises upon which the deduction is made.  In other words, in the case of an 
apparently successful deduction nothing is revealed about the truth value of the premises, 
because it is possible to arrive at a true conclusion from false premises. 
 Although ultimately incomplete, Crombie’s account of Aristotle’s scientific 
method is useful for drawing our attention to this potential problem with Aristotle’s 
demonstration of new scientific explanations.  If this problem is irresolvable, then it will 
evince a significant gap between Aristotle’s description of the scientific process in 
Posterior Analytics and his actual scientific practices.   
 Barnes (1993) offers a fuller explanation of Aristotle’s scientific process.  In the 
introduction to his translation of the Posterior Analytics, Barnes says that Aristotle’s 
scientific method consists of three parts:  “First, we collect the facts.  Secondly, we look 
for the explanations.  Thirdly, we construct the demonstrations” (p. xx note A).  Barnes’s 
being explicit about the first step of gathering data is not at odds with Crombie’s account 
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even though Crombie takes this step for granted.51
 It is significant that Barnes remains more general, less restrictive than Crombie 
about the form of reasoning Aristotle uses and more specific about what is learned in 
each step.  Barnes’ description is vaguer because he does not identify the type of 
reasoning Aristotle uses; however, Barnes’ description is less flawed for the same reason.  
Barnes allows for the idea that Aristotle would not agree that the way the student of 
nature moves from particulars to universals corresponds precisely to our contemporary 
concept of induction. 
  The second step that Barnes identifies 
in Aristotle’s method is looking for the explanations.  This is the step where universals 
are in some way determined from the observational data.  The third step for Barnes is 
demonstration, which is analogous to Crombie’s stage of deduction. 
 Barnes argues that Aristotle’s intention is to axiomatize the sciences; i.e. that 
Aristotle tries to model the empirical sciences on mathematics, in the sense of starting 
from first principles and then deducing further principles.  However, there is an important 
difference between the empirical sciences and mathematics.  In geometry, for instance, 
the axioms can be given before the discovery and demonstration of new theorems,52
                                                 
51 Barnes is using the term ‘facts’ appropriately for contemporary science; he is referring to the things 
empirically determined, which can be true or false.  This is contrasted with common parlance, which gives 
‘facts’ the connotation of being the most certain things, independently of how they are established. Unlike 
Aristotle, we have inherited a substantial tradition of empiricism (and skepticism).  However, if we take 
Aristotle at his word, the facts of the observational data variety are not the kinds of things that Aristotle 
thinks are ultimately the most knowable, although they are most knowable to us. 
 
52 This is true of a 20th century description of mathematics, where any particular geometry, for instance, is 
defined by a set of axioms which then necessarily lead to an internally consistent set of consequences. This 
can be seen, for instance, in plane geometry where the axioms entail that the interior angles of every 
triangle equals two right-angles, and every other proposition. Euclid’s Elements begins by stipulating 
definitions, axioms and the most elementary constructions.  From these, the rest of geometry is a set of 
deductive consequences. What is less helpful about this 20th century description of geometry is that it does 
not illuminate what ancient mathematicians saw themselves as doing.  Euclid et al. may have thought they 
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whereas in empirical science we must use the processes of discovery and demonstration 
even to determine the first principles of each science.53
 Aristotle’s goal is to get justifiable epistemic certainty of the universals, which he 
thinks are logically prior to the observed phenomena in the sense that they are 
explanatory of them, though they are not temporally prior to them.  Because for Aristotle 
all knowledge about nature begins with sense data, knowledge of universals must be 
arrived at through experience.  This is a problem because it is impossible to know 
whether or not future experiences will undermine or contradict the universals. 
  The problem here is that in 
Aristotle’s science it is precisely the fundamental axioms we are looking for.  How can 
Aristotle come up with these axioms for the empirical sciences?   
 Another difficulty with Aristotle’s approach is that there can be multiple 
conflicting universals that seem to explain the same phenomena.  Aristotle’s system 
cannot distinguish among conflicting universals.  Consider the following fictional 
example:  Two Aristotelian observers record the fluctuation of the change in ocean height 
(tidal phenomena) and try to reason to the universal that explains the phenomena.  The 
first thinks the tides are caused by the winds; this is apparent because we observe that 
waves are generally greater on windy days and calmer on less windy days, hence the 
wind is what moves the waters, and must then also be moving the waters to cause the 
                                                                                                                                                 
were discovering mathematical truths perhaps by beginning with particular empirical observations and 
reasoning to general mathematical rules (Boyer, 1991; Rudman, 2007; Berlinghoff and Gouvêa, 2002).  
Examples of this in ancient mathematics include the different approximations for π arrived at after 
observing a regular relationship between diameter and circumference, congruence rules, etc. (Boyer, 1991). 
The Elements is not a book that reveals the process of mathematical discovery.  Instead it is the codification 
of geometry after it had been worked out.   
53 I am referring to the first principles proper to each science and not first principles of all science, e.g. the 
law of non-contradiction. 
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tides.  The second observer thinks the tides are caused by heavenly bodies; this is 
apparent because we observe the correlation between the Moon’s movement and the 
tides.54
This gives us two competing explanations of tidal phenomena.  The first observer 
comes up with deduction (E): 
 
 
(E) All Risings of Water are caused by the Wind 
 All Tides are Risings of Water 
thus, All Tides are caused by the Wind. 
 
The second observer comes up with deduction (F): 
 
 (F) All Risings of Water are caused by the Moon 
 All Tides are Risings of Water 
thus, All Tides are caused by the Moon.   
 
The second observer could also move back in the order of explanations by making a 
syllogism using the fact that the heat of heavenly bodies moves water to get to the 
Moon’s causing of the tides. 
 
(G) All Risings of Water are caused by the heat of the heavenly bodies  
 All Tides are Risings of Water 
thus, All Tides are Risings of Water caused by the heat of the heavenly bodies.55
 
 
                                                 
54 The possible mechanism for this might be suggested by Aristotle pointing out that the heat of the Sun is 
what is responsible for water evaporating, which is what allows it to rain. (Meteorology, II.4., 360a1) The 
second observer knows, as Aristotle says, that the Moon has less heat than the sun, but it still has some 
heat, much more than the stars for instance.  Knowing that the great heat in the Sun raises the water into the 
sky, the second observer reasons from this that the heat of the Moon is sufficient to raise the water, but not 
sufficient to evaporate it, so the water level rises; hence the tides 
55 Properly, to deduce the tides from the Moon’s heat we would have a chain of two syllogisms: The first 
showing that the Moon has heat because it is a heavenly body, all of which have heat, and the second 
showing that the Moon’s heat raises the tides. 
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In these examples the observers have moved from specific observations of daily changes 
in water level to generalizations about the tides and then to higher order generalizations 
that are meant to entail the lower order generalizations.  Both observers can successfully 
deduce the cause of the tides.  However, these deductions cannot both be demonstrations 
of the tides according to Aristotle, because they invoke contradictory premises: (E) 
claims that tides are exclusively caused by the wind, and (F) and (G) claim that the tides 
are exclusively caused by the heat of heavenly bodies.  Thus, a problem is revealed: even 
if it were true that observation could reveal that the wind or heat of heavenly bodies 
caused tidal motion, it could not be observed that this was the only cause of the tides. 
 Aristotle assumes that, in general, we are able to discern the correct universal 
from among the logically possible universals.  Aristotle is often aware of possible 
competing explanations, but does not carefully address the discrimination problem.  In 
fact, Aristotle often begins his scientific investigations by considering all previous 
differing explanations of phenomena offered by other thinkers.  From what others have 
said and from what he has observed and reasoned, Aristotle tries to figure out the right 
explanation.56
                                                 
56 Owen (1961) argues that Aristotle’s claim that knowledge in any given science begins with the 
phainomena, is incorrectly understood to mean that Aristotle believes every science begins with empirical 
observations. “The phainomena to which the Physics pays the most attention are the familiar data of 
dialectic, and from the context in the Prior Analytics it seems clear that Aristotle’s words there are meant to 
cover the use of such data.  For in concluding the passage and the discussion in which it occurs Aristotle 
observes that he has been talking at large about the ways in which the premises of deductive argument are 
to be chosen; and he refers for a more detailed treatment of the same matter to the ‘treatise on dialectic’ 
(A.Pr. I 30, 46a28-30).  He/ [sic] evidently has in mind the claim made in the Topics that the first premises 
of scientific argument can be established by methods which start from the endoxa” (p. 244). 
  It would be nice if he said more about leaving his principles open for 
refinement as new data is introduced, but the fact that he does not do this further evinces 
that he is not thinking about induction in the classical way.  Aristotle apparently thinks 
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we should not make a judgment until we know we have the right universal, which he 
thinks we just know to be true when we know it.  
 Aristotle gives examples of competing explanations, for instance, when he 
explains the cause of thunder.  When the warm dry air is squeezed out of clouds by cold 
air, the dry air runs into neighboring clouds, and the impact it makes is what we call 
thunder (Meteorology, II.9, 369a30).  Aristotle also brings up two other possible 
explanations for thunder, and then explains why they are wrong.  According to Aristotle, 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras believe there is fire in the clouds and that thunder is the 
hissing noise when this fire is extinguished.  Aristotle rejects this explanation because it 
does not explain why lightning moves contrary to the direction that fire moves by nature 
(369b22).57
                                                 
57 Here Aristotle uses ‘explanation’ as an example of the definitional introduction of middle terms, which 
he discusses in Posterior Analytics II.7. 
  Here we see an implicit criterion Aristotle uses for discriminating among 
possible explanations:  one explanation is better than another if it accounts for more 
phenomena, i.e. has broader explanatory power.  This criterion is also consistent with 
conditions (v) and (vi) above, which require that the principles used in demonstrations 
have the broadest explanatory power possible.  However, we have seen that this is vague 
and eminently fallible.  At Meteorology I.7 Aristotle says that, “We consider a 
satisfactory explanation of phenomena inaccessible to observation to have been given 
when our account of them is free from impossibilities” (Webster, trans., 1984, 344a5).  
Aristotle does not argue that the competing explanations of thunder fail because they 
involve impossibilities.  However, strictly speaking, all three explanations are satisfying 
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in that they are free from impossibilities.58
 To head off a potential misunderstanding it needs to be noted that the idea of 
discriminating among possible universals that account for particular phenomena is not a 
matter of picking from a list of different universals all of which are possibly true, or 
could have been true.  ‘Possible universals’ just refers to the fact that we can imagine all 
sorts of things that might causally explain phenomena, we just cannot always know that 
one is right just because we think it is.
  He calls them implausible and explains why 
his explanation is more satisfying.  It is curious that in his discussion of the competing 
explanations, of thunder for instance, Aristotle does not spend greater time discussing the 
possibility of error in his system and how to treat it. 
59
 However, just knowing that universals must be necessary does not help us with 
the problem of how we identify the true universals.  The fundamental problem remains: 
reasoning from a universal (mathematical or otherwise) that necessitates, for instance, 
  The following passages evince the idea that the 
universals we are looking for, the ones that we can use in scientific demonstrations, are 
necessarily true:  “the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity” (Nicomachean 
Ethics VI.3, Ross, trans., 1980, 1139b21); “what you understand cannot be otherwise” 
(Posterior Analytics I.6, Barnes, trans., 1993, 74b6).  These quotations point to 
Aristotle’s belief that the universals we find must be necessary in the sense that 
universals cannot be essentially accidental.  Universals must be necessarily true because 
the principles of nature are unchanging to Aristotle (Physics I.5). 
                                                 
58 I might be overstating this claim.  From Aristotle’s perspective it may be that Anaxagoras’ theory is 
incompatible with a reasonable account of the direction of lightning, and hence impossible.  
59 cf. Posterior Analytics I.6, for Aristotle’s discussion about the necessity of premises in a demonstration. 
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that the rainbow’s arc is a maximum of 180 degrees, to observational data does not 
guarantee the truth of the universal, even if our observations about the degree measure 
are robust.  Aristotle never resolves this problem of determining epistemic warrant.  Of 
course, this is a problem for contemporary model building in the sciences as well.  This is 
part of why it is impossible to achieve justified epistemic certainty about our explanations 
of natural phenomena.  Because contemporary theory building remains shackled to 
induction, contemporary theories remain defeasible.60,61
 Above we discussed a problem with Aristotle’s attempt at using mathematical 
demonstrations to serve as a models for demonstrations in the empirical sciences: the 
problem was with justification, and we tied the problem to empirical investigation’s 
requirement of induction.  It should now be clearer why this problem arises in Aristotle’s 
system.  The distinction between mathematical objects and empirical objects discussed 
above reveals why mathematical objects are not susceptible to problems with induction—
they do not essentially involve physical material, i.e. the stuff that allows for change.  So, 
it is not a problem to let one figure represent all triangles, for example.  There is no error 
generated by this, whereas with natural objects, we have to make observations even to 
generate the first principles of particular sciences.  In geometry one can be certain by 
definition that all plane triangles are three-sided rectilineal figures before one investigates 
the interior angle-sum of triangles.  Thus, this is a problem for Aristotle’s scientific 
demonstration in the sense of using mathematics as a model for scientific demonstrations 
in the empirical sciences.   
 
                                                 
60 However, contemporary accounts of induction are broader than the classical model. See chapter 5. 
61 This is also the reason why Scientific Realism is not epistemically warranted. 
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 The problems for Aristotle’s concept of scientific demonstration discussed here—
epistemic justification of universals, discriminating among competing universals, and the 
limitations of applying mathematical techniques to empirical science—are not resolved 
by Aristotle.  If we follow suggestions to return certain elements of Aristotle’s concept of 
scientific explanation to contemporary models of explanation (e.g. Brody, 1972), then we 
will need to address these potential problems.  It is necessary to address these problems 
because, although adding Aristotelian essence and causation to contemporary models of 
scientific explanation might give greater intuitive satisfaction to some scientific 
explanations, there is also the potential that adding these elements could actually 
undermine the epistemic warrant of the explanations that Brody is trying to improve. 
 Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation has had a profound impact on the 
history of science.  His ideas were passed down through antiquity to Arabic scholarship 
and then reintroduced to the Latin West in the late Middle Ages.  Although intervening 
thinkers modified how Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation was applied, it is still 
thought of as the standard account during Galileo’s time.  Galileo himself tries to take the 
best of Aristotle and exclude what he finds less helpful (see chapter 4).  Galileo makes 
the distinction between Aristotle’s methods and his findings.  However, Galileo’s self-
named Aristotelian contemporaries had moved far from the ideals of Aristotle’s concept 
of explanation (such as careful observation followed by rigorous demonstration), and 
instead embraced history’s understanding of Aristotle’s particular findings (e.g. that the 
heavier body falls faster than the lighter body in the ratio of their weights).  In fact, 
Galileo claims that the 17th century Aristotelian view is that all knowledge about nature is 
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already contained in Aristotle’s corpus.62
 
  Whether the ideal of Aristotle’s concept of 
explanation is something actually attainable in scientific practice will be taken up in 
chapter 5, after we have discussed what Galileo’s departure from Aristotle and the 
Aristotelians consisted of.  Next we will look at the incremental progression from 
Aristotle to Galileo in order to establish the basis of knowledge environment in which 
Galileo built his concept of scientific explanation. 
                                                 
62 See Dialogue “Second Day,” Drake, 1981, p. 126; “Third Letter on Sunspots,” Drake, 1957, pp. 126-7. 
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Chapter 3.  Developments in Scientific Explanation in the Period between Aristotle  
  and Galileo  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This dissertation investigates the most crucial change between Aristotle and 
contemporary science, namely, Galileo’s work.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight some of the developments in the method of investigating nature that occurred 
between Aristotle and Galileo in order to understand better just what is revolutionary 
about Galileo’s concept of scientific explanation.   
 Understanding Galileo’s contribution to the theory of scientific explanation 
requires that we understand what he built upon and changed.  The story is complicated 
for several reasons.  First, the self-named Aristotelians of Galileo’s time thought very 
different things from Aristotle himself.  Second, not surprisingly, what it meant to be an 
Aristotelian changed in significant ways over the 1900 years between Aristotle and 
Galileo. Third, current scholarship mistakenly attributes to Galileo ideas that developed 
from Aristotle and the knowledge context of Aristotle’s time, while at the same time, it 
misunderstands how, exactly, Galileo revolutionized empirical science, especially 
scientific explanation.  Büttner et al. (2002) notes this common misconception:  
 
When historians of science discuss the general state of ideas in the 
seventeenth century, they tend to portray medieval Aristotelian 
scholasticism merely as the counter position against which Galileo’s 
theory of motion gained its profile as a new science, neglecting the 
potential of Aristotelianism as a generic knowledge resource available to 




As the quotation suggests, it is a mistake to assume that all of Galileo’s ideas sprung from 
him sui generis and that they are directly opposed to Aristotle’s.  However, Galileo did 
revolutionize scientific inquiry by increasing empirical rigor through quantifying 
experimental observations and by constructing predictive mathematical models.  In order 
to gain a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between Galileo and Aristotle, 
this chapter discusses the developments in empirical scientific investigations in general, 
concepts of scientific explanations in particular from Aristotle to Galileo and the 
knowledge environment present for Galileo.  Discussing the differences between 
Galileo’s and Aristotle’s concepts of scientific explanation will provide a context for 
evaluating the appropriateness of returning some elements of Aristotle’s concept (essence 
and cause) to contemporary models of scientific explanation. 
 Like Büttner et al. (2002), Crombie (1953) defends the position that the Modern 
approach to empirical scientific investigation did not emerge whole from Galileo.  In fact, 
he goes much further: 
 
The experimental method was certainly not completed in all its 
refinements in the thirteenth or even the fourteenth century.  Nor was the 
method always systematically practised.  The thesis of this book [Robert 
Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100—1700] is that a 
systematic theory of experimental science was understood and practised 
by enough philosophers for their work to produce the methodological 
revolution to which modern science owes its origin. (p. 9) 
 
The latter quotation suggests that, instead of thinking of Galileo as the architect of the 
Scientific Revolution, it may be more accurate to think of Galileo as having put the final 
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piece in a puzzle begun much earlier, the completion of which marked the full evolution 
into Modern Science.63
 Section 3.2 briefly outlines the evolution of Greek science after Aristotle by 
concentrating on the work of a few natural scientists: Archimedes, Eratosthenes, and 
Ptolemy. Section 3.3 looks at the early medieval period, essentially from the fifth to the 
early twelfth century.  Although the emphasis on the investigation of nature declined 
during this time there were some scholars, the Encyclopedists, who collected and passed 
down versions of earlier work.  Section 3.4 looks at the birth of Aristotelian 
Scholasticism, the period when Aristotle’s logical treatises, along with some ancient 
Greek mathematical texts, were translated into Latin.  Useful figures to consider during 
this time include Robert Grosseteste, Theodoric of Freiberg, and Adelard of Bath.  
Section 3.5 considers Copernicus’ direct impact.  Section 3.6 considers the question of 
the impact on Galileo of the common or shared knowledge of his time. 
 
 
3.2 Greek Science in the Period after Aristotle until the Early Middle Ages 
 Expanded the Role of Mathematics in Empirical Demonstrations 
 
 This section examines elements of scientific demonstration in the ancient world 
after Aristotle.  Instead of ending with Aristotle, the use of mathematics in scientific 
demonstrations expanded in proceeding centuries.  Aristotle is explicit that he wants to 
                                                 
63 This sounds dramatic; however, more accurately would be to say that Galileo put in a very significant 
methodological piece and Kepler supplied a significant mathematical model piece, both of which allowed 
Newton to finish the puzzle, i.e. codify modern science with the Principia. 
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model empirical demonstrations on mathematical demonstrations.  Lloyd (1973) explains 
how this tradition grew: 
 
But it was mathematics that provided, in the third and second centuries, 
the finest examples of the systematic demonstration of a body of 
knowledge.  The clear and methodical presentation of proof in Euclid, 
Archimedes and Apollonius became the model for the rest of Greek 
science. (p. 52) 
 
There is an important distinction, not clear in Lloyd’s treatment, which needs to be made.  
It is one thing to model the forms of demonstrations on mathematics but quite another to 
embody mathematics as a part of the structure of nature.  This distinction is often blurred 
and some ancient natural philosophers went much further than Aristotle in basing their 
confidence in their demonstrations about the empirical world on their metaphysical 
commitments to the idea that the natural world is mathematical in structure. 
 For example, the substantial and varying uses of mathematics in Archimedes’ 
(287-212 B.C.E.) corpus demonstrate that at least some natural philosophers continued to 
construct mathematical accounts of empirical phenomena.  In The Method, a short treatise 
that Archimedes wrote to Eratosthenes, Archimedes suggests the benefits of using the 
empirical science of mechanics to aid in solving mathematical problems:   
 
I thought fit to write out for you and explain in detail in the same book the 
peculiarity of a certain method, by which it will be possible for you to get 
a start to enable you to investigate some of the problems in mathematics 
by means of mechanics.  This procedure is, I am persuaded, no less useful 
even for the proof of the theorems themselves; for certain things first 
became clear to me by a mechanical method, although they had to be 
demonstrated by geometry afterwards because their investigation by the 
said method did not furnish an actual demonstration.  But it is of course 
easier, when we have previously acquired, by the method, some 
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knowledge of the questions, to supply the proof than it is to find it without 
any previous knowledge. (Heath, trans., 1953, p. 13) 
 
By “mechanical method,” Archimedes is referring to using physical structures and 
relationships to suggest hypotheses that will then be demonstrable in mathematics.  
Archimedes makes two provocative claims about what can be gained by applying a 
“mechanical method” to help solve mathematical problems.  The weaker claim is that 
mechanical examples are helpful by suggesting new mathematical hypotheses.  The much 
stronger claim, which is not immediately defended by Archimedes, says that mechanical 
examples can even furnish the proof of mathematical theorems.  With the first claim, 
Archimedes is revealing one of his methods for beginning the discovery phase in 
mathematics, i.e. analysis.  First we will look at Archimedes’ example and then two 
simplified examples to illustrate Archimedes’ idea of using empirical trials to inform 
mathematics.  
 In the Method, Archimedes gives the following as the first example of a 
mathematical theorem suggested to him by a mechanical method:  “Any segment of a 
section of a right-angled cone (i.e. a parabola) is four-thirds of the triangle which has the 




The claim is that given any segment of a parabola, the area of the segment will be equal 
to 4/3 the area of a triangle with the same length base and height as the parabolic 
segment.  Archimedes works through the reasoning for this theorem as though the lines 
were weights on a lever and determines by the ratio of these lines what must be the ratio 
of the segment of the parabola to the triangle of equal base and height.  In this process 
Archimedes is treating mathematical objects as physical objects, weights on a lever, and 
is looking for the combination that will balance the lever.  In this physicalization of 
mathematical properties, a balanced lever indicates an equality—Parabolic Segment ABC 
= 4/3 Triangle ABC. 
 To further clarify how Archimedes’s mechanical method might be used to 
generate mathematical hypotheses, consider the following example.  Playing with 
different weights on a lever one begins to recognize that a smaller weight will balance a 
larger one if the smaller weight is further from the fulcrum than the larger.  A careful 
observer may begin to see a relationship between the magnitudes of the weights and their 
distances from the fulcrum.  A careful observer such as Archimedes, will start to get 
ideas about what the relationship might be and come up with the idea that weights 
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balance at distances from the fulcrum inversely proportional to their magnitudes—the 
law of the lever.  Archimedes determined that weights will balance on a lever if the 
following ratio holds between the weights and distances from the fulcrum on the two 
sides:  A : C :: D : B.  See Figure 3.2. 
 
From the mechanically arrived at idea of balancing weights, one might ask if there is a 
lesson in this for mathematics.  The analogy might suggest itself as follows: weights and 
distances balancing other weights and distances is like a two-dimensional figure being 
equal to another two-dimensional figure.  If we treat the two magnitudes from each side 
of the lever as two magnitudes in general or if we treat only their values and do not worry 
about their units, or treat both as lengths, then we could suggest that the two factors, 
weight and distance, are two lengths producing a rectangle.  Then the law of the lever 
would suggest that rectangles are equal when they are in a ratio satisfying the law of the 
lever such that A x B = C x D, which turns out to be true when these magnitudes are in 
the ratio of A : C :: D : B.   This example with weights on a lever illustrates using 
mechanical practice as a means of generating a new hypothesis in mathematics. 
 The next example as well illustrates mathematical hypotheses generation but also 
gives some insight into Archimedes stronger, more inflammatory claim in the quotation 
 
 87 
above that says mechanics can supply proof of mathematical theorems.  Beginning with 
three fixed lengths, such as sticks, one wonders how many different triangles could be 
made.  If more than one triangle can be made from the same three lengths, then having 
congruent sides would not be a condition of congruency between triangles.  On the other 
hand, if only one triangle can be made from the same three sticks, then one could suppose 
that different three sided figures having three equal sides (sometimes called side-side-
side) will be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for two triangles being 
congruent.  More technically stated the question is:  Are triangles that are reflections 
through a single axis of symmetry congruent?  With three sticks one can see that only one 
triangle is possible.  Thus, we have used a “mechanical method” to suggest the 
hypothesis that three specific lengths will always yield congruent triangles.  Having 
discovered this idea empirically, and thereby having some evidence for the truth of the 
hypothesis, we could then devise a geometrical demonstration of this, for instance 
something like propositions I.7 and I.8 in Euclid’s Elements.64
 Heath (1953) points out the significance of Archimedes’ discussion about the 
discovery phase: 
  These examples illustrate 
that one of Archimedes’s methods of discovery in mathematics, i.e. the analysis process, 
relies on being able to infer mathematical propositions from natural phenomena. 
 
                                                 
64 Archimedes does not explain exactly how physical objects could demonstrate a mathematical 
proposition; however, this illustration suggests that the force of such a proof would come from not being 
able to imagine a counterexample, i.e. some other possible arrangement of the same three sticks that did not 
yield a congruent triangle. Archimedes’ mathematical proofs are rigorous; he knew that mathematical 
demonstrations could not be based on a few specific examples.  His proofs are either direct proofs about the 
general case (i.e. not particular objects) or they are reductios ad absurdum. Archimedes may have dropped 
the discussion about physical proofs for mathematical hypotheses because they would lack rigor. 
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Nothing is more characteristic of the classical works of the great 
geometers of Greece, or more tantalizing, than the absence of any 
indication of the steps by which they worked their way to the discovery of 
their great theorems. … As they have come down to us, these theorems are 
finished masterpieces which leave no traces of any rough-hewn stage, no 
hint of the method by which they were evolved.  A partial exception is 
now furnished by the Method; for here we have a sort of lifting of the veil, 
a glimpse of the interior of Archimedes’ workshop as it were. (p. 6-7) 
 
Chapter 2 discussed a difficulty for our understanding of the ancient analytic process: it is 
not clear how to describe the process of devising new hypotheses or how to construct the 
demonstrations that turn the hypotheses into theorems.  Although nothing like a rigorous 
explanation or codification of the process is given, it is still helpful that, unlike Euclid, 
Pappus,65
 Archimedes’ empirical discovery method for mathematics reveals his 
metaphysical commitment to the mathematical character of the world.  Archimedes’ work 
implies that he believes that if a proposition holds in the empirical world then it must also 
hold in mathematics.  This is implied, for instance, by his use of weights on a lever to 
arrive at the quadrature of the parabola.  Archimedes is also committed to the notion that 
mathematics can inform demonstrations in the empirical sciences: he reports that he uses 
geometry to solve problems in mechanics and statics (Lloyd, 1973, p. 46).  Archimedes’s 
work implies one of the following two commitments: either it is the case that if a 
proposition holds in mathematics then it must also hold in the empirical world; or the 
 and seemingly the rest of the ancient mathematicians, Archimedes gives us a 
hint of how he discovers new hypotheses by using a mechanical method. 
                                                 
65 Pappus of Alexandria (c. 290- 350 C.E.) contributed to ancient geometry through original proofs as well 
as by systematically organizing, and insightfully commenting on the greatest works of geometry in the 
preceding six centuries.  His best known work, only partially preserved, is Synagoge (translated as 
Collection or Mathematical Collection). 
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weaker commitment, that if a proposition holds in mathematics then it cannot be false in 
the empirical world, i.e. there could be no physical counterexamples.  It is not just that 
empirical sciences and mathematics suggest hypotheses for each other; Archimedes treats 
mathematics as providing a demonstration, i.e. the rigorous proof of theorems that are 
true both in mathematics and nature.  For instance, in On Floating Bodies, Archimedes 
mathematically demonstrates relationships among weights of bodies and displaced fluids, 
as well as the lever and statics. 
 The suggestion that mathematics can ‘prove’ something about physical objects is 
alien to the contemporary reader; indeed, how can mathematics itself prove physical 
facts?  We treat things like the law of displacement for floating bodies and the law of the 
lever as empirical facts; thus, for us it is not a matter of what holds in mathematics but 
just a matter of whether or not objects do behave a certain way; e.g., whether a body of 
twice a given mass balances that mass at twice the distance from the fulcrum.  
Furthermore, in principle at least, we accept that this law only holds until some further 
observational data comes along that suggests a better hypothesis.  We balk at 
Archimedes’ use of mathematics in the empirical sciences in part because we now have 
many different branches mathematics which are sometimes incompatible such as: 
Euclidian geometry, Lobachevskian geometry, and Riemannian geometry (Bonola, 
1955).  Different geometries are more or less useful for depicting natural phenomena 
depending on what we are trying to model.  However, Einstein showed us that choosing a 
particular geometry to represent nature is inherently a matter of convention.  Ancient 
natural philosophers such as Archimedes and Aristotle did not see a distinction between 
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geometry and physical space.  We are also aware that there always seem to be exceptions 
to our physical laws.  For instance, Archimedes likely would have been surprised to learn 
that not all liquids combine by simple addition: e.g., one cup of water combined with one 
cup of alcohol yields less than 2 cups of liquid.  Archimedes on the other hand thinks that 
mathematical demonstrations can prove empirical facts.  This is a point of departure for 
Archimedes and it is revealing about Archimedes concept of scientific explanation.  In 
the case of the law of the lever, for example, Archimedes takes the empirical fact of 
weights balancing to be proved when he mathematically proves that two rectangles are 
equal when they are in the proportionality: BASE1 : base2 :: height2 : HEIGHT1.  
Archimedes’ belief that he has thus mathematically proven an empirical fact implies a 
belief that the basic structure of nature could not be otherwise and that nature is 
inherently mathematical. 
 For another example of an ancient natural philosopher who applies mathematics 
to the investigation of the empirical sciences we turn to Eratosthenes of Cyrene (275-194 
B.C.E.).  Eratosthenes applied mathematical propositions to observations to determine 
physical facts, such as the circumference of the Earth.  Eratosthenes also reveals an 
advance in the application of mathematics in the investigation of nature by explicitly 
treating physical objects as mathematical objects.  Eratosthenes, to whom Archimedes 
sent the Method, seems to have studied mathematics and nature in a manner similar to 
Archimedes.  Among other advances, Eratosthenes is credited with being the first person 
to divide the globe along latitudinal and longitudinal lines (Lloyd, 1973, p. 49).  This was 
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an important step in aiding navigation or at least map-making.66
 It was known that in the town of Syene (contemporary Aswan in southern Egypt), 
the bottom of a deep well was only directly illuminated by the Sun one day a year. This 
was only possible because the Sun was directly overhead—a vertical rod would cast no 
discernable shadow.  Syene was very near the Tropic of Cancer and the day in question 
was the Summer Solstice. In the town of Alexandria, which is nearly directly north of 
Syene, Eratosthenes set up a vertical rod and measured the angle the sunlight made with 
the rod by measuring the length of the shadow cast at noon on the summer solstice.  
Eratosthenes assumed that the distance between Syene and Alexandria was negligible 
compared with the distance between the Earth and sun.  This assumption allowed him to 
consider the rays of sunlight hitting the two towns to be traveling in parallel lines. The 
angle at which the sunlight hit the top of the vertical rod could be calculated using the 
height of the rod and the length of the rod’s shadow on the ground.  Eratosthenes 
calculated this to be 1/50th of a circle. He further knew by laws of parallel lines that the 
angle the sunlight made with the rod had to be the same angle between the two radii of 
the Earth, one terminating in Alexandria, the other in Syene.  Hence, multiplying the 
distance between Alexandria and Syene by 50 gives the circumference of the Earth.  
Eratosthenes calculated that the circumference of the Earth is roughly 5,000 stades. 
  More famously, 
Eratosthenes conceived of a way to measure the circumference of the Earth using 
geometrical propositions. 
                                                 
66 Ptolemy greatly expanded this application of geometry to problems of navigation by coming up with a 
method for measuring celestial angles.  Ptolemy’s innovation enabled one to calculate their latitude.  The 
problem of determining one’s longitude at sea would not be fully resolved until the invention of the 
portable spring loaded clock in the 18th century. 
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 Although the precise length of a stade is not known, Boyer (1991) claims it was about 
1/10th of a mile.  If this is accurate, or close to accurate, then multiplying the distance 
between the towns, 5000 stadia by 50, gives 250,000 stadia or about 25,000 miles, which 
is remarkably close to NASA’s measurement of 24,860 miles (Dutch, 2004). 
 These examples from Eratosthenes are relevant because they reveal an advance in 
applying mathematics to nature—they show deliberate abstracting of physical objects to 
make them fit with the mathematical propositions.  Measuring anything involves some 
kind of mathematical thinking; 67
                                                 
67 For instance, all scales of measurement are either quantitative, e.g. speed, weight, time, or they are 
qualitative, e.g. Mohs scale of hardness is qualitative but still allows for linear ordering of substances.  
Substances are ranked by the scratch test—the harder substance will scratch the softer, but not the other 
way around. Harder substances are ranked higher than softer substances. This allows for limited kinds of 
ratios of magnitude even though the magnitude cannot be quantified independently from other substances.  
 hence, the blanket statement that someone applied 
mathematics to nature is not inherently remarkable.  Eratosthenes application, on the 
other hand, is more sophisticated, for instance, when he invents “mathematical fictions” 
in order to apply mathematical theorems to the empirical world.  He abstracts the Earth 
and Sun as points and deliberately treats as parallel all line segments drawn from any spot 
on Earth to any spot on the Sun.  Given the size of the Earth, treating the Earth and Sun 
this way is counterintuitive; however, is it eminently useful because it allows for physical 
problems to be solved just as any other geometry problem drawn in the sand.  Although it 
is a less sophisticated incarnation, Eratosthenes is employing the same type of process 
that is a cornerstone of Modern natural philosophy as exemplified by Galileo and 
Newton.    
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 Ptolemy (90-168 C.E.) serves as another example of an ancient natural 
philosopher making mathematical models to comprehend physical phenomena.68  The 
first clue about the significance of mathematics in Ptolemy’s work comes from the 
innovations he made within the field of trigonometry in his creation of the Handy Tables 
for measuring celestial motion.69
 Ptolemy goes further than Archimedes and Eratosthenes in using mathematics to 
produce working models designed to capture complex phenomena.  I argue that Ptolemy 
holds the metaphysical position that the world is inherently mathematical.  This is seen, 
for instance, in Almagest I.3, where Ptolemy argues that celestial bodies must be perfect 
and therefore must move in perfect, regular circular motion.  Ptolemy’s metaphysical 
commitment to the mathematical character of nature is further revealed in his later work 
Planatery Hypotheses (Hypotheseis Ton Planomenon), in which Ptolemy proposes ideas 
about the physical structure of the heavens by making his previous models from the 
  Specifically, Ptolemy used math to measure the relative 
movements of the celestial bodies in order to make mathematical models to aid map-
making and navigation, as well as to contribute to general knowledge.  Ptolemy’s 
trigonometrical innovation was a system for measuring and representing relative radial 
distances between celestial objects, which allowed him to create mathematical models of 
celestial motion that could be used to predict where a planet would be at a given time in 
the future which could then be tested by comparing the predicted results with actual 
empirical observations. 
                                                 
68 Ptolemy’s work is also important to this dissertation because it is his geocentric models of the solar 
system that Copernicus is arguing against in the 16th century, which influences Galileo’s work. 
69 There is an analogy here to Newton’s inspiration in devising the calculus in order to carry out his 
scientific modeling of phenomena.  Newton’s calculus enables him to measure the area under a curve by 
introducing the concept of the progression to a mathematical limit.  
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Almagest into mechanical models (Sambursky, 1962, p.141).  The fact that Ptolemy 
believes his mathematical models capture the physical structure of the heavens indicates 
his ultimately realist position as well as his metaphysical commitment to the 
mathematical character of nature.  These positions facilitate Ptolemy’s belief that his 
assertions about natural phenomena are justified to the same degree of warrant that the 
mathematical propositions have themselves.  Thus, Ptolemy is also able to use 
mathematical objects to inform demonstrations about nature.  Of course, not all of 
Ptolemy’s arguments are mathematical.  It is useful to identify and examine the various 
kinds of arguments Ptolemy makes in his mathematical modeling of the solar system. 
 Ptolemy makes non-mathematical as well as mathematical arguments.  The non-
mathematical arguments include qualitative arguments that are based on intuitions, for 
instance physical intuitions about the elements, and counterfactual arguments.  Ptolemy 
makes at least three different kinds of mathematical arguments: (i) formal, e.g. 
geometrical propositions; (ii) quantitative, e.g. numerical measurement; and (iii) 






Analyzing each type of argument will help clarify the connection between mathematics 
and the empirical world in Ptolemy’s corpus. 
 
Non-Mathematical Qualitative 
 An example of a non-mathematical qualitative argument occurs in The Almagest 
I.7, where Ptolemy argues for the immobility of the Earth based on his intuition that it is 
more likely that light things such as the stars are moving than it is likely that something 
very heavy such as the Earth is moving.  There is an apparent contradiction in the 
arguments that Ptolemy makes in Book 1 of The Almagest, the discussion of which will 
shed light on Ptolemy’s method of demonstration.  In 1.7, Ptolemy argues that the Earth 
does not in any way move locally:  
 
All those who think it paradoxical that so great a weight as the earth 
should not waver or move anywhere seem to me to go astray by making 
their judgment with an eye to their own affects and not to the property of 
the whole.  For it would not still appear so extraordinary to them, I 
believe, if they stopped to think that the earth’s magnitude compared to 
the whole body surrounding it is in the ratio of a point to it.  For thus it 
seems possible for that which is relatively least to be supported and 
pressed against from all sides equally and at the same angle by that which 
is absolutely greatest and homogeneous. (Taliaferro, trans., 1989, p. 11) 
 
Ptolemy argues that the Earth is immobile because it is as a point compared to the whole 
heavens.  I want to call attention to three things in this passage: (i) he analyzes why those 
arguing for the mobility of the Earth err; they make their judgment based too heavily on 
their own perspective.  Ptolemy rejects the argument that since the Earth is a very large 
rock, it is likely that it moves just as very heavy boulders are hard to stop moving on their 
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path downward.  Ptolemy says this argument relies too much on local phenomena instead 
of also considering the immensity of the heavens.  (ii) Ptolemy explains the intuitive 
plausibility of the Earth being motionless when one remembers that he has already shown 
that the Earth is as a point to the heavens.70
 Ptolemy’s arguments above appear to be contradicted or at least undermined 
when he further argues for the immobility of the Earth based on its great weight. 
  Ptolemy argues that all the rest of the 
heavens evenly “push” on all sides of the comparatively tiny Earth.  (iii) Ptolemy knows 
that the Earth is “relatively least” compared with the heavens which are “absolutely 
greatest and homogeneous.”  Thus, Ptolemy argues that it makes sense that the Earth is 
motionless because the lesser could not overcome the virtually infinitely greater. 
 Later in The Almagest I.7, Ptolemy says: 
For in order for us to grant them what is unnatural in itself, that the lightest 
and subtlest bodies either do not move at all or no differently from those 
of contrary nature, while those less light and less subtle bodies in the air 
are clearly more rapid than all the more terrestrial ones; and to grant that 
the heaviest and most compact bodies have their proper swift and regular 
motion, while again these terrestrial bodies are certainly at times not easily 
moved by anything else—for us to grant these things, they would have to 
admit that the earth’s turning is the swiftest of absolutely all the 
movements about it because of its making so great a revolution in a short 
time, so that all those things that were not at rest on the earth would seem 
to have a movement contrary to it, and never would a cloud be seen to 
move toward the east nor anything else that flew or was thrown into the 
air.  For the earth would always outstrip them in its eastward motion, so 
that all other bodies would seem to be left behind and to move towards the 
west. (Taliaferro, trans., 1989, p. 12) 
 
                                                 
70 Ptolemy offers the proof of the claim that the Earth is as a point compared with the heavens in Almagest 
I.6. The gist of the proof is that we do not observe parallax effects when viewing the stars from different 
places on the Earth.  Stellar parallax was not observed until the 19th century. 
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Ptolemy calls the idea of the heavens not moving while the Earth moves, “unnatural in 
itself” because he believes the heavens are the “lightest and subtlest bodies.”71
 Ptolemy further argues that it is the motion of the stars and not the Earth that 
explains the phenomena by pointing out the “absurdity” of how fast the Earth would have 
to be rotating in order to “save the appearances” of the celestial bodies making one 
revolution around the Earth per day.  Ptolemy fails to address the speed problem applied 
to the heavenly bodies; namely, that given their great distance they would have to be 
  The 
bodies in the air, such as clouds and lightning, move more rapidly than terrestrial objects 
do.  Ptolemy argues that it does not make sense for the heaviest and most compact 
body—the Earth—to be spinning with regular and swift motion while the lightest bodies, 
the heavenly bodies, do not move at all.  Ptolemy’s argument is based on (i) local 
phenomena, things in the air (e.g. clouds and lightning bolts are faster moving than 
earthen things such as rocks) and (ii) the Earth is very heavy and very big, so it is less 
likely to rotate than the light heavenly bodies.  Here Ptolemy is arguing that because the 
Earth is large and heavy it is less likely for it to be moving than the stars.  However, 
previously Ptolemy argued that it is less likely that the Earth is moving compared with 
the stars because the Earth is only a point compared with the heavens, which press on it 
equally from all sides.   
                                                 
71 One question is why he thinks the celestial bodies are the lightest.  It is likely that Ptolemy would argue 
that because they are above us and do not fall on us, they must be lighter than anything that could fall on 
us.  If this is the case then it is entirely based on extrapolation from local phenomena, something he scorns 
in the previous quotation.  Of course, there is a sense in which we can only observe local phenomena, e.g. 
the light from the Moon reaching our eyes, from which we extrapolate the location of the Moon.  We have 
had to construct theories about light and gravity in order to understand why we are sometimes able to see 
stars that theory tells us are behind the Sun, and so should not be visible—we explain this by saying that 
light “bends” in gravitational fields. 
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revolving around the Earth virtually infinitely faster than the Earth would have to be 
rotating to produce the same observations.  This follows from Ptolemy’s demonstration 
that the Earth is only as a point compared to the heavens.   
 Ptolemy calls the moving Earth hypothesis a “simpler conjecture” but rejects it on 
the grounds that it does not fit with what we experience.  Ptolemy’s reasoning may be 
question begging depending on how he has determined that it is more likely for the stars 
to revolve around the Earth than it is for the Earth to rotate while the stars remain 
stationary.  If Ptolemy takes our experience to be just that the stars are revolving around 
the Earth, then he is guilty of begging the question because both competing hypotheses 
would create this same “experience”.  To avoid begging the question Ptolemy needs some 
independent reason for justifying the claim that it is more likely for the stars to move than 
it is for the Earth to move.  The question of whether Ptolemy has any independent reason 
for asserting that stars are light and move in circles is addressed by asking: Why does 
Ptolemy think it is more likely for the stars to be moving than it is for the Earth to be 
moving?  The answer is that Ptolemy thinks that the idea of the Earth moving while the 
stars remain motionless is “unnatural” because be believes that the stars are the “lightest 
and subtlest bodies” and that the Earth is the “heaviest and most compact.”  His primary 
reason for believing this is that the stars appear to revolve around the Earth every day.  
This is circular reasoning. 
 Ptolemy’s problematical thinking is further revealed by his tacit assumption that 
the motion of the Earth would cause observable phenomena in the air, but that the motion 
of the heavens would not cause the same phenomena.  The Earth being as a point to the 
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whole, if the heavens are able to keep the Earth motionless by pressing down on it, then 
the incredible speed of the celestial bodies around the Earth should be more than 
adequate to stir up the air and even to move the Earth.  If Ptolemy would argue that this 
does not occur because the ether is so light it cannot really push the fire or air much, then 
this would undermine the idea that since they are absolutely greatest, they push the Earth 
from all sides to keep the Earth immobile.   
 
Non-Mathematical Counterfactual  
 Ptolemy also makes non-mathematical counterfactual arguments such as for the 
immobility of the Earth (against those opponents of his theory who posit the “heavens [to 
be] immobile and the Earth as turning on the same axis from west to east very nearly one 
revolution a day” [Taliaferro, trans., 1989, p. 12]): 
 
But it has escaped their notice that, indeed, as far as the appearances of the 
stars are concerned, nothing would perhaps keep things from being in 
accordance with this simpler conjecture, but that in the light of what 
happens around us in the air such a notion would seem altogether absurd. 
(Taliaferro, trans., 1989, p. 12, emphasis added) 
 
The structure of the argument that the Earth cannot be moving that Ptolemy is referring to 
in this quotation is counterfactual: if the Earth were rotating then we would expect to 
observe certain counterfactual phenomena such as that clouds would never be seen to 
move toward the east because the Earth would always be moving faster in the eastward 
direction, and projectiles and other objects moving in the air would also be dramatically 
affected by the great speed of the Earth’s rotation.  In other words: we do not observe 
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certain phenomena; therefore, the Earth cannot be spinning.  The basic structure of the 
arguments tends to be that if the alternate hypothesis were correct, we would observe 
certain phenomena (x,y,z); however, we do not observe these effects and therefore, by 
modus tollens, the hypothesis is false.  To prove that the Earth is not moving (¬P): 
 
1) Assume P 
2) P→(x,y,z) (justified by common sense principles such as the addition of velocities, we 
 ought to feel like we are spinning very fast and there should be strange wind 
 effects and strange cannon trajectories, etc.)  
3) ¬(x,y,z) (observational data, we do not observe the expected phenomena) 
4) ¬P (modus tollens taking (2) and (3)) 
5) Therefore (1) is false and therefore ¬P, the Earth is not moving (excluded middle) 
 
 One could make such a counterfactual argument to try to give independent reason 
for supposing that the stars are lighter than the Earth.  One could argue for the hypothesis 
that celestial objects are lighter than air and fire based on the observation that the stars do 
not fall on our heads the way heavy objects do.  The counterfactual argument would look 
like the following: Our common experience is that if something is heavy then, when not 
impeded it falls toward the center of the Earth.  If the stars were heavy then they would 
fall toward the center of the Earth.  The stars do not fall toward the center of the Earth.  
Therefore, the stars are not heavy.  Notice this argument assumes that the stars are not 
impeded from falling.  The lack of discussion about whether or not the stars are heavy but 
impeded from falling toward the center of the Earth shows that Ptolemy’s arguments for 
the immobility of the Earth are not what must have convinced him of the fact initially, 
but rather what he thought made the best demonstrations after having fixed his belief. 
 As mentioned above, Ptolemy also argues for the immobility of the Earth based 
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on the absence of wind effects he believes would be present if the Earth were moving.  
Ptolemy believes it less likely that the Earth is moving than it is that the stars are moving, 
because the Earth would have to be spinning very fast, which is hard to imagine for such 
a big thing.  However, since he argues that the Earth must be as a point to the heavens, a 
reasonable deduction is that the stars must be moving incredibly fast.  Of course, since he 
assumes these are light, it is more intuitive to Ptolemy that they are moving than that the 
Earth is moving, even though the stars have to be moving at speeds much, much greater 
than the incredible speed the Earth would have to be moving 
 
Mathematical Formal 
 Ptolemy also makes mathematical arguments.  The first kind to mention is the 
formal mathematical argument found throughout the Almagest.  In fact, the Almagest is 
brimming with geometrical propositions that serve Ptolemy’s models.  Most of the books 
of the Almagest contain multiple demonstrations in Euclidean geometry; i.e. they rely on 
Euclidean propositions such as that all right triangles in the same semicircle are equal, or 
that equal arcs subtend equal angels, etc.  Most famously, in Book IV, in his discussion 
about modeling the Moon’s motions, Ptolemy demonstrates that the two different 
hypotheses for capturing planetary motion—the Eccentric and Epicyclic models—are 
equivalent.  That is, they yield identical predictions and fit the data identically.  These 
demonstrations are the most straightforward mathematically and also the most 
epistemically warranted arguments because they do not contain empirical content.  For 
this reason they serve as a model for empirical demonstrations, but because they do not 
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contain an empirical component the particular details of Ptolemy’s formal geometrical 




 Ptolemy makes qualitative arguments that are in a sense mathematical, in the 
sense that he employs his ideas about the properties of mathematical objects as evidence 
for what nature is like.  Examples of this kind of argument include Ptolemy’s claim that 
circles are appropriate to model the heavens, not because the math is simplest but because 
the heavens must proceed in the best possible way and circles are the best figure.72
 
  For 
example, in The Almagest I.3, Ptolemy argues the following: 
that, since the movement of the heavenly bodies ought to be the least 
impeded and most facile, the circle among plane figures offers the easiest 
path of motion, and the sphere among solids; likewise that, since of 
different figures having equal perimeters those having the more angles are 
the greater, the circle is the greatest of plane figures and the sphere of 
solid figures, and the heavens are greater than any other body.  Moreover, 
certain physical considerations lead to such a conjecture.  For example, the 
fact that of all bodies the ether has the finest and most homogeneous parts; 
but the surfaces of homogeneous parts must have homogeneous parts, and 
only the circle is such among plane figures and the sphere among solids. 
(Taliaferro, trans., 1989, p. 8) 
 
Ptolemy reveals here that his modeling of the heavens is greatly affected by his 
metaphysical views about what the heavens must be like, i.e. perfect.  Ptolemy is not 
arguing from the position of using the simplest mathematics to account for the 
                                                 
72 Although comparing this kind of argument to some of Aristotle’s arguments is controversial, the apparent 
similarity is strong enough to warrant consideration.  See discussion of De Caelo in chapter 2. 
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phenomena.  Instead, Ptolemy is either, explaining why the heavens necessarily move in 
circular motion; or, Ptolemy believes he has observed that he heavens move in perfect 
circular motion and is arguing for why this makes intuitive sense.  This reveals that 
Ptolemy is not merely modeling empirical demonstrations on mathematical 




 Quantitative mathematical arguments can be seen all over The Almagest, for 
instance, where Ptolemy demonstrates the efficacy of his models.  These kinds of 
arguments are mathematical because Ptolemy deduces from the mathematical models 
observational consequences.  These kinds of arguments argue from the position that if the 
observed phenomena are consistent with the mathematical models, then this fact of 
consistency is evidence for the verisimilitude of the models.73
 An example of quantitative demonstration is seen where Ptolemy uses the 
measurements and periods of planetary motion to calculate the actual size of the heavens 
in Planetary Hypotheses.  “In a later book, called Planetary Hypotheses, he abandons the 
purely descriptive attitude of a positivist and propounds some ideas about the possible 
physical structure and causes governing the planetary system” (Sambursky, 1962, p.141).  
Ptolemy takes the predictive accuracy of his planetary models as evidence that he has 
 
                                                 
73 This is akin to the way that contemporary theoretical physicists argue that consistent or simpler 
mathematics is strong evidence for the existence of the graviton, multidimensional strings, or the planet 
Vulcan (which was posited to exist to account for irregularities in Mercury’s orbit before Einstein’s theory 
of General Relativity gave a more satisfactory account).  
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captured the true motions of the planets—the actual physical distances and sizes of 
celestial objects and their orbits based on the combination of his models with basic 
measurements.  An example of a measurement that would serve Ptolemy in this kind of 
physical modeling would be Eratosthenes’ measurement of the circumference of the 
Earth.  Thus equipped, Ptolemy postulates a mechanical model of planetary motion that 
puts the celestial bodies in series of nested gears. 
 The fact that Ptolemy makes a mechanical model speaks to his commitment to the 
idea that his mathematical models reveal truths about nature.  One way to characterize 
this commitment is as scientific realism, as opposed to scientific instrumentalism.  
Scientific realism is the view that, in general, and allowing for errors and approximations, 
the better a scientific theory fits with the observational data, i.e. allows for accurate 
predictions, and coheres with other robust theories, the closer that theory is to getting at 
the true or real nature underlying phenomena.  Realist language includes talking about 
theories getting at the “fabric” of nature.  Van Fraassen (1980b) defines scientific 
realism: “Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is 
like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (p. 8).  
Scientific instrumentalism, on the other hand, contends that the move from “good fit with 
observational data” to claims about what truth about nature the theory is revealing are 
epistemically unjustifiable.  Scientific instrumentalists argue that, because there is no 
independent way to measure how well a theory represents ‘nature’ except by how well it 
fits with the observed phenomena, the realists are unjustified in making additional claims 
about a theory’s fit with nature.  Realists argue that, by pretending that the point of 
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scientific theories is not to get at what nature really is, instrumentalists are missing the 
point of science as well as misunderstanding the motivation of most scientists.  
Determining which side of the debate Ptolemy is on is controversial.  However, 
explaining the competing evidence locating him on each side will help clarify Ptolemy’s 
understanding of scientific demonstration because if Ptolemy is a realist, then we might 
take his commitment to mathematical modeling and mathematical parsimony as further 
evidence that he thinks that nature is inherently mathematical. 
 Strong evidence for claiming that Ptolemy ultimately takes a realist position 
comes from his later work titled Planetary Hypotheses, in which Ptolemy makes a 
mechanical model of the heavens (Sambursky, 1962, p. 141).  Further evidence 
supporting the claim that Ptolemy is a realist is the fact that he chooses his starting 
position for his models based on what he believes is true about the heavens and rejects 
those ideas which are “unnatural” such as that the Earth moves (e.g. Almagest I.7).  By 
contrast, an instrumentalist would not reject a potential model on the grounds that 
elements of the model violated beliefs about the structure of the world unless these 
elements precluded the model from saving the appearances.  That this is not Ptolemy’s 
approach argues for his being a realist. 
 On the other hand, there is also strong evidence to support the claim that 
Ptolemy’s method is instrumentalist.  He distinguishes between theoretical and practical 
philosophy and suggests that the closest we can come to certain knowledge in practical 
areas is to mathematically model observational data (Almagest, I.1).  This is indicative of 
instrumentalism.  The most powerful evidence for an instrumentalist interpretation of 
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Ptolemy’s work comes from his demonstration in the Almagest of the equivalence of his 
two different mathematical models of heavenly motion: the Eccentric and Epicyclic.  
This indicates instrumentalism because by demonstrating that the two different models 
are equivalent Ptolemy is tacitly acknowledging that there is no independent way to 
adjudicate between his models other than by how well they fit with the data; since both 
are identical with regard to the observational data, Ptolemy does not say that one is true 
or more true of heavenly motion.   
 The instrumentalist camp also argues that Ptolemy has a methodological 
preference for the simplest mathematical model that squares with appearances.  The 
instrumentalist claim is that the greatest influence on Ptolemy’s models is finding the 
simplest mathematical model that fits with the data.  It is argued that this criterion is what 
dictated that celestial bodies travel in uniform circular motion in his models and even 
Ptolemy chooses the Earth as the center of the heavens.  Thus, the argument is that 
Ptolemy is an instrumentalist because he has chosen to build models based more on 
parsimony than on physical knowledge or physical intuition. 
 There is further support for the instrumentalist idea that Ptolemy is more 
concerned with simplicity of theory than he is with physical intuitions.  Sambursky 
(1962) reports that Ptolemy’s biggest motivation is the elimination of redundancies and, 
as far as possible, ad hoc additions in his theories, which speaks to simplicity of theory.  
One example of Ptolemy eliminating redundancy is his assumption that either the Earth is 
moving or the celestial bodies are moving but not both.  In fact, Ptolemy does not seem to 
consider the possibility that both the Earth and the stars are moving in order to produce 
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the appearances.  Giving motion to both in his models would have allowed for the Earth 
to spin more slowly; the rapid speed of the Earth was one of Ptolemy’s reasons for 
rejecting the hypothesis that the Earth’s motion produces the appearances.  Although it is 
easier to imagine two contrary motions producing the immense relative speeds necessary 
for the solar system models, it is nonetheless redundant to have two motions where one 
would suffice and so would not be as simple and hence, it is unacceptable to Ptolemy.  
The assumption that only one motion accounts for the appearance of the fixed stars 
traveling daily around the Earth allows Ptolemy to set up the counterfactual that if it is 
the Earth’s motion that explains the appearances then the Earth must be rotating very 
rapidly, and hence a super-wind.74
 There is also evidence that works against the argument that Ptolemy is an 
instrumentalist based on his preference for parsimony over physical knowledge and 
intuition.  For instance, Ptolemy acknowledges that the hypothesis that the Earth is 
moving instead of all the celestial bodies moving is a simpler hypothesis, but he chooses 
to put the stars in motion in his model instead of the Earth based on his understanding of 
the nature of heavenly bodies.  This is a realist consideration, not an instrumentalist one.  
Furthermore, the argument that Ptolemy is an instrumentalist based on his apparent 
interest in simplicity of theory over physical considerations is missing the point that 
Ptolemy chooses the simplest mathematical models of the heavens because he believes 
 
                                                 
74 Of course, the factor more important than simplicity is that the hypotheses must square with experience. 
Ptolemy thinks that our experience of not being constantly confronted with a thousand mile per hour wind 
is strong evidence that the Earth is not moving. This ‘experience’ is only as persuasive evidence as the 
intuition about a counterfactual world is supportable. Galileo, for instance, does not deny that we do not 
feel a thousand mile per hour wind, but instead Galileo uses the idea of relative motion to deny Ptolemy’s 
intuition about the effects we would experience in the opposing cases of celestial or terrestrial motion. 
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that it is necessary that the actual heavenly bodies must move in the most mathematically 
simple way possible.75  Instead of being motivated by wanting to use the simplest 
mathematical models for the instrumental goal of ease of use, Ptolemy uses the simplest 
math because of his intuition and metaphysical beliefs about the constitution of the 
heavens.76
 In addition to showing that mathematics is used as a model for demonstrations in 
empirical science the examples of Archimedes, Eratosthenes, and Ptolemy provide a 
glimpse of the expanded connection between mathematics and empirical science.  This is 
seen, for instance, where Eratosthenes introduces mathematical fictions that allow him to 
treat physical objects as mathematical objects.
   
77
 Despite the continued application of mathematics to the study of the natural world 
by Archimedes, Eratosthenes, and Ptolemy among others (e.g. Aristarchus), in general, 
after about the second century B.C.E., mathematics became more segregated from other 
  The expanded application of 
mathematics in empirical scientific demonstration is also seen where Archimedes relies 
upon mechanical practice to aid in mathematical discovery and geometrical 
demonstrations to prove physical properties, such as the law of the lever.  Of our cases 
studies, Ptolemy goes the farthest in creating mathematical models of nature, which he 
then uses to construct mechanical models. 
                                                 
75 cf. Newton’s Rule 1 in Principia, Book III (p. 398). 
76 It is also the case that the simpler math is more convenient; however, Copernicus argues that the 
mathematical model is simpler if everything revolves around the Sun. If Ptolemy were an instrumentalist he 
might have proposed a heliocentric model even though it would have seemed entirely implausible to him. 
77 For example, in Eratosthenes’ demonstration of the length of the circumference of the Earth, he treats 
lines that begin at different places on the Earth and end at the Sun as parallel lines even though he believes 
that these lines cannot be parallel. Given what we know about the relative sizes of the Earth and Sun and 
the immense distance from the Earth to the Sun, this fiction is an obvious one to make; however, 
Eratosthenes did not have the information we do, and as a geometer, it was a significant step to begin from 
an assumption that he believed to be false. 
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sciences, more specialized as a separate discipline.  In the third and second centuries, the 
study of mathematics expanded to “the exclusion of such subjects as the constitution of 
matter or the classification of natural substances” (Lloyd, 1973, p. 52).  Empirical 
investigation did not stop; for instance, the 3rd century saw the rise of Epicureanism, 




3.3 Decline in Empirical Science and Rise in Developing Technology in the Early 
 Middle Ages  
 
Because Copernicus began where Ptolemy had stopped many people 
conclude that there was no science during the intervening centuries.  In 
fact, there was much intense though spasmodic scientific activity, and it 
played an essential role in preparing the ground for the inception and 
success of the Copernican Revolution. (Kuhn, 1985, p. 100) 
 
Here Kuhn speaks to the misconception that Greek science was extinguished after the 
second century B.C.E. and that substantial scientific investigation did not begin again 
until the sixteenth century, with Copernicus.  A less extreme but still oversimplified view 
is that after its “demise” in the second century B.C.E., natural science was not revived 
until the reintroduction of Aristotle’s logic and Euclid’s geometry in the twelfth century.  
There were several notable counterexamples to these claims:  Ptolemy, Galen, 
Iamblichus, Proclus, Simplicius, and Philoponus, among others.79
                                                 
78 Epicurus is clear that the inquiry into nature is also driven entirely by the desire for tranquility – physical 
investigation is not an end in itself; and it does not matter to Epicurus what explanation is correct, as long 
as it is materialist (Letter to Pythocles, Inwood and Gerson, trans., 1988, p. 16). 
  There is nonetheless a 
79 Ptolemy’s contributions are discussed above. John Philoponus (c. 490-570 C.E.) is mentioned in chapter 
2; we will not go into the details of his work here; however, in support of the position that Philoponus 
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reason for the misconception that Kuhn addresses.  The reason is that there was a sharp 
decline in empirical scientific investigation during the early Middle Ages (roughly the 
fifth to early twelfth centuries) from the sort of investigations conducted by the list of 
authors above.  This section attributes this decline, at least in part, to the rise of 
Christianity in general, and Augustine’s teachings in particular.  The majority of 
empirical investigation that remained during this time was strictly in the pursuit of 
technology.  What accessible knowledge there was of Greek science was handed down by 
the Encyclopedists.     
 This list of counterexamples above notwithstanding, there are reasons for 
suggesting the view that there was a conspicuous absence of scientific investigation in the 
early centuries C.E.  Augustine (354-430 C.E.) is an exemplar of the general de-emphasis 
of the importance of scientific investigation or perhaps of investigating nature at all.  The 
following excerpt from Augustine’s Confessions criticizes the investigation of empirical 
sciences, especially Aristotle’s concept of scientific knowledge for its own sake. 
 
In addition to that concupiscence of the flesh present in delight in all the 
senses and in every pleasure—and its slaves put themselves far from you 
and perish utterly—by reason of those same bodily senses, there is present 
in the soul a certain vain and curious desire, cloaked over with the title of 
knowledge and science, not to take pleasure in the flesh but to acquire new 
experiences through the flesh . . . . Because of this morbid curiosity, 
monstrous sights are exhibited in the show places.  Because of it, men 
proceed to search out the secrets of nature, things beyond our end, to know 
which profits us nothing, and of which men desire nothing but the 
knowing. (X.35, Ryan, trans., 1960, pp. 264-5) 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually engaged in empirical scientific investigations Wildberg (2007) claims that, “Although the 
Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition was the source of his intellectual roots and concerns, he was an original 
thinker who eventually broke with that tradition in many important respects, both substantive and 
methodological, and cleared part of the way which led to more critical and empirical approaches in the 




Augustine demarcates in this passage what it is important to study and natural science 
suffers for it.  Although it is controversial, I take Augustine to be condemning studying 
empirical science for any reason, except perhaps for than spiritual enlightenment.  
Augustine’s reason for disparaging empirical investigation seems to be that it encourages 
the inappropriate focus of one’s attention on to the senses.  My position that Augustine 
undermines natural scientific investigation follows Lloyd (1973) but contradicts Ryan 
(1960).  Ryan holds that this chapter of Confessions should not be taken to mean that 
Augustine is “opposed to valid and worth-while scientific knowledge” (p. 406 endnote 8 
to chapter X.35); Ryan argues, instead, that Augustine is interested in genuine 
knowledge, not idle curiosity.  Ryan’s generous interpretation takes Augustine to be 
condemning the seeking of self-indulgent pleasures and feelings, but not condemning 
genuine empirical scientific investigation.  If this is correct, then Ryan would need to 
elucidate what Augustine considers to be genuine knowledge, which he does not.  Ryan 
would be going too far to claim that Augustine is interested in the kinds of science that 
Aristotle and his successors are engaged in.  This is clear in the last clause of the 
quotation where Augustine specifically targets the Aristotelian ideal of scientific 
knowledge for its own sake. 
 There is further evidence that supports the position that Augustine largely rejects 
empirical science.  Contrary to Ryan’s position, it is more likely that Augustine thinks the 
valid branches of science are quite different from the traditional areas of natural science; 
for example, in Confessions X.35, Augustine says: “I do not care now to know the 
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courses of the stars” (Ryan, trans., 1960, p. 265).  Genuine knowledge to Augustine 
seems to be applicable only to theological matters and not the empirical world. 
 If Augustine is interested in science, it is only in the general sense of a reasoned 
method for demonstrating knowledge and not about learning about the empirical world, 
except perhaps through divine inspiration.  Augustine’s undermining of natural 
philosophy is even more apparent in his Enchiridion on Faith:   
 
. . . it is not necessary to probe into the nature of things, as was done by 
those whom the Greeks call physici; nor need we be in alarm lest the 
Christian should be ignorant of the force and number of the elements—the 
motion, and order, and eclipses of the heavenly bodies; the form of the 
heavens; the species and the natures of animals, plants, stones, fountains, 
rivers, mountains; about chronology and distances; the signs of coming 
storms; and a thousand other things which those philosophers either have 
found out, or think they have found out . . . . It is enough for the Christian 
to believe that the only cause of all created things, whether heavenly or 
earthly, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator, the 
one true God; and that nothing exists but Himself that does not derive its 
existence from Him. (Bk. IX, Shaw, trans., 1961, p. 9-10) 
 
By naming the very empirical sciences that Aristotle and his intellectual heirs pursued, 
Augustine makes even clearer his position that studying nature is a hindrance to proper 
learning (by which he means Christian theology).80
 The decline in interest in the inquiry into nature coincides with a decline in 
interest in using empirical investigative techniques for epistemic justification.  As seen in 
  Crombie (1953) shares the view that 
Augustine disavows natural philosophy; Augustine values nature only as “sacramental 
and symbolic of spiritual truths” (Crombie, 1953, p. 11). 
                                                 
80 When Greek science was reintroduced in the Latin West, the emphasis on Christianity remained, but the 
sense of inherent conflict between Christianity and science lessened (in some schools).  For instance, 
Adelard of Bath acknowledges that we must look for the physical causes that the divine artificer has used to 
understand the creator’s creation.  See Section 3.4 below. 
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these excerpts Augustine eschews the pursuits of the empirical sciences as well as the 
foundational investigative technique of the empirical sciences—using one’s senses to 
collect observational data.  Augustine’s rational technique of divine revelation for 
theological understanding largely supplanted Aristotle’s idea of “getting one’s hands 
dirty” as a way of learning about nature. 
 Although Augustine and his followers had a strong dampening impact the 
prevalence of empirical scientific inquiry, it would not be accurate to say that there was 
no empirical investigation during this time.  Owing to the interest in manipulating nature, 
some empirical investigation occurred even though for the most part it was not ‘scientific 
investigation’ in the sense of constructing rigorous demonstrations of knowledge.  Many 
significant inventions came out of this time by trial and error discovery techniques.81
                                                 
81Technological innovations included new harnessing techniques and the nailed horseshoe, as well as the 
reintroduction and sophistication of the watermill and windmill, which led to the development of power- 
driven machinery.  These machines used gears and the crank and included the tap hammer, forge bellows, 
and wood saws, among others. (Crombie, 1953) Combining these machines allowed for improvements in 
tools such as the plough, and to industrial complexes such as fulling mills. (Derry and Williams, 1960)  
(Hero of Alexandria had developed a water pump and perhaps even a steam pump in the 1st century C.E., 
but these were basically toys, not serious machines, and much was lost in Western Christendom after the 
fall of Rome.) 
  
Although there may have been some interest in the ‘why’ behind the innovations of the 
time, for the most part the motivation seems to have been pragmatic development of 
technology.  There was a notable absence of theory building and careful epistemic 
justification.  Searching for technological developments without regard to understanding 
why things work or justifying one’s new knowledge contradicts Aristotle’s idea of 
science as the systematic search for natural causes and first principles, which are not 
sought for practical application. 
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 What remained of Greek science and learning in the Latin West during the early 
Middle Ages was handed down by the Latin encyclopedists (Crombie, 1995, p. 30).  The 
Natural History of Pliny (23-79 C.E.) is one such example of an encyclopedic work that 
survived in part and influenced scholarship during the early Middle Ages.  Before the 
Greek and Arab ancient texts were translated into Latin in the twelfth century, Pliny’s 
Natural History was the largest known collection of data about nature (Crombie, 1995, p. 
30-1).  Different disciplines owed their intellectual inheritance to different 
encyclopedists.  For instance, much of the Greek math and logic available in the Latin 
West during the early Middle Ages survived because of Boethius.  Much of what was 
known about medicine was passed down in versions of Oribasius’ summaries of Galen’s 
works, although these remained in Greek and so were not commonly accessible.  
 The decline in the study of nature was in part due to the rise of Christianity (as 
seen in the Augustine quotations above).  It should also be noted that, to some degree, the 
contrary is also the case: Christian scholarship helped preserve the Greek and Arabic 
scholarship that had already been done.  The vast majority of what survives from 
antiquity survived because of monk scribes.82
                                                 
82 Although they only account for a small fraction of the extant ancient texts, there have been some 
remarkable papyrus finds in the last few centuries which do not owe their persistence to the diligent scribes. 
  Also, Christian scholars were the only 
scholars in the Latin West during this time and some science writing may have survived 
just because learned people often learn whatever is available.  Nonetheless, passing along 
scientific data is not the same as carrying out the activity of scientific investigation, 
which is what we are chronicling here.  
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 Thus, little progress was made with regard to empirical scientific investigation 
and scientific explanation during the early Middle Ages.  Crombie (1995) claims that a 
“preoccupation with the magical and astrological properties of natural objects was, with 
the search for moral symbols, the chief characteristic of the scientific outlook of Western 
Christendom before the 13th century” (p. 36).  Next we examine some of the notable 
thinkers responsible for changing the character of scientific investigation in the Latin 
West.  The next significant advancement in empirical science came with the translation 
first of Aristotle’s treatises on logic and Euclid’s geometry into Latin, closely followed 
by much more of Aristotle’s works as well as the works of other Greek natural 
philosophers.  
 
3.4 Reintroduction of Greek Science Marks the Beginning of Scholasticism and 
 Becomes the Seed of Modern Science. 
 
 Understanding how the reintroduction of Greek science influenced scientific 
thinking beginning in the twelfth century provides a basis for comprehending how the 
seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, and specifically Galileo’s contribution were 
formed.  Instead of thinking of Galileo as beginning modern science in the seventeenth 
century, it might be more useful to think of Galileo’s contribution as solidifying the most 
important elements of modern science, which really began to form in the twelfth century 
when philosophers of the Latin West began combining study of the newly translated 
ancient scientific texts with the medieval tradition of pragmatic empirical investigation.  
Supporting the view that Modern science began in the twelfth century, Crombie (1953) 
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characterizes the early development of the Modern scientific method as an attempt to 
apply ancient mathematical techniques of explanation and demonstration found in the 
ancient texts newly translated into Latin from Greek and Arabic to the medieval 
traditions of empirical investigation, tradition of, primarily, trial and error. 
 The earliest and perhaps most significant texts were the twelfth-century Latin 
translations of Aristotle’s logical treatises and Euclid’s geometry.  Aristotle’s texts 
explain and Euclid’s exemplify a system for rigorously demonstrating knowledge.  What 
the Greeks had invented and passed down was geometrical demonstration, or proof, in 
which a “particular fact was explained when it could be deduced from general principles 
which related it to other facts” (Crombie, 1953, p. 3).  Twelfth century thinkers, thus 
equipped, began trying to combine this understanding of rigorous demonstration with the 
more hands on approach of trial and error observation and manipulation of nature that 
had developed in the early Middle Ages.83
 Adelard of Bath (ca. 1080—1152), who is sometimes credited with the 
reintroduction of Greek geometry to the Latin West (Burnett, 1998), provides one 
example of combining rigorous demonstrations with empirical investigation.  In 
Adelard’s philosophical writings, which are in the form of a dialogue between a 
  The result was the roots of Modern 
experimental science. 
                                                 
83 As discussed in chapter 2 and as will be discussed at greater length in chapter 4, Aristotle believed in 
“getting his hands dirty.” The point being made here is not that Aristotle completely relied on rational 
reconstruction at the expense of empirical observation; instead the point is that the trial-and-error 
manipulation of nature for technology’s sake eventually gave rise to “experimental science,” in the proper 




philosopher and his nephew, Adelard speaks explicitly about looking for explanations 
that are natural instead of divine:  
 
Nephew: “ . . . when you see plants rise up from it, to what are you to 
attribute this unless to the wondrous effect of the wondrous divine will?” 
 
Adelard: “It is indeed the will of the Creator that plants should be born 
from the earth.  But that will is not without reason.  To make this clear, I 
agree that plants are born from earth, but not from pure earth: rather, from 
mixed earth—in the kind of mixture that contains in each of its parts 
(those at least which lie open to the senses) all four elements with their 
qualities.” (Burnett, trans., 1998, p. 93) 
 
The quotation first exhibits the kind of explanation common during Adelard’s time: 
namely, that phenomenon x (in this case plants growing out of seemingly empty soil) is 
caused by God.  However, this type of account lacks explanatory power for Adelard.  He 
expresses a preference for explanations involving evidence from sense data instead of 
justification supposedly coming from unseen essences.  Adelard’s explanation moves 
toward physical causes determinable by sense and reason.  But Adelard’s limited 
understanding of elements means that he, too, is basing much reasoning on the 
unobservable.  Nonetheless, this is an improvement in scientific thinking very similar to 
the Pre-Socratic philosophers trying to develop explanations based on elements rather 
than on divine intervention.  And similar to the Pre-Socratics, Adelard has limited 
empirical support for supposing what he does about the elements. 
 Robert Grosseteste’s (c. 1168–1253) work also sheds light on the development of 
empirical scientific investigation including scientific explanation.  Grosseteste was the 
founder of the Oxford school of thought, and may mark the beginning of the Modern 
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tradition of experimental science.  Riedl (1942) emphasizes this idea: “In philosophy 
Grosseteste represents, and indeed might well be called the founder of, a new tradition, 
characterized by the blending of philosophy with experimental science” (p.2).84
 Pointing out further similarities between Grosseteste’s scientific method and 
ancient Greek science allows us to be explicit about where Grosseteste’s innovations 
reveal departure from previous Middle Ages thinkers.  Following Aristotle, Grosseteste’s 
theory of subordinate sciences relates the mathematical sciences to the rest of the natural 
sciences.
  
Grosseteste is useful for our inquiry here because his work has both Ancient and Modern 
science qualities.  His treatises are methodical and clear illustrations of an attempt to 
address epistemological problems while developing a rudimentary experimental method.  
Grosseteste discusses his scientific method, including his experimental method, and tries 
to give justification for his observational techniques.  Moreover, as does ancient Greek 
science, Grosseteste tries to apply his scientific method by giving demonstrations, many 
of which are mathematical in character, of his findings. 
85
                                                 
84 I agree with the thrust of Riedl’s claim; however, he is being either too generous or too imprecise when 
he implies that “experimental science” already existed and Grosseteste was merely incorporating it.  
  Grosseteste distinguishes between science propter quid (on account of what: 
reason) and science quia (that is the case: fact).  Grosseteste applies this distinction in the 
investigation of the rainbow:  “The consideration of the rainbow belongs both to the 
student of optics (perspectivi) and to the physicist, but the fact (‘quid’) is the province of 
the physicist and the reason (‘propter quid’) the province of the student of optics” (De 
85 Recall Aristotle’s distinction between knowing why something happens versus knowing that something 
is the case.  See chapter 2. 
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Iride, Crombie, trans., 1953, p. 117).  This is the same distinction that Aristotle makes in 
the Posterior Analytics (79a1-13). 
 
Grosseteste on the Rainbow 
 Having examined Aristotle’s treatment of the rainbow (see chapter 2), examining 
Grosseteste’s explanation of the rainbow illustrates where Grosseteste departs from 
Aristotle and further, illustrates the extent to which Grosseteste’s concept of scientific 
demonstration is a precursor to Galileo’s concept of scientific demonstration.  Claims that 
Galileo invented the concept of empirical experiments (as opposed to thought 
experiments, which date back at least as far as Aristotle), ignore the fact that Grosseteste 
worked with a rudimentary experimental method.86
 We are less concerned with Grosseteste’s findings about the rainbow than we are 
with his methods of discovery and justification.  Discussing where Grosseteste errs as 
well as succeeds is informative of his method.  Grosseteste earns the label ‘empiricist’ 
because of his commitment to the idea that scientific theories must be tested by 
experiments; it is an explicit part of his method that theories that are contradicted by 
experimentation must be abandoned (Crombie, 1953, p. 124).  However, this does not 
  Unlike his early Middle Ages 
predecessors, Grosseteste was concerned with epistemic justification: he offered critical 
analysis of his method for collecting empirical evidence and he was concerned with 
giving scientific demonstrations.  These mark Grosseteste’s kind of inquiry as empirical 
science, which is different from the empirical pursuit for new technology. 
                                                 
86 See discussion in chapter 1 of common and often misleading accounts in the literature of Galileo’s 
contribution to the Scientific Revolution. 
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mean that Grosseteste had great experimental technique.  The following excerpt from 
Grosseteste’s discussion of optics reveals mistakes due to inadequate sampling and from 
over-reliance on his physical intuitions/metaphysical beliefs about the orderliness of 
nature:  
 
That the size of the angle in the refraction of a ray may be determined in 
this way, is shown us by experiments similar to those by which we 
discovered that the reflection of a ray upon a mirror takes place at an angle 
equal to the angle of incidence.  And this same point has been made clear 
to us by the principle of natural philosophy that ‘every operation of nature 
takes place in the most perfect, orderly, briefest and best way that is 
possible’. (Crombie, trans., 1953, p. 123-4) 
 
Grosseteste’s understanding of and his commitment to the metaphysical principle that 
nature is orderly led to his thinking that paths in nature, such as the path of light, would 
trace equal lines and divide angles equally, etc., which yields an incorrect account of 
refraction.  Crombie (1953) points out that Grosseteste could have avoided coming to a 
false conclusion about refraction had he spent more time following his avowed method of 
collecting empirical data:  
 
Very simple experiments could have shown Grosseteste that his 
quantitative law of refraction was not correct.  He was, in fact, primarily a 
methodologist rather than an experimentalist, and also, perhaps, he was 
too much obsessed with the principle of economy, according to which he 
believed lux [light] to behave, and with the alleged similarity between 
refraction and reflection, to arrive at a correct understanding of the 




Crombie also identifies the source of Grosseteste’s error as his over-reliance on 
metaphysical commitments, such as the principle of economy.87
 The criticism, that Grosseteste’s metaphysics led him astray is too vague.  One 
might assume that one’s metaphysics are a source of error primarily when they are 
unknown to the holder of them.  However, Grosseteste’s erroneous demonstration of 
refraction gives us an example of someone who is aware of and purposely using his 
metaphysical views to inform his empirical science explanation.  Because everyone has 
metaphysical views, conscious and unconscious, the fact of their existence in a scientist 
cannot be the problem.  What Grosseteste does is to rely, not only on the metaphysical 
principle that nature is orderly, but also on his assumed ability to correctly apply this 
principle to specific cases, such as to the path of light.  Where Grosseteste goes wrong 
then is in his inference from the principle of orderliness to the conclusion that light 
refracts just as it reflects, where the angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection.  
Thus, a more explicit critique of Grosseteste error, rather than simply claiming that his 
metaphysics led him astray, is to recognize that in determining his law of refraction he 
does not adequately empirically test his inference, i.e. the hypothesis that light will bend 
a certain way because of the orderliness of nature. 
 
 Grosseteste’s shortcomings as an experimentalist notwithstanding, his explicit 
discussion of his method for evaluating and constructing scientific explanations is 
illustrative of his innovations to scientific inquiry.  When Grosseteste argues against 
                                                 
87 The general error of overvaluing metaphysical commitments is not new with Grosseteste, nor does it end 
with him. Francis Bacon will warn against this problem 400 years later in The New Organon. Bacon calls 
the causes of misunderstanding natural processes because of the false ideas that have seeped into our minds 
from previous philosophies, “Idols of the Theater.” 
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previous explanations of the rainbow, he uses mathematics, experimental observations, 
and his metaphysical ideas about the perfection and parsimony of nature. 
 
Nor can a rainbow be produced by the reflection of the rays of the sun 
from the convexity of mist descending from the cloud, as from a convex 
mirror, in such a way that the concavity of the cloud may receive the 
reflected rays and thus a rainbow appear, because if that were so the shape 
of all rainbows would not be an arc, and it would happen that in 
proportion as the sun was higher so would the rainbow be bigger and 
higher, and in proportion as the sun was lower so would the rainbow be 
smaller, of which the contrary is manifest to the senses. (De Iride, 
Crombie, trans., 1953, p. 126) 
 
Based on what he thinks is the case about refraction, reflection, and convex mirrors, 
which, comes from his, albeit limited, experimentation, Grosseteste argues that the 
rainbow could not be produced by reflection.  Having determined that other explanations 
for the rainbow are insufficient to produce the observed phenomena, Grosseteste infers 
that his account is the correct one because it accounts for the phenomena. 
 Grosseteste’s reasoning process in the case of the rainbow is indicative of his 
concept of ‘experimental science’.  First, Grosseteste determines, supposedly by 
experimental observations, that reflection in convex mirrors could produce phenomena 
such as the rainbow; from this, Grosseteste induces that there must be a similar process 
occurring in the sky that produces the rainbow.  He determines that refraction in convex 
objects produces this effect.  He decides that the light from the Sun is refracting in 
“convex clouds”: “Therefore the rainbow must be produced by the refraction of rays of 
the Sun in the mist of a convex cloud.  For I hold that the exterior of a cloud is convex 
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and the interior of it is concave, as is clear from the nature of light and heavy” (Crombie, 
trans., 1953, p. 126).   
 Grosseteste takes it for granted that the common understanding of the “light and 
heavy” will make it obvious to his audience why clouds must have the shape that they do, 
but this is not obvious.  If he is relying on Aristotle’s idea that heavy objects fall faster 
than light objects, then Grosseteste might be thinking that as air becomes heavier ( i.e. 
combined with more water), it will begin to move downward and, as it does, the heavier 
portions will move down faster, creating a curved shape, hence the concavity and 
convexity of clouds.  Of course Grosseteste is mistaken about the shape of clouds and 
what exactly is the refracting surface; nonetheless, his explanation is closer to our 
contemporary understanding of the rainbow than previous explanations are—i.e., that 
rainbows require both refraction and reflection, and curved refractive surfaces, are all 
necessary components of our contemporary understanding of the rainbow. 
 Grosseteste’s work has similarities with Aristotle’s concept of scientific 
explanation in that he considers previous and competing accounts, uses mathematical 
arguments to show impossibilities, and relies heavily on the regularity of nature as well 
as the intuition that natural phenomena are readily knowable to us.  Grosseteste’s work 
also exhibits similarities with Galileo’s approach to scientific investigation in that he at 
least tries to perform empirical experiments and makes inductive arguments for his 
theories based on specific experimental observations.  In spite of his failure to 
consistently follow his own method, he helped to lay the groundwork for further 




Theodoric on the Rainbow 
 Theodoric (or Dietrich) of Freiberg (c. 1250-1310 C.E.) is another contributor to 
the development of empirical scientific investigation during this period.  His contribution 
to the rainbow illustrates a greater conceptual ability to consider the relationship between 
small scale and large scale phenomena as well as greater sensitivity to avoiding errors 
caused by metaphysical commitments.  
 Boyer (1987) describes Theodoric’s insight about rainbows: 
 
Never once did the thought seem to have occurred to [Alhazen], or to 
anyone (with the possible exception of Albertus Magnus) before the 
fourteenth century, that a globe of water can be thought of, not as a 
diminutive spherical cloud, but as a magnified raindrop.  This was the 
brilliantly simple idea which came to Theodoric, and with it he coupled an 
equally simple postulate—that the rainbow is but the aggregate of the 
effects produced by each individual raindrop, without reference to the 
properties of the cone or sphere or other figure which as a totality they 
might resemble. (p. 112) 
 
It would be difficult to say exactly what led Theodoric to this powerful, yet simple 
insight.  However, we may speculate that the basis for Theodoric’s idea is to think more 
analytically (in the more modern sense of breaking phenomena into components) than 
Aristotle and Grosseteste appear to have been able to.  Instead of positing a separate 
aggregate body that would explain our sensory perceptions of the rainbow, Theodoric 
figured out how to aggregate the individual components, knowledge of which is easier to 
devise through experimentation, for instance, with drops of water.  One source of the idea 
might be the need to account for the fact that the rainbow does not change apparent 
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position with a change in the observer’s position (as one might expect it to if it were a 
large scale reflective phenomenon).    
 Besides revealing a step in the progression in scientific thinking in his explanation 
of the rainbow, Theodoric is also relevant to our investigation because he discusses his 
scientific practice in relation to Aristotle’s.  Moreover, writing about Aristotle’s 
authority, Theodoric expresses a more sophisticated view than is expressed by Galileo’s 
Aristotelian contemporaries. 
 
We say that one should teach that which the Philosopher [Aristotle] said, 
for the authority of his philosophic doctrine and for the respect it deserves; 
and each one should interpret that which is said according to the same 
Philosopher, that one never should depart from that which is evident from 
the senses. (Boyer, trans., 1987, p. 113)88
 
 
Theodoric is concerned about the relative levels of justification for making a scientific 
assertion.  In this quotation Theodoric acknowledges the importance of studying 
Aristotle’s works, but he also asserts that one’s observations should trump Aristotle’s 
findings, when there is disagreement between them.  Theodoric is implying that past 
scientific findings, even by the master, should be revisable based on new observational 
data.  Although Aristotle also implies this in the Posterior Analytics, in practice Aristotle 
does not make much room for new observations to revise his theories.  Aristotle instead 
thinks new observations can lead to deeper knowledge, but he does not talk about what 
new observational data would be sufficient to falsify his theories.  Just as Theodoric was 
not explicit about how he arrived at his insight about explaining the rainbow, he was not 
                                                 
88 As a testament to his influence, it is worth noting that Theodoric’s referring to Aristotle as “the 
Philosopher” became common practice from the beginning of Scholasticism through Galileo’s time.  
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explicit about his insight about revising theories, nonetheless, this marked advance in 
evaluating and constructing scientific explanations. 
 In general, Theodoric’s concept of scientific explanation is not fundamentally 
different from Aristotle’s or Grosseteste’s; however, he seems to be capable of exercising 
greater caution about what assumptions he relies on than they do.  One source of error for 
Aristotle and Grosseteste is a tendency to over-supplement their observations with 
rational reconstruction, which is illustrated by their discussions of the causes of the 
rainbow.  Recall that Aristotle is forced to make unwarranted assertions about the 
behavior of mist and color dispersion and Grosseteste virtually assumes that refraction 
will mimic reflection because nature is perfect.  It is especially difficult to explain 
phenomena that cannot be observed directly or close at hand, but this difficulty could be 
treated as a caution against theorizing beyond one’s ability to empirically test 
hypotheses.89
 
  It is not clear exactly how Theodoric seems to have avoided this particular 
pitfall in empirical science.  It may be an illusion that Theodoric had a significantly 
improved method, created by posterity’s only preserving his very best work; after all, it 
would not be surprising if only his best work survived.  In any case, his contribution to 
the explanation of the rainbow and his discussion about the priority of observation over 
authority, mark advances in late Middle Ages empirical science.  
                                                 
89 As above, Ptolemy makes mistakes for similar reasons when arguing for the immobility of the Earth. We 
will see in chapter 4 that Galileo gives up looking for certain kinds of explanations for things that cannot be 
directly observed.  The effect is that there are fewer spheres Galileo considers for scientific investigation, 
but the expectation is that there will be greater accuracy and certainty within the areas of investigation that 
are susceptible to Galileo’s methods.  Further confirmation of the success of Galileo’s project is evinced 
when we see that Galileo’s own mistakes come when he slips back into thinking he can rely on his intuition 




 Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) also provides an important link between 
Ancient and Modern science because, although his basic methodology follows Ptolemy’s, 
he constructed a heliocentric model of the solar-system that provided the subject matter 
for Galileo’s most controversial work. 
 
Aristotle was the last great cosmologist of antiquity, and Ptolemy, who 
lived almost five centuries after Aristotle, was its last great astronomer.  
Until after the death of Copernicus in 1543, the writings of these two men 
dominated the astronomical and cosmological thought of the West.  
Copernicus seems their immediate heir, for in the thirteen centuries that 
separate Ptolemy’s death from Copernicus’ birth no large and enduring 
modification had been imposed upon their work. (Kuhn, 1985, p. 100) 
 
Although the Scientific Revolution and the Copernican Revolution are often conflated in 
casual parlance, it is useful to distinguish between these two significant developments in 
Western thought.  Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium (1543) was the 
spark that grew into the Copernican Revolution in astronomy and cosmology.  Although 
it took some time to catch on, Copernicus’ revolution moved the previously immovable 
world.  Copernicus changed the way people see the Earth in the heavens: for instance, his 
system requires that the Earth not be the center of the solar system, that it be insignificant 
in size and incomprehensibly distant from the fixed stars.90
                                                 
90 This is a necessary assumption that Copernicus makes in order to account for the apparent lack of 
parallax when viewing the fixed stars from the Earth when the Earth is on opposite sides of the sun, e.g. in 
spring as opposed to fall. Recall that in the Ptolemaic models, Earth is at the center of everything and it 
may be much closer to the sphere of the fixed stars (so-called because the stars do not move with respect to 
each other even though in Ptolemy’s models they are revolving en masse around the Earth very fast). 
  The Scientific Revolution, on 
the other hand, is more broadly understood as a shift in our conception of nature: it 
includes, but is not limited to, the Copernican Revolution.  It is helpful to articulate 
 
 128 
Copernicus’ influence on Galileo Because the Copernican Revolution constitutes a 
significant step in the Scientific Revolution, and because, in part, it was through trying to 
demonstrate Copernicus’ heliocentric model that Galileo was led to develop his methods 
of scientific explanation. 
 To understand Copernicus’ influence on Galileo it is useful to understand 
Copernicus’ concept of scientific explanation.  Copernicus was motivated by the 
inconsistencies and ad hoc additions to the Ptolemaic solar-system models.  In 
Copernicus’ dedicatory letter to Pope Paul III, he explains his dissatisfaction with the 
then current state of astronomy: 
 
So I should like your Holiness to know that I was induced to think of a 
method of computing the motions of the spheres by nothing else than the 
knowledge that the Mathematicians are inconsistent in these 
investigations.  For, first, the mathematicians are so unsure of the 
movements of the Sun and Moon that they cannot even explain or observe 
the constant length of the seasonal year.  Secondly, in determining the 
motions of these and of the other five planets, they use neither the same 
principles and hypotheses nor the same demonstrations of the apparent 
motions and revolutions. (Kuhn, trans., 1985, p.138) 
 
The inconsistencies that Copernicus is railing against include the fact that the equant is 
different for each planet and the fact that there is no discernable pattern or way to predict 
how many epicycles or speed fluctuations it would take to account for any given planet’s 
motion in Ptolemy’s system. 
 Despite the great difference in appearance of Copernicus’ model compared with 
Ptolemy’s, there is a sense in which Copernicus is committed to the same guiding 
principles that led Ptolemy to formulate his geocentric model.  For instance, Copernicus 
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gets rid of the equant not because he disagrees with the constraint that the planets should 
move in uniform circular motion as Ptolemy believes; on the contrary, it is because he is 
committed to the idea of regularity that he is more content to move the Earth from the 
center of the heavens than he is willing to accept a center of uniform motion eccentric to 
the orbital center.  Although moving the Sun to the center of the universe and putting the 
Earth in motion is contrary to common sense and the knowledge context of Copernicus’ 
time, Copernicus is able to make the other elements (mathematical elements) of his 
model simpler.  Just as Ptolemy was interested in mathematical parsimony, so was 
Copernicus.  Kuhn (1985) supports the hypothesis that Copernicus and Ptolemy have 
similar methods by claiming that Copernicus modeled De Revolutionibus on Ptolemy’s 
Almagest (p. 136). 
 Kuhn (1985) also claims that De Revolutionibus was not itself a revolutionary 
text, but instead that it was revolution-making, i.e. that it led to a revolution in astronomy 
and cosmology. 
 
The significance of the De Revolutionibus lies, then, less in what it says 
itself than in what it caused others to say.  The book gave rise to a 
revolution that it had scarcely enunciated.  It is a revolution-making rather 
than a revolutionary text.  Such texts are a relatively frequent and 
extremely significant phenomenon in the development of scientific 
thought.  They may be described as texts that shift the direction in which 
scientific thought develops; a revolution-making work is at once the 
culmination of a past tradition and the source of a novel future tradition. 
(p. 135)  
 
Kuhn’s distinction between “revolutionary” and “revolution-making” texts highlights the 
cumulative nature of revolutions in thought.  Kuhn’s assertion in this quotation is 
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supported by the fact that De Revolutionibus received a very quiet reception in the early 
years after its publication.  This fact may largely be due to De Revolutionibus’ preface, 
which was authored by Copernicus’s friend Osiander and essentially snuck into the 
manuscript just prior to publication without Copernicus’ knowledge.  The preface 
indicates an instrumentalist position with regard to the heliocentric model of planetary 
motion.  Even if the preface deflected some of the furor expected due to the publication 
of De Revolutionibus, it is remarkable that the suggestion that the Earth moved was not 
what was the most provocative for Copernicus’ colleagues.  Gingerich (2004) attempts to 
identify all of the reactions contemporary to the publication of De Revolutionibus.  He 
concludes: 
 
My Copernican census eventually helped to establish that the majority of 
sixteenth-century astronomers thought eliminating the equant was 
Copernicus' big achievement, because it satisfied the ancient aesthetic 
principle that eternal celestial motions should be uniform and circular or 
compounded of uniform and circular parts. (p. 55)91
 
  
The reaction to De Revolutionibus that Gingerich suggests may also reflect what 
Copernicus thought was most revolutionary about his model. 
 Despite the fact that both Ptolemy and Copernicus have misleading 
instrumentalist prefaces to their most famous books, both Ptolemy and Copernicus are 
nonetheless trying to model planetary motion as they believe it actually is; in other 
words, they are both scientific realists.  Ptolemy was first committed to the appearances 
                                                 
91 The equant is the point around which a celestial body’s speed appears to be uniform, i.e. about which 
angular velocity is constant. The equant is eccentric to the planet’s orbit.  This eccentricity was troubling 
but necessary in Ptolemy’s system in order  to hold on to the metaphysical or mathematical requirement of 
uniform circular motion, of a kind, while “saving the appearances” that the planets do not move uniformly 
around the Earth.  
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that the Earth is motionless and in the center of the heavens either because of sense data 
to which he then constructed a mathematical model or because he was committed to the 
idea that the heavens must move in the simplest way mathematically possible, and his 
system is what seemed the simplest to him.  Copernicus was first committed to the idea 
that the heavens must move in the simplest way mathematically possible and he was able 
to simplify the math by making the system heliocentric, which led him to believe that the 
solar system is in fact heliocentric.  Some evidence for his realism again comes from his 
dedication: 
 
I consider that opinions which are totally incorrect should be avoided.  
Therefore, since I was thinking to myself what an absurd piece of play-
acting it would be reckoned, by those who knew that the judgements of 
many centuries had reinforced the opinion that the Earth is placed 
motionless in the middle of the heaven, as though at its centre, if I on the 
contrary asserted that the Earth moves, I hesitated for a long time whether 
to bring my treatise written to demonstrate its motion, into the light of day. 
(Duncan, trans., 1976, p. 9, emphasis added) 
 
Copernicus says that the purpose of his book is to “demonstrate” the motion of the Earth.  
He could have easily tempered this statement in several ways by inserting instrumentalist 
language about saving the appearances or the usefulness of creating a model that treats 
the Earth as if it were moving.  Instead, Copernicus acknowledges the danger of his idea 
(which would not be an issue if he were only espousing the instrumentalist model) but 
posits his idea because the contrary opinions are “totally incorrect”.  Dobrzycki (1991) 
argues that it is because of Copernicus’ strong realist language in the dedication that 
Osiander felt compelled to insert his strongly instrumentalist preface (p. 61-2). 
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 Adelard, Grosseteste, Theodoric, and Copernicus facilitated a shift from 
Aristotle’s concept of scientific demonstration to Galileo’s by combining the early 
Middle Ages tradition of trial and error investigation for the sake of technology with 
Aristotle’s requirement of demonstrative rigor in scientific explanations.  This shift, 
resulting from the revival of Greek science in the Latin West, laid the groundwork of the 
Scientific Revolution, of which Galileo was the key figure. 
 
3.5 The Shared Knowledge of Galileo’s Time 
 One question to consider when asking what is revolutionary about a thinker such 
as Galileo concerns the shared or common knowledge of the time, i.e. to what extent are 
new ideas products of the knowledge environment as opposed to being spontaneously 
generated in each thinker?  We have seen the oversimplifications that depict Galileo’s 
methodological innovations in science as simply a straightforward rejection of Aristotle’s 
philosophy of science as though the 1900 intervening years had no impact.92
 
  Wallace 
(1984) on the other hand, argues that Galileo is deeply rooted in the teachings of his day:  
Galileo’s early science, on this accounting, was in essential continuity 
with that being developed contemporaneously by Jesuit scholastics.  Many 
of the terms and expressions he uses in these notebooks continue to recur 
in his later manuscripts and published writings, so much so that one may 
rightfully regard them as the heritage of the Collegio Romano whose 
elements still survive in the nuova scienza [Two New Sciences] of 1638. 
(p. xi) 
 
                                                 
92 See discussion in chapter 1. 
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Another difficulty to accepting the claim that Galileo’s innovations were spontaneously 
created is that there are clear antecedents to the innovations credited to Galileo.  Kuhn 
(1996) argues that scientific revolutions are in part due to the accumulation of 
knowledge.  A second difficulty is that some of Galileo’s contemporaries made similar 
breakthroughs, although none as great as Galileo’s. 
 One of Galileo’s contemporaries who did similar scientific work, including work 
on projectile motion, was Thomas Harriot.  Büttner et al. (2002) claim that there is 
extraordinary similarity between Harriot’s work and Galileo’s even though there is strong 
reason to believe the two were never in contact, even through acquaintances.  Büttner et 
al. (2002) say this about Harriot: 
 
. . . a scholar contemporary to Galileo pursued experiments with falling 
bodies and discovered the law of fall as well as the parabolic shape of the 
projectile trajectory, that he found the law of the inclined plane, directed 
the newly invented telescope to the heavens and discovered the mountains 
on the moon, observed the moons of the planet Jupiter and the sunspots, 
that he calculated the orbits of heavenly bodies using methods and data of 
Kepler with whom he corresponded, and that he composed extensive notes 
dealing with all these issues. (p. 4) 
 
The resemblance between Galileo and Harriot’s areas of investigation is striking.  It 
seems incredible that Harriot receives none of the credit for these discoveries and is only 
rarely mentioned in the history of science, until one learns that Harriot never published a 
single line from his extensive notes. 
 One hypothesis about how history progresses claims that new ideas are almost 
exclusively the products of the time and place in which they occur.  A competing 
hypothesis claims that history is advanced most significantly by the unique ideas of 
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individuals who might have had similar impacts even under different circumstances.  The 
story of Harriot would seem to lend weight to the first hypothesis.  Büttner et al. (2002) 
take this claim significantly farther by arguing for the interrelatedness of shared ideas 
among scholars of the same time even when there is no apparent contact among them. 
 
Historians who attempt to understand the spreading of these new theories 
in seventeenth century Europe are confronted with a puzzle.  The treatises 
of this time, as they were written by natural philosophers such as Galileo, 
Descartes, Baliani, or Harriot, show a great variation with regard to the 
phenomena considered, the basic axioms, or the deductive organization.  
Nevertheless, these treatises also show a number of peculiar common 
features that cannot be explained by their shared starting point in the core 
assumptions of Aristotelian theory rooted in intuitive physics. (p. 11)   
 
  The shared knowledge consists of more than the explicit foundation of a given system, 
such as Aristotle’s philosophy of science.  Instead the landscape is imperceptibly altered 
by each generation, and so it seems as though breakthroughs are erupting spontaneously, 
while in fact they are the result of the accumulation of previously unrecognized nuances. 
 The point of this chapter has been to examine some of the small changes, not 
always recognized, that prepared the context for Galileo’s work.  For instance, we saw 
that Greek thinkers after Aristotle such as Archimedes, Eratosthenes, and Ptolemy subtly 
extended the applicability of mathematics in the empirical sciences.  In the early Middle 
Ages there was a decline in empirical scientific investigation in the Aristotelian tradition 
but the unscientific, pragmatically oriented pursuit of developing new technology and 
ways to manipulate nature flourished.  Also during this time the influence of Christianity 
on scholarship in the Latin West grew substantially.  Beginning in the twelfth century, 
thinkers such as Adelard, Grosseteste, and Theodoric began applying Aristotle’s writings 
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to the Middle Ages tradition of developing technology.  Finally, we looked at 
Copernicus’s revolution-making work.  All of these events had an impact on the 




Chapter 4. Galileo’s Concept of Scientific Explanation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The first half of this chapter examines Galileo’s concept of scientific explanation.  
The second half explores the metaphysical and methodological underpinnings relied upon 
by Galileo and where these depart from those of his predecessors.  Among the figures of 
the Scientific Revolution, Galileo exerted the single greatest influence on solidifying a 
change away from Aristotelian science to what became Modern science.  Because science 
is an inherently social and historical process, it is essential to locate Galileo’s work in an 
historical context to discover and explain his concept of scientific explanation.  This 
chapter will illustrate the most revolutionary of Galileo’s scientific achievements, which 
was to advance a new more practical aim for scientific investigations that is based on 
experimental observations and that strives to construct predictive mathematical models.  
He did this, in part, by sacrificing some of the scope of Aristotelian natural science for 
the intended benefit of increased empirical justification.  Whereas for Aristotle the ideal 
of scientific explanations is giving the final cause of the explanandum, Galileo’s 
scientific explanations aim at the proximate, that is the most immediate, cause of a given 
phenomenon.93
 Galileo’s interest in pragmatic, useful science is apparent in his effort to make 
science the search for measuring, modeling, predicting, and in general applying scientific 
 
                                                 
93 Although the cause that Galileo thinks scientific explanations should give does not align perfectly with 




knowledge to various experiences for the purpose of using that knowledge productively.  
Though in one sense Galileo narrowed the scope of scientific explanations by eliminating 
Aristotle’s final cause from empirical science, in another sense Galileo also expanded the 
scope of scientific explanations by addressing the problem of choosing among competing 
theories, whereas Aristotle seems to have been only interested in explanations of 
phenomena. 
 Galileo’s philosophy of science manifests itself in his understanding of scientific 
explanation.  Galileo believes he has a proper scientific explanation when he can 
demonstrate that he has a model that can be used to predict phenomena (e.g. demonstrate 
what he calls the proximate cause of a phenomenon, such as how bodies float) or provide 
a mathematical model (e.g. of the times squared law for falling bodies).  This marks a 
fundamental shift from Aristotle’s view that scientific knowledge is inherently abstract.  
Aristotle’s view is that if scientific knowledge ever has practical applications it is a 
matter of coincidence, i.e. accidental to the aim of science.94
 Galileo’s scientific explanations are more directly empirically testable than 
Aristotle’s because Galileo rejects Aristotle’s requirement for scientific explanations that 
they derive from the ultimate first principles, i.e. the broadest explanatory principles of a 
given phenomenon.  Furthermore, Galileo rejects the idea that pursuing Aristotelian final 
causes adds to scientific understanding.  Galileo thinks that scientific investigations 
should only include those principles and causes that directly aid in modeling, predicting, 
and manipulating phenomena.  All other causes and principles which may be arrived at 
 
                                                 
94 See chapter 2.1 – 2.2 for discussion of Aristotle’s definition of science. 
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through rational reconstruction instead of empirical observation and which do not aid in 
modeling, predicting and manipulation phenomena, Galileo calls “remote causes” and 
rejects.95
 Galileo’s rejection of the manner in which Aristotle’s philosophy of science was 
applied by the 17th century Aristotelians, which involved more rationalizing and less 
direct empirical observation, as well as his emphasis on experiments led some to 





  It is true that Galileo places a greater emphasis on empirical investigation 
than 17th century contemporaries who call themselves “Aristotelians” do, but it is a gross 
oversimplification to conclude that through emphasis on empirical observation he has 
freed himself from the influence of metaphysical commitments and rationalizations.  In 
fact, insofar as Galileo does employ these elements, he is more like Aristotle than the 17th 
century Aristotelians are. 
4.2 Galileo’s Project: To Advance A More Pragmatically Focused Science 
 Galileo is not only interested in making new scientific discoveries; he is equally 
preoccupied with trying to ingrain in 17th century Italian science his mathematical and 
pragmatic method for conducting science.  For instance, Galileo’s aim in the Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632) is not just to promote the acceptance of 
                                                 
95 Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s final and formal causes comes from his greater focus on the 
epistemological problems of generating empirical explanations and theories. Galileo upholds his empirical 
standards so firmly that he sometimes mistakenly rejects explanations, for instance, that seem to involve 
“action at a distance” such as Kepler’s tidal theory which claims that the Moon causes tidal phenomena. 
96 See Cohen (1960) survey of late 19th and early 20th century Galileo scholarship.  
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the Copernican view of the threefold motion of the Earth.97  In the prefatory section, “To 
The Discerning Reader,” Galileo says that the Dialogue is meant to rebut the idea that 
Italian scholars have not taken up the Copernican question. 98
 Further evidence supporting the idea that in the Dialogue Galileo is as concerned 
with promoting his scientific method, which relies on experimentally determining 
proximate causes for the sake of making predictive mathematical models, as he is with 
promoting Copernicanism, comes from the fact that Galileo was taken by surprise at the 
Vatican’s harsh judgment against him after the Dialogue’s publication.  One theory that 
accounts for why Galileo was surprised suggests that he did not see the Dialogue as 
contravening the Catholic Church’s warning to him in 1616, in which he was told not to 
hold or support Copernicanism in writing or in speech.  If this theory is correct, then the 
subject matter was secondary to Galileo’s aim in showing the appropriate method of 
scientific demonstration. 
  His stated purpose for 
writing the book is to show the serious way in which scientific matters are discussed in 
Italy.  Since he does not say that the purpose of the book is to convince his audience to 
adopt Copernicanism, a case can be made that even more important to Galileo than the 
outcome of the discussion about the Copernican system is the method he tries to put 
forward for scientific explanation and for establishing scientific theories.  
                                                 
97 Besides the Copernican system, the other competing world system that Galileo is writing about in the 
Dialogue is the Brahe model, which replaced the Ptolemaic system. In the Brahe model the other planets 
revolve around the Sun while the Sun revolves around the Earth, which remains motionless in the center of 
the universe.  
98 In fact, Galileo argues that Copernicus’ third motion, which usually refers to Copernicus’ postulation of 
an annual rotation of the poles, is not necessary to explain the observable phenomena, in this case, the tides. 
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 There are competing theories about Galileo’s intentions behind the Dialogue.  For 
instance, he might have thought he was being sufficiently sly in his writing to cover his 
intention of defending Copernicanism; or he might have thought that the election of 
Barberini as Urban VIII made him safe from the Church because Barberini had been a 
friend and patron; or Galileo might have thought that his arguments would have 
convinced the Church to change their anti-Copernican stance.  Or perhaps Galileo was 
most interested in propagating a new scientific method, but to show its efficacy he used it 
to demonstrate Copernicanism’s verisimilitude, because Galileo’s thought his method 
was likely to provide more robust support for Copernicanism than previous methods. 
 There is further evidence that unlike Aristotle, Galileo thinks of practical 
application as the primary aim of scientific investigation.  For instance, Galileo puts great 
effort into inventions such as his Bilancetta, the military compass, and the improvements 
he made to the telescope.  In La Bilancetta (The Little Balance, 1586), Galileo gives 
careful instructions for the construction of the balance that gives the proportions of two 
metals in an alloy.  He gives tips for how to count the number of turns of the fine wire 
using the feel of touching the coil with a thumbnail and listening for the sound the 
thumbnail makes when dragging across the coils.  This shows that Galileo thinks that one 
needs to be able to make precise measurements in order to discover genuine physical 
laws.  In other words, the practicality is a prerequisite for doing science, not a 
consequence of it.  He points out that the principles of his balance are proved in 
Archimedes, but Galileo does not take pains to demonstrate them. 
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 Further evidence that this was not merely an academic exercise for Galileo is the 
fact that he wrote La Bilancetta in Italian instead of Latin, which made it accessible to the 
general public.  Galileo also wrote On Floating Bodies (1612), in Italian, which was his 
first major published work that illustrated a developed form of his scientific method.  
This was Galileo’s best-selling book in his lifetime.  He published exclusively in Italian 
from this point on, which was unusual for scholars.  Although it was not uncommon at 
this time in Italy to use the dialogue format, as it had been used since Plato, the fact that 
Galileo’s most advanced works—Dialogue and Two New Sciences—are dialogues may 
be further evidence that he was interested in conveying the method of investigation 
because this way he could engage the general population instead of scholars only.  
Though it may be the case that the dialogue format was used in Dialogue to comply with 
the Vatican’s injunction not to promote Copernicanism, this rationale would not apply to 
Two New Sciences, because it does not take up the question of Copernicanism.  In fact, as  
Galileo’s final publication, and hence presumably reflective of his most refined 
understanding of scientific method, Two New Sciences further illustrates this shift in the 
focus of science because it is a treatise about the strength of materials and the motions of 
bodies, especially falling bodies, all of which have practical applications from metal 
working to artillery.  Instead of trying to find the essences of materials, Galileo seeks to 
understand attributes that affect their uses.  
  Further evidence of Galileo’s interest in scientific investigation for usefulness 
comes from his significant efforts to make money from his extracurricular scientific 
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work. 99  For instance, Galileo’s desire to discover and apply scientific findings for the 
purpose of making money, which is suggestive of the shift Galileo makes in science, is 
illustrated by his efforts to win the prize for solving the longitude problem.  Vying to 
solve the longitude problem was not restricted to natural philosophers—sailors, 
instrument makers, clock makers, and hobbyists were among those who attempted to 
solve the problem.  Nor was it the case that Aristotelian astronomers were necessarily 
uninterested in solving the problem.  Rather, the difference between the Aristotelians and 
Galileo is in their approaches or attitudes toward scientific investigation: the Aristotelians 
pursued the principles of celestial movement for its own sake, for highest knowledge, and 
then perhaps looked to apply these principles to aid navigation, whereas I claim that 




4.3 The Shift from Searching for Remote Causes to Searching for Proximate Causes 
 This new scientific approach, however, was not without criticism.  For instance, 
in October 1638 Descartes wrote to Mersenne about the shortcomings in Galileo’s 
recently published Two New Sciences. 
 
                                                 
99 Pursuing scientific knowledge for the sake of making money was very different from Aristotle’s 
conception of science. An earlier example of this use of science is provided by Leonardo da Vinci (1452-
1519), in the form of a letter he wrote to Ludovico Sforza, in 1481, in which Leonardo gives his resume for 
making war machines and begs for work. See Kemp (1989). 
100 In 1636, Galileo submitted, to the States General of the Netherlands, his proposal for a method of 
determining longitude at sea using eclipses of the Medicean Stars (the then-visible moons of Jupiter).  He 
later received a gold chain worth 500 Florins for his efforts. This approach was still being attempted in the 
18th century.   
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But [Galileo] seems to me very faulty in continually making digressions 
and never stopping to explain completely any matter, which shows that he 
has not examined things in order, and that without having considered the 
first causes of nature he has only sought the reasons of some particular 
effects, and thus he has built without foundation (Drake, 1978, pp. 387-8). 
 
Descartes’ primary problem with Galileo is his disregard for “first causes.”  Descartes 
argued that scientific explanations must begin with the first principles of a science and 
then proceed “in order” from these principles to the phenomena being explained.  Galileo 
on the other hand, by not worrying about remote principles, such as dynamical principles 
of motion, or indeed God (for Descartes: cf. The World, Principles of Philosophy) is free 
to model phenomena without having to make competing dynamical principles cohere, 
which, as described in chapter 2, is a substantive problem for Aristotle (e.g. violent 
motion). 
 Caution needs to be taken to avoid over-simplifying the difference between 
Galileo and his detractors: Galileo’s innovation of rejecting Aristotelian causation in 
explanations is not absolute; it is wrong to suppose that Galileo’s contemporaries were 
only interested in causes, especially remote causes (e.g. ‘final’ and ‘formal’ causes), and 
that Galileo had no use for the concept of causation.  Although it is true that Galileo 
rejects the notion that scientific knowledge is knowledge about the most remote and least 
useful causes or principles, Galileo is still interested in finding the causes proximate to 
phenomena under investigation.  In order to explain the difference and discuss the 




 In the Discourse on Floating Bodies (1612) Galileo discusses causation and gives 
the following implicit definition of the kind of cause (cagione) he employs in scientific 
explanations:  “cause which, being present, the effect is there, and being removed, the 
effect is taken away” (Drake, trans., 1981, p. 130).  Galileo’s definition implies two 
compliance tests for identifying the kind of causation he thinks is relevant to scientific 
explanations and theories.  If x and y are the potential cause and effect respectively that 
are being tested, then: (i) if x is present, then is y also present?  And, (ii) if x is not 
present, then is y also not present?  One immediate problem, however, with this definition 
is that it cannot distinguish between the cause and the effect.  In the case where x is the 
only cause of y and they are always present together, i.e. if it is never the case that y is 
present while x is not, it is not possible to discern the direction of causality.  In other 
words, this definition does not necessarily answer the question of whether x is the cause 
of y or y is the cause of x.  Before we address this problem we need to explain how this 
definition provides a context in which to understand just what proximate versus remote 
causes are and how the distinction between them helps clarify what is different about 
Galileo’s project. 
 This definition of causation shows the difference between Galileo’s and 
Aristotle’s understandings of causation in science.  Galileo is explicit about why he 
thinks his concept of causation is the one appropriate to scientific explanations: 
 
Indeed, the immediate cause is its being less heavy than water, and the 
predominance of air is the cause of less heaviness, so that whoever offers 
as the cause the predominance of this element adduces the cause of the 
cause, not the proximate and immediate cause.  Now, who does not know 
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that the true cause is the immediate cause, and not the mediate? (Drake, 
trans., 1981, p. 70) 
 
This quotation shows that Drake’s assertion that Galileo rejects causal explanation is not 
accurate.  There remains a place for causal explanations in Galileo’s science, but his 
position is that it is the immediate or proximate causes that are relevant to scientific 
explanations and that the remote causes he accuses the Aristotelians of pursuing have no 
place in empirical science. 
     This is demonstrated by Galileo’s argument that the cause of a body’s sinking 
is because of its having a greater specific heaviness (density) than the specific heaviness 
of water.  In other words, objects sink when they displace an amount of water that weighs 
less than the object doing the displacing.  This explanation fits with his definition of 
causation.  When greater specific heaviness is present, objects sink.  When greater 
specific heaviness is not present objects do not sink, i.e. they float. 
 This explanation for why bodies float is a case, however, where Galileo’s 
definition does not distinguish the cause from the effect, since the presence of sinking is 
necessary and sufficient for the presence of greater specific heaviness of the sinking 
object.  However, in this case the definitional problem does not hinder Galileo because it 
is not an open question whether something sinks because it is dense or is dense because it 
sinks.  The latter would suggest that certain things are made denser by sinking—but this 
is nonsensical because if they were not already denser than water they would not sink and 
could not then be made denser by sinking.  Hence, this example illustrates both the 
problem with Galileo’s definition of not being able to distinguish cause from effect, and 
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Galileo’s (albeit unsatisfying) treatment of the problem—he seems to assume that it is not 
a problem at all because the direction of causality will always be intuitively obvious. 
 This example from Floating Bodies captures the significance of the shift in 
science.  Galileo’s critics argue that by looking for only the proximate cause, such as 
specific heaviness in the cause of floating, and not looking further, Galileo has not 
actually revealed the cause of floating in an explanatory sense.  In Aristotelian terms, for 
something to be a scientific explanation it must employ the broadest explanatory 
principle possible for that science.  For instance, the remote or ultimate Aristotelian cause 
that explains human mortality comes from the fact that we are animals.  Although Galileo 
does not address this example specifically, by analogy Galileo would be looking for 
quantifiable phenomena that could predict mortality, such as the time it takes for 
someone to die from air deprivation (hypoxia) or exsanguination.  Galileo argues that by 
searching for the ultimate cause of why certain things are denser than others, the 
Aristotelians increase error without aiding scientific knowledge.  Galileo is explicit about 
the problem with Aristotle’s insistence that scientific explanations should consist of 
ultimate causes, or in Aristotle’s terminology final and formal causes: 
 
Besides, he who alleges heaviness brings forth a cause well known to our 
senses, because we can very easily ascertain whether ebony, for example, 
or fir, is heavier or less heavy than water; but who will make manifest to 
us whether the element of earth, or that of air, has predominance in them? 
(Drake, trans., 1981, p. 72) 
 
The Aristotelians are interested in whether something floats because they think this 
observation will get them closer to knowing why it floats, especially the final cause of 
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why it floats.  Galileo argues that observing floating cannot generate the answer the 
Aristotelians are looking for.  The Aristotelians are primarily interested in which things 
float only insofar as it illuminates deep truths about bodies in general.  Galileo is 
interested in which things float because being able to use knowledge about floating 
facilitates more control and use of nature. 
 Galileo further argues that it is neither helpful nor useful to say that something 
floats because it has more air or less earth in it, because this information can only be 
reasoned to after the fact, i.e. after having already observed whether or not the object 
floats.  In contrast, with Galileo’s emphasis on the proximate cause of floating, which he 
identifies as specific heaviness (i.e. density), one can weigh objects and make predictions 
about whether or not they will float.  Succinctly showing the circularity of the 
Aristotelians’ method Galileo says:  
 
For he knows it floats when he knows air has predominance, but he does 
not know that air predominates except when he sees it float, and therefore 
he does not know that it floats except after having seen it float. (Drake, 
trans., 1981, p. 72)  
 
However, Galileo does not reject all elemental explanations.  For instance, he would not 
object to someone’s developing a better test for density.  However, the conflict between 
Galileo and the Aristotelians would remain because the new test would only indicate if 
something will float and not why it floats in an Aristotelian sense; i.e. the new test would 
still not reveal why density is correlated with floating (as opposed to some other property) 
any more than the floating test does.  The Aristotelians would make the same inference 
from density to ratios of elements such as earth and water and Galileo would still argue 
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that there is no value in rationally reconstructing causes that are useless for predicting and 
manipulating phenomena. 
 Galileo’s work on free fall provides another example of the differences between 
Galileo’s and the Aristotelians’ concepts of scientific explanation.  Instead of searching 
for the ultimate cause of falling, such as would be needed to generate an explanation that 
satisfies Aristotle’s account, Galileo is interested more in characterizing how bodies fall, 
i.e. the rate of acceleration of bodies.  Galileo is concerned that he needs to explain why 
there is a small gap in the fit between his theory and experience, which he does with air 
resistance.  The Aristotelians, however, do not worry about the large discrepancy 
between what was observed at the tower and Aristotle’s theory that the rate at which 
objects fall is proportional to their weights.  It appears that compared to the Aristotelians, 
Galileo  is not opposed to more general and reductive accounts if they can be given 
empirical teeth, but rather objects to simply inventing them out of whole cloth as is the 
case with the appeal to occult properties.  Galileo eschews looking for elemental causes if 
it is impossible to learn about them, for instance, if they are unknowable given the current 
state of knowledge and technology, or if they are in principle impossible to know 
scientifically. 
 In another example, the case of floating bodies, the Aristotelians have a hard time 
explaining why a pot filled with water sinks although an empty pot sitting upright floats.  
They have even greater difficulty explaining why the same empty pot floats or sinks 
depending on its orientation when placed in water.  This is because they do not 
understand displacement.  However, even if they understood the concept of displacement, 
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they would still have thought that floating was susceptible to further explanations than 
Galileo’s ‘specific heaviness’ by searching for the primary cause of density.  Thus, 
Aristotelians, even when they feel they have found the Aristotelian ultimate cause, cannot 
use scientific knowledge to predict which items will float.  In contrast, Galileo’s method 
provides a model of floating that allows for testing and quantifying.  Once confirmed, 
Galileo can use this knowledge to predict which items will float and to construct better 
floating things (e.g. only with this understanding of floating could someone think of 
constructing ships of iron instead of wood). 
 
4.4 Three-Part Method of Generating Scientific Demonstrations 
 To better understand the differences between the Aristotelian concept of scientific 
demonstration and Galileo’s, it is useful to explicate Galileo’s three-part method for 
generating scientific demonstrations, and hence what constitutes scientific knowledge for 
Galileo.  Galileo tends to use the following schema: (i) lay out all of the reasonable 
possible theories or explanations for a given phenomenon; (ii) find arguments that 
discredit, ideally, all but one of the possible explanations; thus, ideally after step (ii) only 
one of the possible explanations remains; in this case step (iii) is to show how the 
remaining explanation does in fact reasonably account for the given phenomenon, and to 
account for any counter-objections or anomalies in the explanation.  Galileo judges 
himself to be successful only when he is satisfied that he has provided the proximate 
cause of the phenomenon in question.  Step (ii), elimination of incorrect explanations, 
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takes of the form of demonstrating that the incorrect explanations do not or, preferably, 
cannot give the proximate cause of the phenomenon. 
 Galileo’s three-step process seems straightforward; however, it soon becomes 
clear that there are several pitfalls.  For instance, a lot of work is done in step (i) by the 
criterion of reasonableness; this is a problem because Galileo is not always clear about 
how he judges reasonableness.  For instance, Galileo rejects as completely unreasonable 
the theory that the tides are caused by the Moon, which leads him into error.  Another 
difficulty occurs when there is not enough information to discredit all but one of the 
possible explanations.  For this less than ideal, but common, case where more than one 
possibility remains after step (ii), a different third step is required: (iiia) the task then is to 
explain why one of the explanations is preferable to the others by using certain criteria 
such as preference for generality or preference for specificity, predictive accuracy, 
simplicity (i.e. conformity to Ockham’s razor), plausibility, etc.  As will be discussed in 
the second half of the chapter, one’s metaphysics necessarily plays a significant role 
throughout the scientific process; this is most apparent in this variation of the third step 









4.5 Two Case Studies: Ashen Light of the Moon and Tidal Theory 
 
Ashen Light of the Moon (Earthshine) 
 Investigating two specific cases will help illustrate the development of Galileo’s 
scientific method.  The first case to be considered is Galileo’s explanation of, i.e. his 
demonstration of the proximate cause of, the ashen (secondary) light of the Moon.  In The 
Starry Messenger (Sidereus Nuncius) (1610) Galileo demonstrates the cause of the ashen 
colored, faint light of the Moon or as he calls it, the ‘secondary brightness’ of the Moon 
(Finocchiaro, 2008).  Contemporary stargazers call this earthshine, a name made possible 
by Galileo’s correct explanation of the phenomenon.101
                                                 
101 The name: “Galilean Light of the Moon,” should now replace all previous names for this phenomenon. 
  Earthshine is the glow visible 
around the circumference and on the part of the surface of the Moon unilluminated 
directly by the Sun.  This is visible between Last Quarter Moon and First Quarter Moon, 
i.e. when the Moon is less than half full.  Sometimes this is seen merely as the faint 
outline of the rest of the circumference from the illuminated crescent of the Moon before 
and after the new Moon.  Galileo begins his discussion about the cause of Earthshine by 
considering the theories previously put forward.  In this case his method seems similar to 
how Aristotle often begins investigations.  However, whereas Aristotle deliberately 
considers what all reputable philosophers have previously said on a subject (See: 
Metaphysics I.3; Physics I.2; Parts of Animals I.1), Galileo is only incidentally interested 
in what other philosophers have said insofar as it aids the process of laying out all of the 
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possible explanations for a given phenomenon.102
 The initially plausible competing explanations that Galileo deals with include: 1) 
that earthshine comes from the Moon itself; 2) that the light is a reflection of the light 
from Venus or the stars; and 3) that the Sun’s light penetrates all the way through the 
Moon.  Galileo demonstrates that each of these seemingly plausible theories is incorrect.  
If the light came from either the stars or the Moon itself, it would be especially apparent 
during lunar eclipses because at those times the Moon is in the Earth’s shadow and 
therefore cannot be illuminated by the Sun.  However, the earthshine phenomenon is not 
what is observed during lunar eclipses. 
  Galileo’s demonstration of the correct 
explanation of the secondary light consists of his first refuting all the false explanations 
and then explaining how the only remaining possibility does in fact account for the 
phenomenon. 
 Galileo does not think that the light observed during eclipses is this same ashen 
light—he argues instead it is a different phenomenon altogether.  He observed that during 
an eclipse the light seen on the Moon is “much weaker, somewhat reddish, and almost 
coppery” (Messenger, Van Helden, trans., 1989, p. 54).  Galileo claims that, unlike the 
ashen light, the light during an eclipse moves and is always concentrated near the edge of 
the arc of Earth’s shadow.  Galileo implies that these two observations are sufficient to 
prove that the ashen light is not the same phenomenon as light during an eclipse: “From 
this we understand with complete certainty that this light comes about because of the 
proximity of the solar rays falling upon some denser region which surrounds the Moon on 
                                                 
102 Galileo’s biographer Vincenzio Viviani claimed Galileo had fewer books and spent less time studying 
the works of others than most philosophers of the period. (Drake, 1957, p. 240) 
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all sides” (Messenger, Van Helden, trans., 1989, p. 55, emphasis added).  It is not clear 
what Galileo’s ground is for asserting that we know this with “complete certainty”.  
Kepler’s (correct) theory is that during an eclipse sunlight refracts through Earth’s 
atmosphere and illuminates the Moon.  Galileo is certain that his theory is correct, which 
turns out to be false.  Galileo errs because he has not applied his own method.  Galileo’s 
lapse here highlights a problem in his own method; namely, that he makes no room for 
the possibility that new plausible hypotheses may turn up.  Despite his great advances 
elsewhere, Galileo’s assumption that his certainty about his assertions is epistemically 
justified leads him into trouble similar to what Aristotle faces. 
 For example, Galileo seems to take the phenomenon of light on the Moon during 
eclipse as evidence that the Moon has an atmosphere.  Although the Moon does have a 
very rare atmosphere, we now take this phenomenon to be evidence of atmospheric 
filtering and refraction through Earth’s atmosphere, just as Kepler described.  Despite his 
false assertion about the cause of the reddish eclipse light, Galileo’s claim that the 
secondary light is not seen during an eclipse is good evidence to reject the theories that 
claim the ashen light is reflected from the stars or produced by the Moon itself. 
 Galileo also debunks the theory that earthshine is reflected from Venus by 
pointing out the geometrical impossibility of light from Venus reaching that part of the 
surface of the Moon unilluminated by the Sun when Venus is at or near conjunction with 
the Earth.  This would be true at both superior and inferior conjunction.103
                                                 
103 Conjunction refers to the apparent alignment of two celestial bodies viewed from Earth.  At superior 
conjunction the Sun is between Venus and the Earth; at inferior conjunction Venus and the Earth are on the 
same side of the Sun. 
  His arguments 
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are compatible with both the Copernican system he prefers and the Tycho Brahe model, 
which the Aristotelians had adopted by the early 17th century.  The possibility that the 
ashen light of the Moon is caused by the Sun’s light reflected off Venus when at superior 
conjunction is rejected because it is nonsensical to suppose that the light reflected off 
Venus could illuminate the Moon by shining through the Sun.  Galileo rejects the 
possibility that reflected light from Venus illuminates the Moon when it is at inferior 
conjunction because light striking Venus when it is directly in line with the Earth and the 
Sun would be reflected away from the Moon.  See Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
 
Further evidence that light from Venus cannot reach the Earth or Moon during either 
conjunction is that Venus is not visible to us during these times.  Further, Galileo notes 
that the angular distance between Venus and the Sun never exceeds 60 degrees, which 
entails that even when not at conjunction, light traveling from Venus could not reach the 
surface of the Moon illuminated by the ashen light.  See Figure 4.3 below; the vertical 
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line shading represents the area of the Moon that could be reached by light traveling from 
Earth but that could not be reached by light from Venus. 
 
 Galileo goes on to explain how we know that it is not the case that the Sun’s light 
permeates the Moon.  Galileo’s argument is that if the Sun’s light did penetrate the Moon 
then the secondary light would never be diminished except during lunar eclipses.  
However, this again is contradicted by the observed phenomena.  Galileo points out that 
the secondary light diminishes as the Moon approaches quadrature.104
 Although Galileo’s conclusion is correct, this represents an example of a problem 
with his three part demonstrative method because he is too quick to reject this theory.  
For instance, he does not seem to consider the possibility that the Moon might be made of 




                                                 
104 Quadrature occurs twice per lunar cycle and refers to the midpoints between Full and New Moons; the 
angle between Sun, Earth and Moon is 90 degrees. 
  In this case we would still expect to see the secondary light diminish 
as the Moon approached quadrature because of the ever-increasing angle formed by our 
line of vision to the Moon and the path of the light from the Sun to the Moon.  This 
105 This or a similar idea might have easily occurred to Galileo because of the common, Aristotelian view 
that the celestial bodies are constituted by the 5th Aristotelian element, quintessence.  
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oversight of Galileo’s may reveal that he had already made up his mind about the idea 
that the Moon’s matter is similar to that of the Earth, a stance which would make it 
unnecessary to take seriously the translucent Moon theory of secondary light. 
 We see from Galileo’s treatment of competing explanations in the secondary light 
example, that a potential source of error in Galileo’s demonstrative method involves the 
process of elimination.  Since he has explained why the secondary light cannot be coming 
from the Moon, stars, Sun or other planets, Galileo takes it as necessary that the cause 
must be the only remaining celestial body—namely the Earth.  It is important to note that 
his demonstration does not end there, with the elimination of the other possibilities.  
Galileo is not satisfied until he can give a plausible demonstration of how the remaining 
theory actually accounts for the phenomenon.  In the case of earthshine, Galileo takes 
pains to explain the geometry that makes intelligible the concept of earthshine being 
reflected light from the Earth.  The geometry of the orbits necessitates that the Moon 
“sees” the Earth in the opposite phase from that in which the Earth “sees” the Moon.  
Hence, at the time of the new Moon, someone on the Moon would see the full Earth 
because the Sun is illuminating the entire hemisphere.  Conversely, at the full Moon, 
observers on the Moon would see the new Earth phase.  The portion of the Earth being 
illuminated by the Sun faces away from the Moon, so this sunlight is reflected off the 
Earth, away from the Moon.  The demonstration is complete only after Galileo explains 
how the secondary light and its variations could be caused by the reflection of sunlight 
off of the Earth by showing geometrically how the angles of reflection between the Sun, 
Earth, and Moon could produce the observed phenomena. 
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 In presenting these examples of scientific demonstrations, Galileo gives the 
impression that the heavy lifting in his scientific demonstrations is done directly by the 
observable phenomena; however, without discussing it explicitly, equally heavy lifting is 
done by Galileo’s elimination of potential hypotheses as being implausible.  It makes 
sense that implausible theories would be rejected, but Galileo is not explicit about how he 
judges which hypotheses are implausible.  Equally problematic is Galileo’s failure to 




 Galileo’s method for demonstrating the cause of the tides is the same as his 
method for demonstrating the cause of earthshine.  First, he considers the possible 
explanations.  Next, he refutes the false accounts.  Finally, he demonstrates how the 
remaining theory does in fact account for the phenomenon being explained.  Galileo does 
not think the alternative tidal theories to his own have merit and so he believes they do 
not require serious refutation.  The primary competing theory is that the tides are moved 
by attraction to the Moon.106
                                                 
106 Galileo also briefly mentions and dispenses with the theory that the Moon’s heat rarefies the water 
nearest it and the theory that the deepest waters of the ocean cause the tides by moving the less dense 
shallower waters around (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 487). 
  Kepler is the leading proponent of this theory in the 17th 
century, although this view goes back at least to Posidonius in the 1st century B.C.E.  
Galileo believes he has done away with the plausibility of this theory by calling it 
“repugnant” to the senses: 
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“…almost as though the moon and sun were taking part in the production 
of such effects.  But that concept is completely repugnant to my mind; for 
seeing how this movement of the oceans is a local and sensible one, made 
in an immense bulk of water, I cannot bring myself to give credence to 
such causes as lights, warm temperatures, predominances of occult 
qualities, and similar idle imaginings. (Dialogue, Drake, trans., 1981, p. 
516, emphasis added)  
 
 Galileo’s rejection of the lunar attraction theory seems to be generated by the 
theory’s apparent reliance on pseudo-explanatory occult forces.  Galileo is either unaware 
of or unconvinced by the absence of appeal to occult forces in Kepler’s theory.  What is 
repugnant to Galileo’s mind is the idea of action at a distance.  Galileo is not looking for 
a better dynamical theory to explain how action at a distance might occur, because he 
rejects a priori the notion that there could be any action at a distance.  Thus, any theory 
that includes action at a distance, regardless of the dynamical account given, does not 
require disproving.  This process of eliminating alternative hypotheses demonstrates the 
significant role that Galileo’s theoretical framework plays in his decisions about what is 
plausible versus what is unthinkable.   
 Since Galileo does not seriously consider the competing theories of the tides, 
Galileo’s discussion about the tides hinges on the final step of his method; specifically, 
demonstrating how the only remaining possible theory properly explains the 
phenomenon.  If Galileo can demonstrate the verisimilitude of his tidal theory, then he 
will have vindicated the Copernican view that the Earth moves.  To do this, Galileo needs 
to eliminate potential obstacles to his theory, the largest of which are the considerable 
arguments against the idea that the Earth moves. 
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 Galileo was convinced of the Copernican hypothesis about the motion of the 
Earth prior to the first time he publically wrote about the tides in 1616.107  In a letter 
Galileo wrote to Kepler in 1597, Galileo claims that he has already been an advocate of 
the Copernican theory for “several” years (Drake, 1970, p. 200).  This is also evident 
from his tidal theory’s utter dependence on the postulation of a twofold motion of the 
Earth, if we assume that his theory had the same basic structure from its inception.  This 
early date of acceptance is important to understanding Galileo’s scientific method 
because it was not until 1609 that Galileo had physical evidence for the Copernican or the 
Brahe models.108
 In December of 1609, Galileo used the telescope to determine that Venus has 
phases consistent with its revolving around the Sun, and inconsistent with the Ptolemaic 
scheme.  This removes an ‘anomaly’ from the Copernican and Brahe models, since it 
explains why Venus’ apparent brightness does not alter much even though its distance 
from us varies by a factor of five.  Venus having phases explains this phenomenon 
because brightness varies inversely with distance.  So, when Venus is closer to Earth, less 
of the sunlight reflecting off of Venus reaches Earth, but what does reach Earth is 
  It was in late spring or early summer of that year that Galileo learned 
about the telescope and constructed a model of his own with which he was able to see 
that at least some heavenly bodies do not revolve around the Earth. 
                                                 
107 In early 1616 Galileo wrote a treatise that presented his tidal theory (in substantively the same form as it 
appeared in the Dialogue, 1632), which Galileo then sent Cardinal Alessandro Orsini (Drake, 1978, p. 252). 
A few weeks later Galileo was warned by the Inquisition not to support Copernicanism in print. 
108 Tycho Brahe’s model largely replaced Ptolemy’s in the early part of the 17th century.  The Brahe model 
is a kind of admixture of Ptolemy’s and Copernicus’ models.  Brahe retains the Earth as the center of 
universe, which is orbited by the Sun, Moon and the fixed stars, as in the Ptolemaic model; however, in 
Brahe’s model the planets orbit around the Sun, as in the Copernican model. And for this reason (i.e. the 
fact that it makes the Earth stationary), the Brahe model cannot underwrite Galileo’s tidal theory – but, 
Galileo’s telescopic evidence is consistent with Brahe and Copernicus.  
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brighter than what reaches us from Venus when it is further away.  When Venus is 
further away more of its illuminated surface is visible to us.  The greater brightness 
because of greater visible surface area is roughly balanced by the greater distance from 
Earth.  
 Galileo’s discovery and observations of the ‘Medicean Stars’, the four largest 
moons of Jupiter—Io, Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto—also gave compelling evidence 
(although not everyone was immediately compelled) that there are celestial objects that 
do not revolve around the Earth.  So, what was it that convinced Galileo, fifteen years 
before he had telescopic evidence, that Copernicus was right?  This is especially curious 
given that the obvious kinematic explanations of the observed motions are compatible 
with the Brahe model. 
 However, Galileo’s theory of the tides presented in the “Fourth Day” seems to 
undermine, in at least two ways, his careful work up to that point in Dialogue.  The first 
is that it seems to involve retreating to a large extent from his anti-Ptolemaic arguments 
that are based on the principle that because motion is relative there are no tests that can 
be performed on the Earth to determine if the Earth is moving.  By contrast, and although 
it is not entirely clear what he means by the phrase, Galileo says that the combination of 
Earth’s motions results in an “absolute motion” of Earth’s parts, which is what causes the 
tides (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 496).  The second difficulty is that Galileo’s tidal theory 
seems to rely tacitly on action at a distance, which, as was described earlier, Galileo 
called “repugnant”.     
 
 161 
 In Galileo’s theory the Moon does not act directly on the tides, but it does act 
indirectly by affecting the motion of the Earth.  Galileo attacks the geocentric solar 
system models of Ptolemy and Brahe, whose model had become the norm by this time, 
by discrediting the arguments designed to show that the Earth is not moving.  He does 
this by arguing that experiments done on the Earth are unable to prove the mobility of the 
Earth because they are “indifferently adaptable to an earth in motion or at rest” 
(Dialogue, Drake, trans., 1981, p. 6).  For example, consider a common Aristotelian 
demonstration used for the immobility of the Earth: if a ball is dropped from the top of a 
tower, it lands at the base of the tower.  If the Earth were moving, the ball would fall as 
far away from the tower as the Earth would have rotated during the ball’s descent, but 
since the ball does not fall away from the tower, the Earth cannot be moving.  Galileo 
explains why he does not accept this as a proper argument for the Earth’s immobility in 
the following excerpt from the “Second Day”: 
 
...whatever motion comes to be attributed to the earth must necessarily 
remain imperceptible to us and as if nonexistent, so long as we look only 
at terrestrial objects; for as inhabitants of the earth, we consequently 
participate in the same motion. (Drake, trans., 1981, p. 132)   
 
Galileo’s argument is that if the Earth is moving, then the ball is already moving with the 
same direction and velocity as the top of the tower from which it is released.  Hence, 
contrary to the Aristotelians, Galileo maintains that we should expect to see the ball land 
at the base of the tower whether or not the Earth is moving.  In other words, Galileo’s 
position is that motion is relative.  However, this raises the most compelling question 
 
 162 
about his tidal theory: if motion is relative, why then does Galileo think the movement of 
the tides can supply confirmation of the movement of the Earth?109
 One possibility is that Galileo does not think that motion is relative or at least not 
absolutely relative.  The phrase in the excerpt above that Drake translates as 
“imperceptible to us and as if nonexistent” could be taken as evidence that Galileo thinks 
that there is only apparent relativity of motion, but that in fact if our observational 
techniques were sensitive enough, we could detect effects of the Earth’s motion on 
objects smaller than the ocean.  In this case, Galileo would be arguing that rocks dropped 
from towers and cannon balls shot in opposite directions are in fact affected by the 
motion of the Earth, but that we are not able to perceive these differences because of their 
small scale compared with the size of the Earth.  Galileo’s objection to Ptolemy’s tower 
argument would not be that both the ball and the tower participate in the motion of the 
Earth, and so do not change with respect to each other.  Instead, the focus of Galileo’s 
argument would be that because the ball is so small relative to the Earth, our observations 
are too inaccurate to conclude, as Aristotle and Ptolemy do, that the Earth is not moving.  
In this case, Galileo’s argument that we perceive small changes in the oceans (the range 
of tidal motion is miniscule compared with the depth of the oceans) because they are so 
much larger would be consistent. 
 
                                                 
109 In Dialogue, “Day Two” there are multiple “experiments” based on the same reasoning: for instance, a 
cannonball fired perpendicularly to the Earth’s surface will have a longer flight time than the ball dropped 
from the tower, which should give the cannon, which is fixed to the Earth, even more time to move away 
from where the cannonball will land. There is also a slight variation where two cannons are fired—one 
eastward and the other westward. The ball traveling westward should greatly outdistance the ball traveling 
eastward if the Earth were rotating eastward as proposed by Copernicus (Drake, 1981, p. 147). 
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 The fact of Galileo’s tidal theory makes the possibility of Galileo’s disbelief in 
relative motion more likely.  However, Galileo’s “tower proof” later in the “Second Day” 
argues exclusively from the position that because both the tower and the rock participate 
in the same motion as the Earth, we expect to observe the same motions whether or not 
the Earth is moving.110
 
  Clarifying his argument, Galileo claims:  
It is obvious, then, that motion which is common to many moving things 
is idle and inconsequential to the relation of these movables among 
themselves, nothing being changed among them, and that it is operative 
only in the relation that they have with other bodies lacking that motion, 
among which their location is changed. (Drake, trans., 1981, p. 135) 
 
I take Galileo’s refutations of Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s arguments for the immobility of 
the Earth as compelling evidence that Galileo’s argument hinges on the relativity of 
motion.  We are still left then with the difficult task of understanding why Galileo does 
not think his tidal theory undermines his earlier arguments. 
 To show that the Earth’s movements cause the ebb and flow of the tides, Galileo 
needs to establish two propositions: (i) that if the Earth were stationary it would be much 
harder to give any adequate account of the tides; and (ii) if the motion of the Earth does 
conform to the Copernican model, then these motions will necessarily lead to (something 
like) the observed tidal phenomena.  What needs to be explained is why Galileo thinks 
the oceans “feel” or react to the motion of the Earth despite his argument that the ball 
dropped from the tower or projectiles launched from the surface of the Earth are not 
affected by it. 
                                                 
110 See Drake (1981: 191-4) 
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 Galileo’s theory is that the tides are produced because the sea beds, which hold 
the oceans, shake up the water the same way that water in a basin is sloshed about when 
the basin is picked up, or one of the water barges carrying freshwater from the mainland 
to Venice disturbs the water within when accelerated or decelerated (Dialogue, Drake, 
1981, p. 493).  Galileo says that if the Earth had only one uniform motion, i.e. a single 
motion of constant trajectory and velocity, it could not produce tidal effects alone.  
However, because there are multiple movements, Galileo argues that the Earth does 
exhibit its motion through the tides.  That the Earth must have two different motions in 
order to produce tidal effects is the key assertion that Galileo must demonstrate.   
 The Copernican theory Galileo argues for in the first sections of Dialogue 
involves three regular motions: diurnal, annual, and precessional.  None of these constant 
motions alone, argues Galileo, could produce changes in tidal phenomena and the last is 
in any case negligible.  However, there are changes in tidal phenomena; they change as 
frequently as the phases of the Moon and Earth’s relationship to the Sun.  Galileo 
explicitly acknowledges that the tides are irregular even though the motions causing them 
must be regular: “that the Mediterranean and all other sea basins (in a word, that all parts 
of the earth) move with a conspicuously uneven motion, even though nothing but regular 
and uniform motions may happen to be assigned to the globe itself” (Dialogue, Drake, 
1981, p. 494).  Galileo argues that observable tidal motion is the effect of the 
combination of the annual and diurnal circular motions of the Earth.  These motions 
combine to produce what Galileo calls “regular absolute motion” of parts of the Earth, 
but not of the Earth as a whole (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 496).   
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 Specifically, at any instant, any two points along the equator on opposite sides of 
a spinning sphere are moving in opposite directions 
with respect to the plane of the equator; see Figure 4.4.  
“A” and “B” are points on opposite sides of a sphere.  
Points on opposite sides move with different velocities 
with respect to the inertial frame of reference “P” 
when the direction of their motions is parallel to the 
orbital path of the sphere.  Thus, from the perspective 
of an inertial frame of reference, the instantaneous 
velocity at point “A” is the tangential velocity of that 
point on the sphere added to the orbital velocity of the sphere.  However, from the same 
frame of reference, the velocity at point “B” is measured by subtracting the tangential 
velocity from the orbital velocity.  Galileo says that the part of the Earth spinning in the 
same direction the Earth is revolving around the Sun is moving much faster than the 
opposite part of the Earth, which is spinning in the opposite direction of the Earth’s 
orbital path.  Galileo calls this difference one of absolute motion (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, 
p. 496), but does not clearly explain what he means by ‘absolute’ motion given the 
context of his earlier refutations of the arguments for the geocentric solar system 
models.111
                                                 
111 It would be nice to know with respect to what Galileo thinks the parts of the Earth are changing 
velocities; i.e. does Galileo think absolute motion is simply the changing of velocities with respect to the 
Sun, or the solar system, or does he have some other unidentified inertial frame of reference in mind?  The 
answer to this question is not necessary for the arguments being considered here; however, as a matter of 
interest to another area in the philosophy of science it might offer insight into another unclear frame of 
reference that Newton points to in the “bucket experiment” in the General Scholium of Principia. 
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 For his tidal theory to meet his own criteria for a scientific demonstration, Galileo 
needs to justify his assertion that only something the size and viscosity of the oceans 
could display noticeable effects as a result of the Earth’s motions.  Justification is needed 
because the veracity of his claim is not immediately obvious.  Galileo does not have an 
independent way to corroborate his claim about the significance of the magnitude of the 
oceans.  Furthermore, Galileo cannot argue that this claim is entailed by a dynamical 
theory of mechanics, because Galileo never postulates one.  In the absence of other 
observational data that clearly corroborate this claim, and which are not merely consistent 
with all competing theories, and without a demonstration from a dynamical theory, what 
remains to justify his claim are on the epistemic level of physical intuitions.112
 Galileo’s justification problem is illustrated by considering the following intuition 
contradictory to Galileo’s intuition that of all the terrestrial bodies, only the oceans reveal 
Earth’s motions.  An Aristotelian intuition might propose that if the Earth were moving, 
smaller bodies would react more detectably than larger bodies.  The idea is that a ‘force’ 
large enough to accelerate the Earth even a little will be significant enough to throw small 
things about dramatically. 
 
113
                                                 
112 See section 4.6 below for discussion of the impact metaphysical influences, such as physical intuitions, 
have on Galileo’s scientific explanation. 
  Hence towers, cannons, and people should all feel, i.e. be 
affected by the motions of the Earth Galileo is arguing for.  The Aristotelian intuition 
might propose the following demonstration to support his intuition: place three boats on 
the ocean: one small punting barge, one medium-sized fishing boat, and one large 
Spanish galleon.  Sail all three vessels in light weather (i.e. small waves) and heavy 
113 The term ‘force’ is anachronistic; it is only being used here as a place holder for whatever is causing the 
Earth’s motions that Galileo is arguing for.   
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weather (i.e. large waves).  Which vessel most feels the effects of the waves?  In light 
weather the galleon is as steady as the dock while the barge is still noticeably moved.  
Even in moderate weather the smallest boat is tossed about dramatically while the galleon 
is gently rocked.  From this we can postulate a general rule: (allowing for slight variation 
due to different hull designs) the larger the boat, the more stable it is.  Boats are a good 
test because they are not fixed to the Earth, which was one of Galileo’s stipulations about 
the ocean.  This example is meant to support the contrary intuition to Galileo’s, namely 
that larger bodies should be less likely to feel the effects of the motion of the Earth, as 
opposed to Galileo’s intuition that the oceans feel the Earth’s motion in part, precisely 
because they are so large.   
 Galileo tries to justify why his arguments for tidal motion are not susceptible to 
the same counterarguments—i.e. that motion is relative—that he makes to refute the 
grounding assumption of the Aristotelian arguments for the immobility of the Earth.  
Galileo postulates that his tidal argument for Earth’s mobility is immune to the relative 
motion counterargument because of two differences between his argument and those of 
the Aristotelians: 1) relative to the size of the Earth, the oceans are of significant size, and 
towers and cannons are negligible; 2) the oceans are not fixed to the Earth the way towers 
and cannons are.  These are robust observations.  Galileo further argues that because 
different parts of the Earth are undergoing changes in velocity, something fluid and large 




 The key to Galileo’s defense for claiming that only the oceans should exhibit 
Earth’s motion is revealed in his claim that only the oceans ‘feel’ the motion.  The 
implication is that all terrestrial bodies are affected by the Earth’s motions; however, only 
something as large as the oceans, and as free to move as the oceans, can produce effects 
discernable to humans.  In most coastal areas the tidal rise in water level is only a matter 
of a few feet; the fact that the tides are so variable is important—it shows that other 
factors than the motion of the Earth must be operative, since otherwise the motions of the 
Earth should produce the same effects (at least at similar latitudes) in all bodies of water.  
Compared to the depth of the ocean, the tides are negligible, but still large enough to be 
measured by humans.  For instance, a percentage change in us that matched the 
percentage of change in the oceans, would be entirely undetectable to us.  This is not the 
full thrust of Galileo’s idea.  This is where it becomes essential that Galileo insists that 
there be at least two distinct terrestrial motions.  The two motions accelerate opposite 
parts of the Earth in contrary directions.  Thus, since the oceans span the world, the same 
body (ocean) is pulled in opposite directions.  Now the fluidity is key. 
 
Among all sublunary things it is only in the element of water (as 
something which is very vast and is not joined and linked with the 
terrestrial globe as are all its solid parts, but is rather, because of its 
fluidity, free and separate and a law unto itself) that we may recognize 
some trace or indication of the Earth’s behavior in regard to motion and 
rest. (Dialogue, Drake, trans., 1981, p. 484) 
 
Because the ocean is fluid, contrary impulses push it just a little, causing the tides.  So, 
for Galileo, it is not a matter of people being accelerated in contrary ways, because we 
are as a point to the Earth, so we are not pulled in multiple directions.  The oceans span 
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the Earth and are not fixed.  Some mountain ranges may be large enough to likewise feel 
the contrary accelerations, but because they are fixed to the Earth, we are not able to 
detect the small contrary accelerations they feel.114
 This compound effect is not seen in small bodies because they are not subjected to 
contrary forces.  Large bodies, such as the oceans, feel the force, but only very slightly.  
Galileo remarks that the tidal displacements of a few feet are nothing compared with the 
depths and breadths of the oceans.  The claim is that the parts of a great basin, a big 
ocean floor for example, are moving unequally in some absolute sense.  Galileo must 
admit that the ends of the ocean floor are not moving relative to one another, but he says 
that absolutely (or perhaps with respect to an unidentified frame) they are moving very 
differently: one side is accelerating and moving very fast and the other is impeded, hardly 
moving at all (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 499).
 
115
 Galileo considers a counterargument to this demonstration in the Dialogue by 
having Simplicio, the character representing the Scholastics, raise an objection based on 
the lack of a corresponding wind effect.  Simplicio suggests that the air should also be 
sloshed about, causing extremely high, constant winds.  Salviati replies, “The air, being a 
thing that is in itself very tenuous and extremely light, is most easily movable by the 
slightest force; but it is also most inept at conserving the motion when the mover ceases 
acting” (Dialogue, Drake, trans., 1981, p. 508).  Hence, it is because water is heavier than 
air that we have tides but not as noticeable effects in the air.  It is also because this is 
 
                                                 
114 In defense of Galileo, someone might have suggested that this force on things like mountain ranges is 
the cause of earthquakes and volcanoes. And in fact we now believe that there are land tides. 
115 Of course, this is an exaggeration if Galileo has in mind motion relative to the Sun.  The maximum 
tangential velocity of a point on the Earth at the equator is just over 1,000 mph; the orbital velocity is close 
to 67,000 mph—hence the maximum ‘absolute’ difference is only about three percent. 
 
 170 
supposed to be an acceleration rather than merely a velocity phenomenon, meaning that it 
is harder to accelerate water than air.  However, Galileo uses as evidence the claim that 
there is a perpetual breeze on the oceans toward the west, between the tropics (Dialogue, 
Drake, 1981, p. 510).116  European navigators were already well aware of the trade winds 
by Galileo’s time.  Galileo is correct that there is some easterliness to the trade winds, 
which is due to the Coriolis Effect.117
 In sum, Galileo’s two conclusions about tidal theory are: 
  Simplicio points out, however, that the same wind 
phenomena would be created if the Earth were stationary and the firmament revolved 
around it, as in the geocentric models (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 512).  This is just the 
kind of argument Galileo uses earlier in Dialogue to show how the idea of relative 
motion invalidates Ptolemaic arguments.  The crux of Galileo’s arguments against the 
Ptolemaic system is that Ptolemy’s “evidence” does not properly support the hypothesis 
that the Earth is immobile, because the same effects would be felt with or without the 
Earth’s motion.  Thus, by Galileo’s arguments that motion is relative, Ptolemaic evidence 
is inconclusive.  The challenge to Galileo’s argument, however, is to explain why 
Galileo’s rejection of the Ptolemaic arguments does not also defeat his own tidal theory. 
 
(i) “if the terrestrial globe were immovable, the ebb and flow of the oceans 
could not occur naturally;” 
 
(ii) “when we confer upon the globe the movements just assigned to it [by 
the Copernican system], the seas are necessarily subjected to an ebb 
                                                 
116 Predominantly, the trades are caused by the high pressure air that builds up around the tropics moving 
toward the low pressure system around the equator. 
117 The Coriolis Effect is the apparent veering of bodies toward the right in the Northern hemisphere and 
toward the left in the Southern hemisphere.  This is the effect of moving on a rotating sphere. 
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and flow agreeing in all respects with what is to be observed in them.” 
(Drake, trans., 1981, p. 484) 
 
Though Galileo admits there is a strong correlation between the phases of the Moon and 
the monthly variation in the tidal cycle, he rejects the idea that the Moon has any direct 
causal impact on the movements of the oceans.  Galileo rejects the lunar hypothesis 
because he does not believe the remote Moon can act on the local water.  Galileo admits 
such a hypothesis calls for “occult” forces (Dialogue, Drake, 1981, p. 516).  This type of 
objection is described elsewhere as being “action at a distance.”  Galileo cannot imagine, 
or his intuition will not allow, that there might be an invisible force between the Moon 
and the waters.  Galileo’s position is not unreasonable.118
 Despite his “repugnance” for the thought that the Moon could impact the waters 
from afar, it is essential to his tidal theory that the Moon impacts the motion of the Earth 
from afar.  Galileo makes the analogy with a weight on a diameter of a clock wheel.  As 
the weight is moved closer to center, the speed of rotation increases (for a constant force).  
It is not repugnant to the imagination that the weight on a stick should slow down the 
  However, Galileo does not go 
so far as to accept a correlation between the Moon and tides as a coincidence.  He comes 
up with the ingenious hypothesis about the acceleration and retardation of the Earth 
because of the relative position of the Moon.  This makes the phases of the Moon and the 
tides related phenomena even though they are not linked such that the Moon is directly 
causing the tides.  However, as will be shown below, it is a problem for his hypothesis 
that Galileo has apparently merely substituted one occult force for another. 
                                                 
118 Neither was this an uncommon view; consider the great reluctance of French scholars to accept 
Newtonian Mechanics well into the 18th century.  
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gear, because the weight is attached to a stick that is attached to the wheel.  There is 
constant physical contact between them.  How does the Moon have this effect on the 
Earth?  Why is this hypothesis not “repugnant” to Galileo? 
 
Now if it is true that the force which moves the Earth and the moon 
around the sun always retains the same strength, and if it is true that the 
same moving body moved by the same force but in unequal circles passes 
over similar arcs of smaller circles in shorter times, then it must 
necessarily be said that the moon when at its least distance from the sun 
(that is, at conjunction) passes through greater arcs of the Earth’s orbit 
than when it is at its greatest distance (that is, at opposition and full 
moon).  And it is necessary also that the Earth should share in this 
irregularity of the moon. (Dialogue, Drake, trans., 1981, pp. 525-526) 
 
Once again Galileo’s theorizing raises many questions; for instance, the justification for 
Galileo’s certainty that the force on the Earth and Moon remains constant is unclear.  
Although it makes for a simpler dynamical theory to suppose that the Earth’s speed 
around the Sun is constant (due to a constant force), this supposition would then require 
that some other cause also be posited because, in fact, the Earth does appear to change 
speeds with respect to the Sun.  Alternatively, Galileo could take the phenomena of 
Earth’s speed variations as evidence that the force moving the Earth around the Sun is not 
constant.  This relates to the earlier discussion about specific weight—how does Galileo 
decide what theory a given class of observations support?  Of course, Galileo wants the 
simplest explanation (this is also a difficult condition to assess); however, Galileo is a 
realist, meaning that he believes that his scientific explanations are true accounts of the 
fabric of the world.  If Galileo is certain that the force is constant just because it makes 
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for a simpler dynamical theory, then he would be revealing a very strong rationalist 
component to his method. 
 
4.6 Analysis of Implicit Elements of Galileo’s Method 
 The two case studies above demonstrate methodological factors explicit in 
Galileo’s concept of scientific demonstration.  This next section analyzes the 
complexities necessary to understanding Galileo’s method of scientific demonstration.  
The earlier analysis of Aristotle’s method (see chapter 2) will now serve to highlight what 
makes Galileo’s method revolutionary.  Because Galileo’s biggest critics identified 
themselves as ‘Aristotelian’, it is often assumed that Galileo’s method is completely 
contrary to Aristotle’s.  The Aristotelians of Galileo’s time were direct intellectual 
descendants of the Scholastic tradition, which began when 12th century thinkers first tried 
to apply Aristotle’s treatises on logic to the tradition of empirically based development of 
technology in the Medieval West.  Despite this tradition of trying to understand nature in 
order to control it, and even more to the point, despite Aristotle’s commitment to careful 
observation, the Aristotelians of Galileo’s time had long since abandoned Aristotle’s 
actual scientific methods in favor of some sort of Aristotelian dogmatism.  The 
consequence was that in method, the Aristotelians differed more from both Galileo and 
Aristotle than Galileo differed from Aristotle.  As discussed above, this goes against a 
long-standing stereotype that says the change from Aristotle to Galileo is the change from 





  The rest of this chapter will show why this stereotype is misleading 
and what the essential elements of Galileo’s method are that need to be considered when 
developing a better model for scientific explanation. 
17th Century Aristotelians 
 It is easier to explain where Galileo departs from the Aristotelians than to show 
where he departs from Aristotle, in part, because Galileo takes pains throughout his 
career to highlight where he thinks the Aristotelians go wrong.  In his “Letter to the 
Grand Duchess Christina” (1615) Galileo says that he believes that his Aristotelian critics 
have fallen into error because of their overconfidence in trying “to understand by means 
of reason alone,” instead of also relying on extensive empirical observations (Drake, 
1957, p. 175).  Here, Galileo’s professed method diverges from his contemporaries’ but is 
more similar to Aristotle’s in trying to make experience and observation the beginning of 
knowledge and the basis of inquiry. 
 Galileo goes further in criticizing the Aristotelians.  In the “Second Day” of 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632) the character representing the 
Aristotelian viewpoint, Simplicio, claims of interpreting Aristotle’s corpus that, “There is 
no doubt that whoever has this skill will be able to draw from his books demonstrations 
of all that can be known; for every single thing is in them” (p. 126).  Likewise, in the 
“Third Letter on Sunspots” (1612) Galileo says of his Aristotelian contemporaries: 
 
                                                 
119 For examples of this stereotype see Hall (1962), Koyré (1978). For more discussion about the stereotype 
in Galileo scholarship, see Cohen (1960). 
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So far as I can see, their education consisted in being nourished from 
infancy on the opinion that philosophizing is and can be nothing but to 
make a comprehensive survey of the texts of Aristotle, that from divers 
[sic] passages they may quickly collect and throw together a great number 
of solutions to any proposed problem. (Drake, 1957, pp. 126-7) 
 
Aristotle’s scientific methods seem to have been lost by the Aristotelians by this time and 
replaced with a sort of literary review approach.  Galileo represents them as approaching 
any new problem as a matter merely for further interpretation of Aristotle’s assertions.  
The Aristotelians assumed that, with the exception of those items of faith corrected by St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle had already discovered all of nature’s truths. 
 Discovering what is truly revolutionary about Galileo by comparing and 
contrasting him with Aristotle is a more complex undertaking.  It will be helpful to begin 
this process by establishing the elements that influence Galileo’s thinking that are 
relevant to this discussion.  
 
Analysis of Influences on Method 
 To understand what Galileo considers to be a satisfactory scientific explanation, it 
is necessary to look at the influences on his scientific methods that he does not explicitly 
discuss.  There are three implicit influences on Galileo’s philosophy of science, which 
underlie his method for generating scientific explanations, defined above and illustrated 
with the case studies.  These three influences are: 1) Galileo’s metaphysics, which I 
divide into three categories—worldview (hereafter theoretical framework), metaphysical 
commitments, and physical intuitions; 2) experiences, i.e. empirical observation, which is 
often broken into ‘experiments’ and “mere” observation; and 3) reason, which includes 
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how judgments are made about experiential data and the structure of rational arguments 
(e.g. Aristotle’s syllogisms).   
 
Metaphysics 
 The first implicit influence on Galileo’s philosophy of science is his metaphysics, 
which I divide into three classifications: theoretical framework, metaphysical 
commitments, and physical intuitions.  Although these three categories are different, they 
are lumped together under ‘metaphysics’ because they all have similar impacts on 
empirical observations and on theory building.  They are the same just insofar as they 
impact the investigation and explanation of science in the same way: (i) they affect the 
formation of questions one asks about nature; (ii) they affect the rudimentary judgments 
about what one has observed; and (iii) they affect the range of possible explanations that 
satisfactorily answer those questions.  These three differ along a continuum that ranges 
from less conscious/deliberate with a greater impact on one’s scientific investigations, to 
the more conscious/deliberate with lesser impact on one’s scientific investigations.  
Theoretical framework, metaphysical commitments, and physical intuitions cannot be 
sharply differentiated; instead the continuum on which they lie has fuzzy boundaries.  
This is so because the status of a particular metaphysical influence can be different for 
different people and can change over time for the same person.  For instance, something 
may start as an intuition and then become a conscious metaphysical commitment.  Or an 
intuition could become a part of one’s theoretical framework directly without ever being 
a conscious metaphysical commitment.  Ockham’s Razor, for example, is taken by some 
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to be an intuitively justifiable rule of thumb for theory building while for others the razor 
is a deliberate metaphysical commitment to the orderliness of nature and the connection 
between human understanding and the intelligence responsible for nature’s orderliness.  
For others, the razor is merely an intuitively useful rule of thumb in the process of 
creating new theories and is consistent with scientific instrumentalism.  It is also possible 
that a version of the razor could be an implicit part of someone’s worldview before she 
becomes conscious of the influence it may have on theorizing and then deliberately 
removes it.  Although there are not clear lines that differentiate these three metaphysical 
influences on conducting science, we can give examples where it is generally more 
appropriate to use one term over the others.  
 One’s theoretical framework has a strong impact on what questions need to be 
asked and answered because it determines what phenomena need explaining.  For 
example, are we trying to explain why the Moon, being perfect and ethereal, has spots?  
Or do we need to explain why the Moon, which has shadows because it is a large rock 
like the Earth, stays in the heavens instead of falling on us?  Do we need to explain why 
projectiles keep moving after they have left the thrower’s hand, or do we need to explain 
why objects stop moving once they are imparted with motion?  Metaphysical 
commitments have a similar impact on what questions need to be asked, but can be a 
little more deliberate/conscious.  Additionally, frameworks are revisable in a way in 
which metaphysical commitments (at least in theory) are not, because frameworks can be 
influenced by observations more directly (and unconsciously) than metaphysical 
commitments can be.  For instance, are we beginning from the assumption that the 
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heavens must be perfect and so they must travel in the most perfect shape, circles?  Or is 
the movement of the heavens an open question?  In this case it makes sense that the 
Ancients arrived at circular motion.  Because the heavens appear to move regularly, there 
seemed to the Ancients to be only two possibilities for the paths of heavenly bodies: 
either the paths are straight or they are curved.  However, the paths could not be straight 
because the universe was considered to be finite, so the regular curve that ancient 
geometers were left with was circular.  The latter allows for Kepler to figure out a 
simpler model based on curved but not circular motion (i.e. elliptical motion).  ‘Physical 
intuition’ is similar to theoretical framework and metaphysical commitment, but 
intuitions tend to be the most plastic.  In one sense intuitions might be called unconscious 
metaphysical commitments because we do not always consider where particular 
intuitions come from, but they are nonetheless more deliberately applied because they 
suggest possibilities for us to consider.   
 Despite these differences in metaphysical degree, theoretical framework, 
metaphysical commitment, and physical intuition have a similar constraining impact on 
theorizing when they narrow the field of what one considers to be possible explanations.  
Toulmin (1961) stresses the idea that science is not merely the recording of new 
observations but instead is our interpretation of new observations within the context of 
our previous theories and metaphysics: 
...in studying the development of scientific ideas, we must always look out 
for the ideals and paradigms men rely on to make Nature intelligible.  
Science progresses, not by recognizing the truth of new observations 
alone, but by making sense of them.  To this task of interpretation we 
bring principles of regularity, conceptions of natural order, paradigms, 
ideals, or what-you-will: intellectual patterns which define the range of 
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things we can accept (in Copernicus’ phrase) as ‘sufficiently absolute and 
pleasing to the mind’.  An explanation, to be acceptable, must demonstrate 
that the happenings under investigation are special cases or complex 
combinations of our fundamental intelligible types. (p. 81) 
 
In this excerpt, Toulmin makes it clear that our scientific understanding is not objective.  
The fact that our scientific explanations rely on and are constrained by our metaphysics is 
useful when it facilitates finding an explanation that meets one’s criteria, perhaps by 
narrowing the field of possible explanations; and of course, this constraining effect is 
detrimental when it hinders finding a satisfactory explanation because it has eliminated 
the “correct” explanation.  An example of this is seen when Galileo eliminates the 
possibility that the Moon directly causes tidal phenomena.  This problem of potentially 
eliminating the best explanation is unavoidable in the sense that every stage of scientific 
investigation relies on one’s metaphysics.  So, the goal of clarifying these elements is to 
aid in figuring out the best way to be deliberate about what metaphysical underpinnings 
are influencing our work and how to avoid errors due to them and how to revise our 
metaphysics based on new information.  
 Determining the metaphysical basis for Galileo’s commitment to something like 
Ockham’s razor highlights the significance of his metaphysics.  The language of the 
scientific instrumentalism versus scientific realism debate can also be helpful for looking 
at the metaphysical underpinnings of one’s theories.  An instrumentalist viewpoint might 
take Ockham’s razor merely as a general guideline for building theories—i.e., as a 
desirable condition for theories, but one that is trumped by other factors such as ease of 
use or greater generality or applicability.  A realist committed to the razor, on the other 
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hand, might take the razor as representing her metaphysical view that the universe is 
actually the simplest possible; and hence, simpler theories are more likely to be true 
theories.  Of course both instrumentalists and realists are committed to devising models 
that fit with conditions such as empirical fit.  Galileo turns out to be committed to the 
metaphysics of orderliness.  This goes hand in hand with his scientific realism.  
Although, realism is not an all or nothing proposition, that is, one can be realist about 
some things but not others, there could have been no dispute between the Copernican and 
the Brahe views, no fight between Galileo and the Church, except on the basis of realist 
commitments.  The nature of his realism will be made clear later by considering his 




 The next element to consider is how experience shapes Galileo’s theories in the 
empirical sciences.  Going at least as far back as Kant (1781), the difference between 
Aristotle’s method of empirical observation and Galileo’s has been characterized as the 
                                                 
120 One piece of evidence supporting the claim that Galileo is a realist comes from his strong desire for the 
terms of his appointment to the Tuscan court in 1610 to recognize him as a philosopher and not just as a 
mathematician (Drake 1957, p. 64).  Drake claims that it was Galileo’s work in astronomy and mathematics 
in The Starry Messenger that made Galileo an overnight celebrity and inspired his former pupil, Cosimo the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany, to make Galileo his chief mathematician.  So why, then, was Galileo also 
concerned with being called a philosopher?  What did it mean to be a philosopher at this time? For 
Aristotle, the paradigm of philosophy is first philosophy or metaphysics, which is an investigation into 
substances and their causes, especially the final cause; this investigation requires investigation into and 
acquaintance with first principles.  Although Galileo rejects science being the search for ‘final’ causes, as 
seen in the excerpts from Floating Bodies, Galileo is still interested in proximate causes just insofar as they 
provide explanatory power to demonstrations.  So, this line of reasoning suggests that Galileo wanted to do 
more than just accurately record celestial positions; he might want the title “philosopher” in order to 
emphasize his interest in answering “why” questions behind the appearances.  If it is going too far to take 
Galileo’s desire for the title ‘philosopher’ as evidence of his interest in causation, one could still infer from 
this desire that Galileo wanted the credentials and institutional backing to enter into debates with the 
Church astronomers not just about the workability of the models but actually about cosmic architecture.  
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difference between “mere” observation and ‘experimentation’.  In this sense, experiments 
involve asking specific questions about natural phenomena and then designing 
experiments in such a way that the ‘variable’ being tested can be isolated.  The difference 
is that in experiments, what is observed is the result of a specific, predetermined plan; 
whereas, according to this characterization, observations made outside of experiments are 
supposed to be a matter of chance.  Experiments try to artificially simulate phenomena or 
to generate them in conditions in which ‘noise’ has been filtered out.  One example of 
this in Galileo’s corpus is his inclined plane experiments.  He used an inclined plane to 
determine the law that explains how bodies accelerate during free fall.  The three possible 
factors were length of time of acceleration, distance traveled during acceleration, and the 
vertical height traveled during acceleration.  In this case the incline allowed Galileo to 
experimentally measure acceleration by translating the final speed reached by a ball 
released along an inclined plane into the distance the ball traveled after being launched 
horizontally.  Galileo kept the vertical height of release constant while varying the angle 
of the incline, and hence the length of time the ball spent accelerating along the track.  He 
found that the distance the ball landed from the track was constant when the vertical 
height remained constant, independent of the angle of incline.  From this Galileo was able 
to isolate the variable that determines the speed reached through acceleration, namely 
vertical height traveled and not distance traveled during acceleration or length of time of 
acceleration. 
 The advantage to ‘experimenting’ as opposed to “merely” observing is that 
experiments tend to make more clear what question is being asked, or what is being 
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tested.  This idea is expressed by Kant in his explanation of the differences between 
modern and ancient science.  In the quotation that follows, Kant is characterizing what is 
new about the methods used by moderns such as Galileo. 
 
They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after 
a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in 
nature’s leading-strings, but must itself show the way with principles of 
judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to 
questions of reason’s own determining.  Accidental observations, made in 
obedience to no previously thought-out plan, can never be made to yield a 
necessary law, which alone reason is concerned to discover.  Reason, 
holding in one hand its principles, according to which alone concordant 
appearances can be admitted as equivalent to laws, and in the other hand 
the experiment which it has devised in conformity with these principles, 
must approach nature in order to be taught by it.  It must not, however, do 
so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher 
chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to 
answer questions which he has himself formulated. (1st Critique, Kemp-
Smith, trans., 1929, p. 20) 
 
Kant’s purpose in explaining this change to experimentation made by the moderns is to 
make the analogy to his theory that all experience presupposes organization into some 
sort of causal framework.  Kant’s theory strongly supports the idea that all observations 
are post-theoretical.  The point of the passage above is to explain that the innovation of 
the moderns in collecting empirical data was to construct specific frameworks—the 
experimental set-ups—that would answer the specific questions they wanted answered.  
Kant is contrasting this method with Aristotle’s “accidental” observations.  Kant is 
rejecting Aristotle’s idea that the way to learn about nature is to be actively passive; i.e. 
to work at being open enough to receive the forms nature confronts us with. 
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 However, Kant’s criticism of Aristotle’s epistemology in the excerpt above is 
overstated.  Aristotle’s intuition that by removing objects from their natural settings we 
are only learning about how they behave in these artificial settings is not unreasonable.  
The stereotype about the change from the Aristotelian system to the modern conception 
of nature involves the story that it took Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes to begin 
experimenting in the Baconian sense of putting nature “on the rack”.  The assumption is 
that any controlled experiment would be viewed by Aristotle as having taken nature out 
of context.  The Kantian criticism that observations are somehow random and can never 
be guaranteed to give a full picture of a system should be separated from the idea that 
Aristotle thought it important to get his “hands dirty.”  Galileo for instance, was aware of 
the importance of experience to Aristotle’s method.  In the “First Day” of Dialogue, 
Simplicio says: 
 
Aristotle would not give assurance from his reasoning more than was 
proper, despite his great genius.  He held in his philosophizing that 
sensible experiments were to be preferred above any argument built by 
human ingenuity, and he said that those who would contradict the 
evidence of any sense deserved to be punished by the loss of that sense. 
(Drake, trans., 1981, p. 36) 
 
This illustrates some of the similarity between Aristotle’s and Galileo’s methods, 
especially the importance of sensate experiences to both, while revealing how the 17th 
century Aristotelians are farther removed from both Galileo and Aristotle than they are 
from each other.  However, there may be a meaningful difference between Galileo and 
Aristotle with regard to thought experiments and experiments designed to eliminate 
“natural” influences such as air resistance. 
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 Although Aristotle allows for some thought experiments involving 
counterfactuals (e.g. the proof of the impossibility of void, Physics IV.8), he would likely 
disagree with Galileo about the value of what is learned by constructing unnatural 
conditions with which to test natural phenomena.  For example Galileo wants to know 
how objects would fall in a vacuum, i.e. how they would fall in an ideal space.  Aristotle 
would argue that it is not helpful to think about how objects would fall where it is (in his 
view) in principle impossible for them to fall.  Furthermore, Aristotle would not think 
one could learn anything about how things happen in nature by devising thought 
experiments or physical experiments designed to remove objects from nature.  Galileo, on 
the other hand, thinks that experiments designed to simulate the ideal are better able to 
reveal nature’s truths. 
 It would be false to say that Aristotle is not interested in ideal solutions; after all, 
the universals that Aristotle reasons to from observations of particulars are all ideal in 
this sense.  However, they are not idealized, i.e. mathematical fictions abstracted from 
imperfect data the way Galileo does.  Aristotle tries to account for the deviation in nature 
from the ideal by introducing the caveat that many things in nature happen “always or for 
the most part”.  In fact, in Aristotle’s science it is possible for an occurrence to be 
relatively infrequent and still be the natural effect.  For example, Aristotle argues that by 
nature, acorns become oak trees.  This is true even though he acknowledges that only a 
small percentage of acorns become trees, the vast majority are squirrel food, and only a 
small percentage of fish eggs become fish.  So, both Aristotle and Galileo are able to 
think in terms of explanations involving ideals while allowing for deviation.  One 
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difference between them is that Galileo strives to find a formula that can predict 
phenomena, while Aristotle wants to find the complete account of how particular 
phenomena fit within the whole of nature.  Another difference between Aristotle and 
Galileo is that despite recognizing that nature does not always exhibit what is most 
natural, Aristotle still does not try to manipulate nature in order to reveal the ideal.  
Galileo’s idealizations aim at the mathematically regular.  For example, he wants a 
simple formula for free fall or the periods of pendulums that predicts behavior when 
certain factors are accounted for, such as air resistance, even though these complicating 
factors are more prevalent than squirrels eating acorns. 
 
Reason 
 In addition to the differences between Galileo and Aristotle in terms of the 
elements of metaphysics and experience in Galileo’s scientific work, there are also 
important differences between them in terms of the role that reason and rational 
arguments play in their theories.  Reason plays two fundamental roles in the formation of 
Galileo’s scientific explanations.  First, by interpreting an experience, reason judges what 
one saw.  In this role reason is the mediator between the raw sensory input and one’s 
metaphysics, which constrain to a certain degree what is possible for one to see.  
Reason’s second role is in determining what a set of observations is in support of, i.e. 
what is the best explanation or model that accounts for the phenomena.  In both cases 
reason is judgment.   
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 Empirical theory creation is facilitated by applying reason to empirical 
observational data.  For example, interpreting rudimentary observations can be like 
making a coherent story from a disordered series of pictures: the general understanding 
the interpreter already has that she brings to any new set of pictures influences the story 
that can be made from them.  A different general understanding or theoretical framework 
will yield a different story from the same experiences.  This is illustrated by the account 
of the famous free fall experiment at the Leaning Tower in Pisa.121
 Galileo intended to disprove the Aristotelian notion that heavier objects fall faster 
than lighter objects, over the same distance, in the ratio of their weights (Physics IV.8).  
From the top of the tower a cannonball and a musket ball were released from the same 
height as close to simultaneously as could be done at the time.  Galileo and his Scholastic 
critics observed the same event and recorded the same data: both sides agreed that the 
heavier object, the cannon ball, landed before the much lighter musket ball.  However, 
both sides felt equally vindicated in their opposing interpretations and conclusions.  For 
which of the two competing theories is this event evidence?  The Aristotelians felt 
vindicated because the heavier object moved faster, as Aristotle predicted (although not 
dozens or hundreds of times faster as it should, based on the ratio of their weights).  
Galileo, on the other hand, believed that the heavier object only landed before the lighter 
object because the lighter object’s motion was more greatly impeded by air resistance.  
 
                                                 
121 Whether Galileo actually conducted this experiment himself or not remains controversial.  However, it 
does seem clear from the historical record that a version of this experiment was conducted in Pisa and that 
either Galileo participated in it or it preceded him.  In either case, Galileo was aware of the results (Drake, 
1980).  There is evidence from his notebooks that Galileo did conduct his own free fall experiments like 
those conducted at Pisa (Lindberg, 1992). 
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Again, both camps agreed about the rudimentary observation, but they made different 
judgments about the single event. 
 The two camps made different judgments because each side had brought a 
different theoretical framework to the experiment: the Aristotelians’ framework required 
that heavy objects fall faster than light objects because they contain more earth in them, 
which is what causes them to move downwards; Galileo’s framework, on the other hand, 
required that all objects fall alike, except when resisted.  So, just as people with very 
different perspectives will make different stories from the same pictures, there is a sense 
in which Galileo and the Scholastics saw something different from each other.  Hanson 
(1958) argues that, “seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ undertaking.  Observation of x is shaped by 
prior knowledge of x” (p. 19).122
 Because an observation is an interpretation or judgment, and because 
interpretation necessarily requires at least a rudimentary theoretical framework, a 
theoretical framework is another necessary condition for the possibility of making an 
observational judgment.
   
123
                                                 
122 For further discussion see Kuhn (1996) chapter 10, for a discussion about the impact of theoretical 
frameworks on observations. Among others, Kuhn gives the example of how the Aristotelians saw the 
pendulum as a body repeatedly “falling with difficulty” slowly coming to rest, overcoming the effect of 
being suspended by a cord; whereas Galileo saw the pendulum as almost continuously repeating its motion, 
except for what is lost through resistance (p. 119).  
  There is a difficulty, however, because observational 
judgments both come from and inform theories.  The challenge is to explain how Galileo 
was able to reason from the same event the Aristotelians witnessed to a much richer 
explanation of falling bodies.  One important aspect of this issue concerns the extent to 
123 The challenge to philosophers of science is to clarify this dialectical interaction that must take place.  In 
addition to Kuhn (1996), for the status of the contemporary debate about the theory laden-ness of 
observations, i.e. whether pre-theoretic observations are possible and if so how there can be a genuine 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms and sentences in sciences, see: Psillos 2002; 
Hempel 1965; Hanson 1958; Popper 1934a, 1934b, 1960.. 
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which one is prepared to allow experience to correct a theory—in other words, how 
falsifiable the theory is, and what one is prepared to admit as disconfirming evidence.   
 One example of Galileo’s willingness to trust his theory over physical evidence is 
his experimental attempt to determine the speed of light.  Galileo sent an assistant with a 
lamp to the top of one hill while Galileo, also equipped with a lamp, went to the top of 
another hill.  The idea was to be as far apart as possible while still being within sight of 
each other.  The lamps had shutters that blocked the light from being visible to the 
opposite observer.  Knowing the distance between the two hilltops, Galileo knew he 
could calculate the speed of light if he could measure the time it took for light to travel 
from one hilltop to the other and back.  Galileo’s plan was to measure the elapsed time 
between Galileo’s opening the shutter on his lamp, the assistant seeing the light from 
Galileo’s lamp and then immediately opening the shutter on his lamp and then Galileo’s 
seeing the light from the student’s lamp.  Galileo was surprised to find that he could see 
the light on the other hill coming back to him before he had even fully opened his lamp.  
Allowing for reaction time, the light seemed to be traveling instantaneously.  
Remarkably, Galileo did not conclude that the speed of light is infinite.  He concluded 
instead that to measure the speed of light the lamps needed to be farther apart than was 
feasible to allow observation.  This is an example of very careful reasoning.  It would 
have been reasonable to conclude, as others did, that light travels instantaneously.  
However, Galileo does not take pains to ensure that his reasoning from observation to 
theory is always this careful by being explicit about what would confirm or disconfirm 
the theory that light travels instantaneously.  
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 Further insight into Galileo’s conception of the complicated dialectic between 
experience and theory can be gained by considering more closely the significance of his 
use of idealization in theory building.  Experience does not provide examples of the ideal; 
e.g. pendulums come to rest, falling objects do not reach the ground simultaneously, and 
balls released from the same height on an inclined plane leave a range of marks on the 
floor instead of a single mark.  The free fall experiment exemplifies this quandary.  
Galileo felt justified in his confidence that the disturbing factor was air resistance and that 
the air resistance was enough to account for the discrepancy between ideal and actual 
conditions.124
 The problem of mediating the dialectical interaction between experience and 
theory can be understood in two ways: First, reason is the tool that judges whether 
experimental variation from the hypothesis is due to the experimental technique or some 
factor unaccounted for in the hypothesis being tested.  In the case of free fall, even if an 
air resistance factor is posited that makes the observational data fit the hypothesis it will 
be susceptible to the criticism that positing this air resistance factor is ad hoc.  The only 
way to defend against the charge of making ad hoc additions to a theory is to design 
further experiments that will independently corroborate that air resistance accounts for 
variation from expected results.  These experiments will likewise produce imperfect 
results, which again will need to be judged in order to ascertain whether the new results 
are due to imperfect experimental technique or some other still unaccounted for factor.  
   
                                                 
124 Aristotle, as well as the Scholastics, held that the rate of fall is an inverse function of the resistance of 
the media; however, there does not seem to have been any attempt to work out how media might resist 
differently depending on the mass and volume of a body, or any attempt to measure resistance. In fact, they 
were not interested generally in measurement as such. 
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Observational data alone cannot by themselves determine a theory; it is always necessary 
to interpret the data in order to form a theory, which requires reason. 
 This invokes the second aspect of this problem, which can be seen as a part of the 
general problem of (enumerative) induction in the empirical sciences.125  Even a close 
fitting factor that accounts for air resistance in the experiments possible at Galileo’s time 
cannot, in principle, be proved accurate for all possible experiments.  Galileo does not 
explain how he can be sure that his experimental observations are capturing how objects 
will fall in the future any more than Aristotle explains how he can be sure that his 
generalizations accurately represent a class of phenomena.  When Kant is praising 
Galileo’s method over Aristotle’s he does not acknowledge this similarity between 
Galileo and Aristotle.  The suggestion being put forward here is not that empirical 
science is untenable because it necessarily relies on induction; the point is that any fully 
developed theory of scientific explanation ought to explicitly address the problem of 
induction as it applies to positing things like natural laws.126  By induction, and like 
induction itself, its continued usefulness seems to be good grounds for continuing its 
use.127
                                                 
125 One way to characterize the problem of classical induction (now called enumerative induction) is that 
there is not a theoretical way to distinguish between good and bad inductions; any attempt to justify an 
induction in empirical science would rely on induction, and hence be circular. See: Hume’s An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, Section IV; Goodman (1983), “New Riddle of Induction” in Fact, 
Fiction, and Forecast. 
   
126 Lange (2000) argues that inductive confirmation is only appropriate for things like natural laws because 
induction relies on the “principle of the uniformity of nature”.  Lange argues that “we cannot confirm h 
inductively if we believe that ⌐□h [it is not necessary that h is the case]” (p. 121). Hence, we must assume 
that there are natural laws and that they are necessary, in order to achieve inductive confirmations in the 
empirical sciences.  
127 Furthermore, there is no alternative substitute for induction in generating theories in the empirical 
sciences. (Notwithstanding Popper’s (1934) attempt at making the structure of scientific progress deductive 
through his theory of Falsificationism.) Aristotle did not see induction as problematic because he believed 
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 The question of how Galileo adjudicates between reason and empirical data is 
related to the earlier question of what first persuaded Galileo of the truth of Copernicus’ 
hypothesis.  What convinced him that there was something true about Copernicus’ theory 
even though it seems to violate our common sense judgment that we are not spinning 
around extremely fast?  It is not a case of a new theory immediately giving more accurate 
predictions than the old.  Galileo must have been initially persuaded by rational argument 
rather than empirical data.  A closer look at the free fall experiment will serve to fill out 
Galileo’s understanding of the role of rational argument.  
 There are three relevant topics broached by the free fall experiment: (i) as 
discussed above, this experiment reveals the critical impact that an observer’s theoretical 
framework has on the interpretation of experiences.  Galileo is similar to the Aristotelians 
insofar as both camps tolerated deviation in the actual results from the theoretically 
expected results.  Galileo was confident that the observed results were within the limit of 
the expected results adjusted for air resistance.  The Aristotelians accepted results that 
differed from the abstract, mathematical predictions of Aristotle because they were not 
concerned with mathematics in general, and especially not quantitative measurement 
(recall that Aristotle predicts that two bodies will fall in the ratio of their weights).  It is 
the attitude toward mathematics that reveals the change from the Aristotelians to Galileo: 
                                                                                                                                                 
that, for the most part, humans just tend to be able to correctly identify the correct universals based on 
observations.  Being more epistemically incredulous, we suggest that relative levels of inductive 
justification need to be built into models in the empirical sciences. 
 
 192 
for Galileo, our understanding of nature is essentially mathematical, i.e. what it means to 
understand some phenomena is to have a mathematical model of the phenomena.128
 Galileo’s emphasis on mathematics leads to (ii), the second point to be considered 
about the free fall experiment: the relative lack of importance of mathematics to 
Aristotelian science is highlighted by the fact that the Aristotelians were not deterred by 
the very large deviation from the predicted mathematical results, and instead were 
satisfied that the general relation held of the heavier hitting before the lighter.  And (iii), 
the third point is that Galileo satisfaction with, and even expectation of some deviation 
from the ideal case, in which the two balls reach the ground simultaneously, reveals that 
what is more important is discovering the mathematically regular explanations, which he 
believes underlie the imperfect events in the physical world.  An in depth look at point (i) 
will serve as a context for discussing (ii) and (iii) later. 
 
 Point (i) above is important to the overall question of Galileo’s views on reason 
versus experience because it shows the sense in which the theoretical is prior to 
experience.  This may be more clearly seen in the arguments the Aristotelians made 
against the use of the telescope for gathering celestial data.  The Aristotelian idea was 
that celestial bodies are composed of different material from terrestrial bodies and further 
that celestial bodies move in a different medium.  For the Aristotelians, this means that 
the heavens should have a science unique to them; any similarities, or the ability to use 
similar equipment, such as the telescope to investigate two different realms, would have 
                                                 
128 This is very different from what Aristotle considers necessary for ‘understanding’ phenomena, i.e. 
having scientific knowledge. Without a causal explanation (preferably giving the final or formal cause) one 
does not have scientific knowledge according to Aristotle.  See chapter 2. 
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to be explained or argued for independently.  An explanation common during Galileo’s 
time for the Moon’s uneven coloring claims that different parts of the Moon absorb and 
emit light differently (Van Helden, 1989, p. 11).  Galileo was not so influenced by a 
commitment to a perfectly spherical Moon that he was constrained to explain away the 
obvious interpretation of the visual data collected meticulously night after night.  The 
Aristotelians rejected Galileo’s explanation that the different coloring on the Moon came 
from mountains and valleys on the Moon as “repugnant” to sense.  Galileo was also able 
to see an uneven Moon because his prior-to-the-fact reasoning held that one should begin 
with the idea that the same observational data should be attributed to the same causes if 
the same conditions hold.129
 The example further demonstrates that experience alone cannot dictate 
explanations; experience is more helpful after the reasoning has been employed.  If this 
were not the case, it would be possible to be convinced by arguments such as those 
against the motion of the Earth and in favor of the Aristotelian concept of free fall.  A 
rapidly spinning Earth seems to violate common experience.  However, starting from the 
position of disallowing theories that violated common sense had stalled scientific 
progress.  This leaves open the question of how to know when we have the right 
explanation. 
  In this case the reasoning is the inference from the 
understanding that dark spots on the Earth are shadows caused by uneven surfaces, to the 
same cause of dark spots on the Moon.  This conceptual framework had to be in place 
before Galileo could discover a bumpy Moon.  
                                                 
129  Of course, the Aristotelians would assent to the same principle, but they nevertheless disagreed with the 
starting assumption that the same conditions might hold for celestial and terrestrial bodies. 
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 Galileo’s method of demonstration reveals his concern for certain epistemological 
problems, which Aristotle seems to be less concerned with, and reveals his lack of 
concern for other epistemological problems.  Galileo’s rejection of pursuing the answer 
to questions such as why things fall, why the celestial bodies revolve, and why certain 
objects are denser than others, evinces Galileo’s caution against theorizing about matters 
which cannot be empirically justified.  However, Galileo’s confidence that he is able to 
determine all of the plausible explanations for a given phenomenon reveals a lack of 
concern for anticipating error, which is a fundamental epistemological problem.   
 
Mathematical Nature 
 Although many of the descriptions to this point sound as if Galileo is interested in 
mathematics and Aristotle is not, this is not strictly accurate.  Both Aristotle and Galileo 
use mathematical proofs in demonstrations about physical phenomena.  For example, 
Aristotle claims that the ratio 2:1 is the formal cause of the octave; Galileo claims that the 
distance objects fall varies proportionally to the squares of the times they have been 
falling.  If there is a difference on this level, it is that the mathematical formula is the aim, 
it is the end of the scientific investigation for Galileo, while it may only be a part of the 
picture for Aristotle.  The major difference, however, lies in Galileo’s expanded use of 
mathematics in the investigation of nature.  He is interested in quantifying phenomena.  
This is not something that either the Aristotelians or Aristotle were concerned with.  The 
main point is that while Aristotle gestures towards mathematics, mostly as an exemplar of 
justified certainty in the sciences, Galileo actually uses it.  Of course this is over-
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simplified – there is the model of the Aristotelian mixed sciences, but that is mostly just a 
model; and even where it is filled out, the use of geometry and arithmetic is largely 
piecemeal.  For example, although in Physics IV.8 Aristotle claims that the speed of fall 
varies as a positive function of the weight of the falling body, there does not appear to be 
any evidence that the mathematical component of his theory of falling bodies held any 
import to him.  It is very unlikely that Aristotle tried to acquire observational evidence to 
support his mathematical assertion.  
 This second change, the quantification of nature, marks a significant divergence 
from Aristotle’s thinking.  Once Aristotle has explained the reason for a phenomenon 
such as free fall, for instance, he is not generally interested in the practical task of 
measuring it.  This is because measuring the particular speeds, even if Aristotle had 
reasonable means of doing so, would not tell him more about why things fall.  Moreover, 
in Metaphysics VIII.3 Aristotle implies that measuring introduces error, and so the more 
accurate sciences are the ones that do not involve measurement: “We find greater 
exactness where there is no magnitude, and the greatest exactness where there is no 
motion” (Tredennick, trans., 1935, 1078a9).  This highlights one of Galileo’s great 
innovations in the philosophy of science.  Whereas Aristotle does not have an 
independent way of choosing from among competing explanations, Galileo’s preference 
for quantified predictive accuracy is an empirically justifiable method for evaluating 
explanations and theories. 
 Point (ii) above, about how mathematics is not central to Aristotelian science, 
further highlights the difference between experience in the Aristotelian system and 
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experience in the Galilean system.  The lack of concern about the failure of Aristotle’s 
mathematical predictions shows the mathematics or at least mathematical precision to be 
a secondary consideration for the Aristotelians: they do not expect the theory to yield 
precise, verifiable predictions.  The main point for them is that heavier objects fall faster 
in this world, and they do not care about abstract worlds.  Galileo’s conviction that this is 
the Aristotelians’ conception of mathematics is evident in “The Second Day” of Dialogue 
where the conversation is about the value of applying mathematics to the material world.  
Sagredo claims that trying to deal with physical problems without geometry is impossible 
and Simplicio (representing the Aristotelian view) responds that there is no significant 
value in applying math to nature because mathematics does not capture the way bodies 
actually are: “After all [gentlemen] these mathematical subtleties do very well in the 
abstract, but they do not work out when applied to sensible and physical matters” (Drake, 
trans., 1981, p. 236).  This attitude, however, runs contrary to a central aim of Galileo’s, 
which is to find useful theories through building mathematical models of natural 
phenomena.  McTighe (1967) captures the challenge to Galileo: “The Aristotelian claim 
that the science of mathematics and the science of nature move on two quite different 
planes of abstraction, and that natural science must therefore seek an appropriately 
physical explanation of nature, had to be met head on” (pp. 365-366). 
 There is an apparent paradox in modern science inherited from Galileo.  Galileo, 
who was interested in making the focus of science the application of theory to the 
empirical world, made greater progress by thinking about what is not the case, i.e. 
idealizations and the mathematically abstracted, than the Aristotelians were able to make, 
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because they did not allow “false” models.  Levins (1966) gets to the heart of the 
epistemological question about the use of models to represent nature:  
 
For all models are both true and false.  Almost any plausible proposed 
relation among aspects of nature is likely to be true in the sense that it 
occurs (although rarely and slightly).  Yet all models leave out a lot and 
are in that sense false, incomplete, inadequate. (p. 430)130
 
   
The value of a model is measured by how accurately it represents the phenomena being 
studied and how well it lends itself to further, testable hypotheses.  Galileo’s work on 
floating bodies, his attempt at using the Medician stars to solve the longitude problem, his 
models of free fall and the motion of the pendulum, and his work on the military 
compass, among other examples, strongly imply that he is looking for mathematical 
principles that can be used to predict phenomena, not just to explain past events.  
Galileo’s commitment to mathematically demonstrable regularity is the point of (iii) 
above. 
 As we see in the Assayer Galileo has a different metaphysics from Aristotle. 
 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which 
stands continually open to our gaze.  But the book cannot be 
understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and 
read the letters in which it is composed.  It is written in the 
language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, 
and other geometric figures without which it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one 
wanders about in a dark labyrinth. (Drake, 1957, trans., pp. 237-
238) 
 
                                                 
130 Cartwright (1983) says that there are two aims of scientific theories: one is to tell us what is true in 
nature, the other is tell us how we can explain it; she argues that these two things are entirely different and 
should be kept distinct (p. 44).   
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It may be this “dark labyrinth” that Kant has in mind in his criticism of Aristotle’s 
epistemology.  The generality of mathematics is important to the Modern and 
contemporary scientific projects because quantification facilitates being able to judge 
how well experiments are reproduced because of better measurement, and more easily 
facilitates the use and the sharing of scientific knowledge through a common language.  
Galileo’s colorful ode to mathematics suggests the comparison between geometrical 
propositions being deduced from axioms, and knowledge about the world coming from 
Galileo’s mathematically regular principles.  This raises the question of whether Galileo 
is a mathematical Platonist.131
 In a certain sense Galileo’s Platonism appears to be clear from his belief that the 
world is written in the language of mathematics.  He is closed off to the possibility of 
random and irregular physical happenings in the following way:  
 
  
There is no doubt whatever that by introducing irregular lines one may 
save not only the appearance in question but any other. … Lines are called 
regular when, having a fixed and definite description, they are susceptible 
of definition and of having their properties demonstrated. … Irregular 
lines are those which have no determinacy whatever, but are indefinite and 
casual and hence indefinable; no property of such lines can be 
demonstrated, and in a word nothing can be known about them.  Hence to 
say, ‘Such events take place thanks to an irregular path’ is the same as to 
say, ‘I do not know why they occur.’  The introduction of such lines is in 
no way superior to the ‘sympathy,’ ‘antipathy,’ ‘occult properties,’ 
influences,’ and other terms employed by some philosophers as a cloak for 
the correct reply, which would be:  ‘I do not know.’  That reply is as much 
                                                 
131 One of the difficulties in answering this question derives from the inconsistency in the literature about 
what the term “Platonist” should refer to. A strong form of Platonism would imply a commitment to 
Platonic metaphysics. Adjusting what Platonism means to the scope of the question being asked here, it 
will be sufficient to determine what Galileo thinks is the ontological status of mathematical objects and 
whether he believes the structure of nature is inherently mathematical. 
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more tolerable than the others as candid honesty is more beautiful than 
deceitful duplicity. (Assayer, Drake, trans., 1957, pp. 240-1) 
 
Galileo’s Platonism appears implicit in the idea that to understand any phenomena one 
needs to use regular lines, shapes, and other geometric or mathematical properties about 
which precise demonstrations are possible.  However reasonable the leap to Platonism 
seems, it is not as defensible as the position that Galileo is only making an 
epistemological claim and not a metaphysical claim about the universe.  Though it may 
be true that it would be more difficult to make causal claims about phenomena if they 
were irregular, there remains the question of whether or not there can be or are irregular 
things in nature.  Galileo’s claim in the quotation above is that what it means for us to 
know something about natural phenomena is that we can describe it in regular terms.  
Mathematics is ideal for this purpose, so mathematics is an excellent tool for our 
knowing things about nature.  This is not the same as assuming that the structure of 
nature is inherently mathematical.   
 There are two possibilities for Galileo’s position on the mathematical nature of 
the world.  The first possibility, and the importantly weaker claim, is that the only things 
we can meaningfully explain are regular, and so only the phenomena that admit of being 
described with mathematical regularity are objects for the study of empirical science.  
The second possibility is that irregularity is only in the appearances and that underlying it 
are mathematically understandable phenomena—the universe just is mathematical.  We 
can put this question directly into terms relevant to the investigation here about Galileo’s 
concept of scientific demonstration.  What exactly is a demonstration in the empirical 
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sciences: is it that, given the assumption of a certain mathematical function’s obtaining in 
nature, certain predictable results can be seen to follow?  Or is it the claim that the facts 
of predictive success establish the truth (or at least highly confirmed plausibility) of the 
postulated function?  Because Galileo never directly discusses his metaphysical views 
about this, it is not possible to know for certain.   
 I argue that Galileo believes that the basic structure of nature is mathematical, and 
this is why he claims that his explanations can be known with complete certainty.  The 
idea is that to the extent that nature is mathematical in character, mathematical 
demonstrations about natural phenomena should hold with the same degree of certainty 
as purely mathematical demonstrations do.  My argument that Galileo believes that the 
basic structure of nature is mathematical is based on three pieces of evidence: (i) 
Galileo’s apparent realism; (ii) Galileo’s acceptance of Copernicanism contrary to 
common experience and many years before Galileo had physical evidence that there were 
other centers of motion in the solar system; and (iii) Galileo’s claims that we can know 
the truth of an explanation with complete certainty, which is illustrated by his comments 
in the two case studies.  More importantly, the second part of what I am claiming is that, 
although Galileo’s views do impact his ability to implement his own three-part method of 
generating scientific explanations, his metaphysical beliefs about the mathematical nature 
of the world do not affect our ability to evaluate his method.   
 The following quotation speaks to Galileo’s desire for rigor, even though we have 




Salviati: …from our Academician who made many speculations about this 
subject, all geometrically demonstrated, according to his custom, in such a 
way that not without reason this could be called a new science.  For 
though some of the conclusions have been noted by others, and first of all 
by Aristotle, those are not the prettiest; and what is more important, they 
were not proved by necessary demonstrations from their primary and 
unquestionable foundations.  Since, as I say, I want to prove these to you 
demonstratively, and not just persuade you of them by probable 
arguments… (Drake, trans., 1989, pp. 54-55) 
 
Galileo points to the importance of what can be demonstrated or proved beyond doubt in 
science just as in mathematics.  Notice the complaint about Aristotle’s conclusions, 
which are “not the prettiest”; this is a reference to Galileo’s preference for elegance and 
generality.  Given that Galileo believes that science is about producing predictive 
mathematical models, it is consistent that interest in mathematical parsimony would 
translate into interest in parsimony of empirical theory. 
 Galileo says that reason can fill in the blank where observation is missing—this is 
seen for instance where Galileo reasons to mathematically regular laws based on 
observational data that is never perfect.  In one sense this is akin to Aristotle’s claim in 
Meteorology I.7 that, “We consider a satisfactory explanation of phenomena inaccessible 
to observation to have been given when our account of them is free from impossibilities” 
(Webster, trans., 1984, 344a5).  This illustrates Aristotle’s use of reason to substitute for 
missing observational data.  There is a difference between Aristotle’s statement and 
Galileo’s using observational data as approximating mathematical laws, at least in degree 




 Galileo points out that Aristotle goes farther than he does in rationally 
reconstructing physical phenomena, for instance as expressed by the character Simplicio 
when he refers to Aristotle’s proof of the impossibility of void.  The arguments against 
the possibility of the motion of the Earth were also well known (e.g. from Book I of 
Ptolemy’s Almagest).  Galileo says Aristotle’s theories were not proven mathematically 
from unquestionable foundations.  But it is not clear where these unquestionable 
foundations are supposed to come from or even what they are supposed to be.  Of course, 
both Galileo and Aristotle want to find the true causes of phenomena where possible.  If 
there is a difference between them here, it is in the ambition to pursue “phenomena 
inaccessible to observation” in the first place. 
 The difficulty of knowing how far one can reason from experience is highlighted 
by a brief exchange between Simplicio and Sagredo in Two New Sciences.  Simplicio 
claims that common experience shows that light travels instantaneously.  He gives the 
example of being able to see the flash from a cannon well before the sound of the shot 
can be heard.  Sagredo must take Simplicio to task for the improper conclusion: 
 
From this well-known experience, Simplicio, no more can be deduced 
than that the sound is conducted to our hearing in a time less brief than 
that in which the light is conducted to us.  It does not assure me whether 
the light is instantaneous, or time-consuming but very rapid. (Drake, 
trans., 1989, p. 87) 
 
One can be deceived by sensory input if one is not careful to consider the limitations of 
each experience; that is, it is necessary to separate the immediate conclusions one tends 
to jump to as far as possible from the raw sensory data. 
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 There is an exchange in Two New Sciences that shows Galileo’s belief in 
tempering experience with reason and the Aristotelians’ reluctance to apply the abstract 
to the material world. 
 
Simplicio: The considerations and demonstrations made by you up to this 
point, being mathematical things abstracted and separated from sensible 
matter, I believe would not work according to your rules if applied to 
physical and natural materials. (Drake, trans., 1989, p. 96) 
 
This statement of Simplicio’s describes the Aristotelian notion of observation in the 
material world taking precedence over the more Platonic idea of deducing the world from 
the ideal.  Galileo answers this challenge with a conclusive demonstration using only 
reason to defeat Simplicio’s view of free fall.  Simplicio asserts the Aristotelian idea that 
an object ten times heavier than another object will fall ten times faster than the lighter.  
The character Salviati responds: 
 
…I seriously doubt that Aristotle ever tested whether it is true that two 
stones, one ten times as heavy as the other, both released at the same 
instant to fall from a height, say, of one hundred braccia, differed so much 
in their speeds that upon the arrival of the larger stone upon the ground, 
the other would be found to have descended no more than ten braccia. 
(Drake, trans., 1989, p. 106) 
 
Simplicio makes a simplistic linguistic argument claiming that Aristotle did conduct this 
experiment.  The heart of his argument is a quotation from Aristotle where he says, “We 
see the heavier…”  Simplicio claims that Aristotle would not say “we see” unless he had 
actually conducted the experiment.  Sagredo is not convinced because of the wildly 
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different results seen at the free fall experiment in Pisa.  Galileo then points out that the 
Aristotelian position can be defeated with reason: 
 
Salv: “But without other experiences, by a short and conclusive 
demonstration, we can prove clearly that it is not true that a heavier 
moveable is moved more swiftly than another, less heavy, these being the 
same material, and in a word, those of which Aristotle speaks.” (Drake, 
trans., 1989, p. 107) 
 
What follows is a rational demonstration refuting the Aristotelian view.  Simplicio first 
agrees to the concept of terminal velocity.  He then grants that two different bodies, if 
“connected” would influence each other—the heavier body tending to accelerate the 
lighter and the lighter tending to retard the heavier.  Salviati then proposes putting the 
two objects together thereby creating a body heavier than the larger alone.  But since 
Simplicio agreed that the joined body should fall more slowly than the larger body alone, 
we have a contradiction in the theory.  By Simplicio’s answer, the larger body should fall 
faster than the larger body joined to the smaller body because of the rule that heavier 
bodies fall faster.  This is an absurdity, so the initial principle is false.   
 This is an example of Galileo using reason to show that a certain hypothesis has 
internal contradictions, which is one way he justifies rejecting hypotheses.  However, it is 
crucial that he adds “without other experiences” before he can disprove Simplicio’s 
notion of free fall.  This implies that some experience is necessary.  Hence, the traditional 
characterization that the difference between Aristotle and Galileo is the difference 
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between Rationalism and Empiricism is erroneous.132
 
  For both Aristotle and Galileo 
experience is secondary to reason.  
4.7  Summary of Departure from Aristotle 
 So we see that Galileo differs greatly from the Aristotelians but not as 
dramatically from Aristotle as the standard literature portrays.  When viewing Galileo’s 
and Aristotle’s works side by side, the difference is subtle but significant in four ways: (i) 
Galileo’s greater interest in pursuing practical applications led him not to search beyond 
the proximate causes of phenomena and to search for the proximate causes only insofar 
as they help in the construction of predictive mathematical models.  He does not search 
for the ultimate first principles and causes, which according to Aristotle, are not intended 
to be practically applicable (Metaphysics I.1).  Galileo eliminates Aristotle’s final and 
formal causes, because Galileo does not find them empirically justifiable and hence, they 
are an unacceptable source of error.  Furthermore, (ii) Galileo does not insist that 
scientific explanations must answer ‘why’ questions, that is give the cause of the 
explanandum—Galileo is satisfied when he has a mathematical model that is predictive 
and its accuracy can be quantified.  (iii) This also gives Galileo an objective standard for 
judging competing explanations—quantification allows for measurement of predictive 
accuracy.  This provides a system for detecting and eliminating error from theories.  
Thus, (iv) whereas Aristotle seems only to be interested in explanations of phenomena, 
Galileo’s philosophy of science is also concerned with justifcation of theory choice, e.g. 
                                                 
132 For examples of this characterization see Drake (1980), Hall (1962), Reichenbach (1951), Koyré (1978); 
for discussions about this characterization in Galileo scholarship see Cohen (1960).  
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based on Ockham’s razor, measurable predictive accuracy, coherence with prior theories, 
etc.  For Galileo, once he has an explanation of a phenomenon, the explanation becomes 
the new explanandum that must be tested and explained.  Galileo’s project was not 
merely to furnish new scientific explanations but to change the very nature of scientific 
investigation.   
 We have now identified the point in the history of the concept of scientific 
explanation where Aristotle’s teleological causes, which rely on identifying the essence 
of the explanandum, were rejected at the hands of Galileo.  Now we are ready to take up 
the question of what would be gained and lost by trying to reintroduce the Aristotelian 
elements of ‘essence’ and ‘cause’ to contemporary accounts of scientific explanation. 
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Chapter 5.  Implications for Contemporary Scientific Explanation Models 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explicate Galileo’s concept of scientific 
explanation, to illustrate how it changed from Aristotle’s concept of scientific 
explanation, and to suggest how this analysis might be helpful to contemporary 
discussions of scientific explanation.  Although Galileo, was not the sole agent of the 
Scientific Revolution, an examination of the elements of his considerable shift from 
Aristotle’s conception of scientific explanation remains fundamental to understanding 
Galileo’s ultimate influence on contemporary scientific explanation.  As detailed in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4, there are marked differences between Aristotle’s and Galileo’s 
frameworks for scientific explanation, such as Galileo’s increased focus on epistemic 
justification through mathematical modeling, as well as his use of systematic 
experimentation (Settle, 1998, p. 335).  Discerning these differences, how and why they 
came about, and their importance, is essential to evaluating the merits of reintroducing 
into contemporary models of scientific explanation those elements that Galileo (and 
subsequent natural philosophers) dropped from Aristotle’s account of scientific 
explanation (e.g., Aristotle’s ideas of causation and essence). 
 The differences between Galileo’s and Aristotle’s concepts of scientific 
explanation are particularly topical in light of criticisms in contemporary philosophy of 
science that focus on the shift credited to Galileo (e.g., Brody, 1972; Van Fraassen, 1980, 
1980b; Salmon, 1984, 1998).  Although Galileo is not explicitly targeted, there are 
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implicit criticisms of Galileo’s exclusion of Aristotle’s ideas regarding causation and 
essence.  Specifically, these criticisms argue that the eliminated concepts of Aristotle’s 
ideas of causation and essence should be reintroduced into contemporary science.  To 
conclude this work, I first briefly recapitulate the primary differences between Galileo’s 
and Aristotle’s concepts of scientific explanation, particularly emphasizing the issues 
surrounding Aristotle’s causation and essence.  I then examine the arguments for 
reintroducing causation and essence into scientific explanation, with a contrast of 
Galileo’s reasons for removing them.  Finally, I complete this work with a summarization 
of the potential advantages and disadvantages of such a reintroduction.   
 
5.2  Galileo’s Actual Contributions 
 In this study, I have examined Galileo’s and Aristotle’s concepts of scientific 
explanation.  Specifically, Galileo’s ideas of scientific explanation were compared with 
those of Aristotle (chapter 2.5; 4.6), as well as the ideas from some of the key figures in 
Western science in the intervening years between Aristotle and Galileo (chapter 3.5).  
These comparisons show that between Aristotle and Galileo significant advancements in 
scientific methodology occurred, for instance, in the works of Adelard, Grosseteste, and 
others (chapter 3.4).  Tracing the development of the theory and practice of scientific 
explanation from Aristotle to Galileo allows us to understand the innovations Galileo 
makes, as well as his motivation for those innovations.  
  Galileo makes two primary innovations that are relevant to our current 
discussion: the first consists in his increased focus on mathematical modeling; the second 
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involves his methods of experimentation.  Before reviewing these changes, it is important 
to point out that the root of the salient differences between Galileo and Aristotle is 
Galileo’s insistence that science is about gaining knowledge that can be given practical 
application (chapter 4.2).  This desire for science to have a practical use meant that 
predictive models were generated that could be empirically tested.  If a model did not 
accurately predict phenomena then Galileo was forced to look for sources of error or 
deviation in that model.  One source of error is empirical data collection.  Increasing 
empirical justification (e.g. through experimentation) reduces error in empirical data 
collection.  There is no such necessity for rigorous empirical justification in Aristotle’s 
concept of science because Aristotle’s aim for science is not practical application but 
instead an understanding of first principles.  Because first principles by Aristotle’s 
definition have the highest explanatory power and least practical applicability, Aristotle 
does not need the level of predictive reliability that Galileo requires that necessitated that 
he develop a system of more rigorous empirical justification.  The differences between 
Aristotle’s and Galileo’s purposes for scientific investigation led to different approaches 
for achieving scientific explanations.  
 Examination of those differences reveals that although they are more nuanced 
than some previous scholarship has suggested, they are still substantial with profound 
impact on the pursuit for scientific explanations.  What is true is that Galileo advances 
two intrinsically related uses of mathematics: the first is quantifying natural phenomena, 
and this is a prerequisite for the second, which is predicting phenomena with 
mathematical models.  Galileo’s interest in making science applicable led him to use 
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predictive mathematical models in his concept of scientific explanation.  The use of 
mathematical modeling allowed Galileo to explain and predict phenomena accurately in a 
manner that Aristotle could not, because Galileo’s use of quantification allowed for more 
accurate model building through better testing of those models (e.g., understanding the 
free fall problem, chapter 4).  
 Another difference between Galileo and Aristotle lies in Galileo’s improvement 
of the experimental method.  Although some scholarship claims that the difference 
between Aristotle and Galileo is that experience was not essential to Aristotle’s 
philosophy of science at all (Drake, 1980; Hall, 1962) while Galileo invented 
experimentation, in chapter 2 I show that Aristotle does care about empirical 
observation.133
                                                 
133 Much more so than Aristotle himself, it was the 17th century Aristotelians who did not care to look, e.g. 
in a letter he sent to Kepler, Galileo reports the absurdity the philosopher at Padua who refused to look 
through Galileo’s telescope (Burtt, 1934, p. 66-7).   
  Further, evidence that the claim that Galileo invented experimentation is 
also inaccurate is demonstrated in chapter 3 where I show that scholars as early as 
Grosseteste were interested in experimentation.  What is more correct to say is that 
Galileo developed a more sophisticated concept of experimentation and relied on it more 
rigorously than any of his predecessors had.  For instance, unlike Aristotle, Galileo 
isolated specific variables for testing, and unlike Grosseteste, Galileo carefully designed 
and carried out multiple iterations of experiments.  Galileo’s use of the experimental 
method, resulting from a concern for greater empirical justification, led to more reliable 
results.  Another result of Galileo’s demand for empirical verification of his hypotheses 
was that he endeavored to frame only hypotheses that could be empirically tested.  
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 The innovations in mathematical modeling and experimentation are mutually 
supporting without being viciously circular, and together they form the foundation of 
Galileo’s methodology of scientific explanation.  Galileo starts with a general model, 
which leads to questions that he then tests using his experimental method.  He then uses 
the results from these experiments to generate predictive models.  To continue building 
on the internal consistency of his framework, Galileo uses the results from the predictive 
models to generate new questions, which are then tested through the experimental 
method, and so on (this is similar to the dialectic between theoretical framework and 
experience discussed in chapter 4).      
 One crucial result of Galileo’s change in the focus of scientific explanation is that 
Galileo was not interested in pursuing Aristotle’s interest in the broadest causation of 
natural phenomena (see chapter 2).  The difference between Aristotle’s search for causal 
explanations and Galileo’s reliance on proximate causes is often characterized as 
involving a shift from searching for a cause (e.g., Aristotle) to searching for laws (e.g., 
Galileo) (Drake, 1980, p. 11).  Galileo seems to have accepted that science cannot know 
the sort of ‘why’ that Aristotle sought, and is instead interested in finding proximate 
causes or causes only in so far as they are needed in order to create the predictive models 
necessary to making science applicable. 
 
5.3  Tacit Criticisms of Galileo’s Contributions 
 This thesis’s analysis of the differences between Galileo’s and Aristotle’s 
scientific explanations starts to create a framework for examining contemporary 
 
 212 
arguments made to reintroduce into contemporary scientific explanation elements similar 
to Aristotle’s ideas of causation.  I would like to include in this framework a brief 
discussion of Hempel’s covering law models, which are the standard for contemporary 
discussions about scientific explanation (Psillos, 2002; Salmon, 1984; Wallace, 1974), 
and which being taken into account will assist in my illustration of three criticisms 
posited by contemporary philosophers (this overview of criticisms is not intended to be 
exhaustive).  While these criticisms are not identical, and there is some disagreement 
about the precise nature of the debate regarding contemporary scientific explanation, they 
share a common theme that primarily argues that explanations should address why things 
happen (Woodward, 2003).   
 Hempel’s models are called “covering law” models because they require that the 
explanans take the form of a general law under which the particular phenomenon being 
explained is subsumed (Dray, 1957).  The archetypical model is the Deductive-
Nomological (D-N) model, which is a set of four adequacy conditions that are supposed 
to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific explanations.  The four 
conditions of the (D-N) model are: (i) “The explanandum must be a logical consequence 
of the explanans;” (ii) “The explanans must contain general laws, and these must actually 
be required for the derivation of the explanandum.”  (iii) “The explanans must have 
empirical content;” (iv) “The sentences constituting the explanans must be true.”  
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965).  Conditions (i) and (iv) require that the 
explanans be valid and sound.  The D-N model is nomological because condition (ii) 
requires that the explanans contain a general natural law.  Condition (iii) requires that the 
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explanans haves an empirical basis.  These four criteria are meant to cover the full range 
of scientific explanations (both of general facts and particular events).  These are 
intended to be the conditions, which taken together, are both necessary and sufficient for 
something to be a proper scientific explanation; however, Brody (1972) claims that these 
conditions are not in fact sufficient.  
 With Hempel’s model in mind, the primary criticisms (e.g., Brody, 1972; Van 
Fraassen, 1980; Salmon, 1984) center on the concept that contemporary scientific 
explanations are missing ideas that were present in Aristotle’s ideas of essence and 
causation, which omission erroneously allows for “scientific explanations” to lack proper 
explanatory power (and which omission, as stated previously, is implicitly attributable to 
changes in the concept of scientific explanation introduced by Galileo). 
 
Brody (1972) 
 According to Brody (1972), the heart of Aristotle’s notion of scientific 
explanation is that a demonstration that is also an explanation captures the cause of the 
explanandum.  This account of explanation, according to Brody (1972), anticipates and 
resolves problems in the standard 20th century models of scientific explanation, as 
exemplified by the (D-N) model expressed in Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and 
Hempel (1965).  Specifically, Brody (1972) criticizes Hempel’s (D-N) model, claiming 
that the model fails to establish proper explanatory power because it takes no account of 
two crucial elements: (i) the essence of the explanandum, without which one cannot be 
certain of (ii) the cause of the explanandum.  If these missing elements are indeed 
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important components of scientific explanations, then the absence of these elements in 
scientific explanation raises serious questions.  Brody’s complaint is that Hempel’s 
models are too inclusive because although they do include intuitively satisfying accounts 
(i.e. those that seem to capture cause and essence) as scientific explanations,  they also 
allow as scientific explanations intuitively unsatisfying accounts (i.e. those that seem not 
to capture cause and essence). 
 In an effort to illustrate how contemporary scientific explanation would benefit 
from reintroducing this discarded element of Aristotle’s scientific explanation, Brody 
(1972) highlights the flaw he perceives in the D-N model (i.e., how criteria for an 
explanation can be met within the D-N model without the explanation being intuitively 
satisfying) by setting out the following example:  
 
(A) (1) “sodium normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one 
 (2)   everything that normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to- 
  one normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one 
         ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 (3)   therefore, sodium normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one- 
  to-one” (p. 20).   
 
Brody says that this example reveals a problem with the D-N model because it fits the 
criteria for an explanation, but is intuitively unsatisfying.134
                                                 
134 It can be argued that because the explanantia have empirical content and are true, Hempel’s conditions 
(iii) and (iv) are satisfied.  If we assume that conditions (i), that the explanandum is a logical consequence 
of the explanans, and (ii), that the explanans contain general laws that are actually required for the 
derivation of the explanandum, are likewise satisfied, then Brody’s example would count as a scientific 
explanation under the D-N model. For the purpose of this thesis I assume that Brody’s Explanation A does 
meet Hempel’s conditions for a D-N explanation. 
  Brody argues that it is not 
the case that “sodium normally combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one” because 
“everything that normally combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one normally 
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combines with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one.”  Brody argues that such an explanation 
does not identify the cause of sodium’s combining with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one 
because the explanans has not captured the essential attribute of sodium that is 
responsible for why it combines with chlorine in a one-to-one ratio.  Brody thus 
concludes that A is not a proper explanation.  Alternatively, Brody claims that an 
intuitively satisfying explanation would include an account of the atomic structures of 
sodium and chlorine and the theory of chemical bonding, since this explanation would 
capture the cause and essence of sodium.135
 In order to achieve a satisfactory solution, according to Brody (1972), one would 
need to add to the D-N conditions an additional condition that states “its explanans 
contains essentially a description of the event which is the cause of the event described in 
the explanandum” (p. 23).  Brody claims that if this condition were added to Hempel’s 
model, then Example A would fail to be a scientific explanation under the revised D-N 
model because A does not capture the essence of sodium necessary to give the cause of 
its combining with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one.  Brody contends that adding his new 
condition to Hempel’s model would disqualify as D-N explanations all accounts that are 
not intuitively satisfying explanations, such as his Example A.  Brody points out that this 
additional condition would, however, not disqualify accounts such as the one he suggests 
that includes the atomic structure of sodium and chemical bonding theory.  Brody wants 
the model of scientific explanation to exclude all potential explanations for sodium’s 
combining with chlorine in a ratio of one-to-one except the atomic theory explanation 
 
                                                 
135 The atomic structure explanation would not be ruled out by the D-N model, but the point is that both 
Example A and the atomic structure account qualify as explanations under the D-N model.  
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because, presumably, atomic theory gets at the essence of sodium, and the theory of 
chemical bonding provides an intuitively satisfactory causal explanation of why sodium 
and chlorine combine in a ratio of one-to-one.    
 If, however, Brody’s proposed addition to the set of D-N model conditions 
reduces the efficacy of scientific explanation models by eliminating potentially helpful 
explanations that scientists find useful, for example, in designing new experiments, then 
Brody’s condition should either be qualified or disregarded.  Brody’s suggestion that we 
should accept as scientific explanations only those accounts that have intuitively 
satisfying elements of cause and essence would be too restrictive if it excluded 
potentially useful explanations.  For example, in Brody’s Example A, it is a valid 
conclusion that sodium combines with chlorine in a one-to-one ratio, and this may be 
useful knowledge for predictive modeling, even though this does not seem to reveal 
sodium’s essence.  
 Hempel tries to avoid eliminating or restricting with his models those 
explanations that are actually useful in scientific inquiry.  Brody, on the other hand, does 
not seem to be as strongly motivated to avoid eliminating potentially useful scientific 
tools.  This illustrates another pitfall in Brody’s attempt to exclude scientific explanations 
that are not intuitively satisfying.  For instance, Hempel’s covering law models allow for 
numerous explanations of the same phenomenon, whereas Brody’s conditions may 
restrict the covering law explanation to one per phenomenon.  As a point of comparison, 
take Hempel’s discussion of the fact that the level of water in a beaker remains the same 
when an ice cube is floating as when that ice cube has melted (Hempel, 1965, p. 346).  
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Hempel’s explanation for this is based on such laws as Archimedes’ law of floating 
bodies, conservation of mass, etc.  Explanantia of this type would naturally lead to a D-N 
model type explanation for the water level in a beaker with melting ice.  Consequently 
and given the general nature of the laws used, Hempel points out that it is possible to 
come up with explanations governing all similar events, such as “a floating piece of 
marble on mercury or of a boat on water.”  The most direct explanation for why the 
beaker level remains constant while the ice melts gives us a law Hempel calls a “minimal 
covering law implicit in a given D-N explanation.” 
 
But while such laws might be used for explanatory purposes, the D-N 
model by no means restricts deductive-nomological explanations to the 
use of minimal laws.  Indeed such a restriction would fail to do justice to 
one important objective of scientific inquiry, namely, that of establishing 
laws and theories of broad scope, under which narrower generalizations 
may then be subsumed as special cases or as close approximations of such. 
(Hempel 1965, p. 347) 
 
Hempel goes on to discuss the common occurrence of a D-N model explanation 
capturing the cause of the event.  This shows that Brody’s insistence that explanations 
capture the cause of a phenomenon is what Hempel would judge as too restrictive.  Thus, 
Brody’s suggested solution to the problems he identifies in contemporary scientific 
models may inadvertently weaken the applicability of scientific explanations to the actual 
practice of conducting science.  
 Brody is attempting to get at the kinds of explanations that would satisfy 
Aristotle’s causal requirements.  Hempel on the other hand, seems to be after 
explanations that scientists use on a day-to-day basis for experiment building.  Thus, 
 
 218 
Brody is probably correct that Hempel would accept his Example A as satisfying the D-N 
model.  Hempel might also agree that it is not as satisfying an explanation as Brody’s 
preferred explanation involving atomic theory.  However, Brody claims that his Example 
A is not merely less satisfying, but that it is not an explanation at all.  In contrast, Hempel 
might argue that the fact that the atomic theory explanation applies to a more general 
class of phenomena does not render the first explanation useless in the design and 
performance of scientific experiments.  However, the point of contention would remain: 
Hempel would claim that Explanation A is merely narrower while Brody would argue 
that Example A is not an ‘explanation’ at all. 
 
Van Fraassen (1980a; 1980b) 
 Van Fraassen (1980a) joins Brody in similarly criticizing contemporary models of 
scientific explanation.  Like Brody (1972), Van Fraassen (1980a) considers whether 
Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation contains elements that are missing from the 
standard contemporary model and further whether or not we can transfer desirable 
elements from Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation to contemporary models.  Van 
Fraassen (1980a) emphasizes that the difficulties in successfully accounting for scientific 
explanation are the same for us as they were for Aristotle:  
 
[W]e can identify the main philosophical problems and puzzles 
concerning science that Aristotle faced, and can state them in modern 
terms, because we recognize them as identical or closely similar to ones 





Unlike Brody however, Van Fraassen pays considerable attention to the consequences 
(potentially unintended) of incorporating these missing elements into contemporary 
models of scientific explanation.  Van Fraassen (1980a) summarizes his project as the 
quest to answer three questions that cumulatively resolve the issue of whether or not, or 
in what way, Aristotle’s concept of scientific explanation can be mined to find solutions 
to some of the problems in contemporary models of scientific explanation:  
 
The first question for us is: how much of his account of science is just 
enough to solve those main philosophical problems that he and we both 
face?  And the second question is: what is presupposed by that much of 
the account?  And the third: could we, in good philosophical conscience, 
accept these presuppositions?  To put it briefly: what philosophically 
controversial theses would have to be defended today, if we were to accept 
an Aristotelian account of science? (p. 20) 
 
Van Fraassen reiterates his claim that Aristotle’s “solutions are very good” particularly in 
his dealings with asymmetries.  The asymmetry problem deals with that part of causation 
concerned with making sure the cause of the explanandum is captured by the explanans, 
and not the other way around.136
                                                 
136 To illustrate the asymmetry problem of causation consider the following examples from Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics I. 13. First, from the terms A (being near), B (not twinkling), and C (planets), it is 
possible to deduce the fact of the matter: 
  However, Van Fraassen concludes that at the heart of 
  B of C…planets do not twinkle 
  A of B…what does not twinkle is near 
therefore,  A of C…planets are near 
This is a deduction of the fact of the matter that the planets are near; however, this does not answer the 
‘why’ question because we do not think it is the case that the nearness of the planets is caused by their not 
twinkling. Consider the alternative deduction with the terms arranged differently; A (not twinkling), B 
(being near), C (planets):   
  B of C…planets are near 
  A of B…what is near does not twinkle 
therefore, A of C…planets do not twinkle 
This deduction is a demonstration according to Aristotle because it answers the ‘why’ question; i.e. the 
cause of the planets not twinkling is their being near. 
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Aristotle’s solutions is what Van Fraassen calls “modal realism (the objectivity of 
physical necessity).”  Writing about how far Aristotle goes with his inferences from 
observations, Van Fraassen (1980a) points out: 
 
Aristotle’s view does not end there.  The body of science consists of 
propositions which are necessary, according to him.  And secondly, an 
answer to a why-question is not a good answer unless it shows why the 
fact at issue had to be the way it was.  By this he means that the answer B 
to the question “why A?” in addition to being appropriate (that is, 
describing the sort of fact corresponding to the respect-in-which the 
question is asked) must be connected with A through a necessary truth.  
These necessary truths, as we saw, had to be propositions stating physical 
necessities, necessary connections in nature. (p. 43; original emphasis) 
 
The condition Van Fraassen points to is Aristotle’s contention that having scientific 
knowledge means that one knows not only why something is the case, but also that it is 
necessary that it is the case (see discussion in chapter 2.2).  Having determined what we 
would have to accept in order to incorporate the essential elements of Aristotle’s concept 
of scientific explanation into our own, Van Fraassen rejects the suggestion that we should 
include those elements from Aristotle’s scientific explanation that are missing in the 
standard contemporary models, because to do so would necessarily mean adopting 
Aristotle’s modal realism, which is unacceptable since it would violate basic empiricist 
ideas.  He says, “The only genuine empiricist course at this point, it seems to me, is to 
deny that explaining something consists in showing why it had to be the way it is—tout 
court” (Van Fraassen, 1980, p.43). 
 Although Van Fraassen rejects Brody’s proposal for what to borrow from 
Aristotle in order to improve the alleged problems in Hempel’s D-N model, Van Fraassen 
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does think there is another way that Aristotle’s discussion of scientific explanation can 
help contemporary philosophy of science.  Van Fraassen (1980a; 1980b) argues that 
Aristotle is right to think of explanations as answering ‘why’ questions.  However, Van 
Fraassen goes further than Aristotle in that he discusses the way in which every 
explanation is context dependent, based on the reason any given ‘why’ question is 
asked.137
 
   
The discussion of explanation went wrong at the very beginning when 
explanation was conceived of as a relationship like description: a relation 
between theory and fact.  Really it is a three-term relation, between theory, 
fact, and context.  No wonder that no single relation between theory and 
fact ever managed to fit more than a few examples!  Being an explanation 
is essentially relative, for an explanation is an answer. (1980b, p. 156, 
emphasis original)  
 
The picture of scientific explanation that Van Fraassen puts forward is very different 
from standard accounts because by removing the argument form and making 
explanations relative, Van Fraassen implies that explanation does not function as a tool 
that science uses to expand.  Van Fraassen claims that explanations are not a part of 
science; instead they are a product of science.  One might wonder then what the value of 
explanation is to science, if they are not non-relative, constructive arguments.  Van 
Fraassen claims that, “while it is true that we seek for explanation, the value of this 
                                                 
137 Van Fraassen’s claim that scientific explanations are answers to questions, and as such require that the 
context of the question be known, is better understood through Bromberger’s analysis of the presupposition 
of ‘why’ questions. Bromberger (1966) claims that every interrogative sentence has a declarative sentence 
as its underlying structure. Consider the following sentences: (1) “Why does copper turn green when 
exposed to air?” and (2) “Copper turns green when exposed to air.” Bromberger uses (1) and (2) to 
illustrate the relationship between ‘why’ questions and their underlying structures; if a sentence has the 
relation to a ‘why’ question that (2) has to (1), then it is the “presupposition” of the why-question (p. 604). 
If the declarative sentence that is the underlying structure of the interrogative sentence is true, then it is 
necessary that a correct answer to the question exists. The declarative sentence indicates the presupposition 
of the question, which also gives the context, i.e. the presupposition indicates the context of the question. 
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search for science is that the search for explanation is ipso facto a search for empirically 
adequate, empirically strong theories” (p. 157, emphasis original).  Instead of clarifying 
the distinction between explanation and theory, Van Fraassen’s position raises the 
unanswered question of what the difference is between a strong theory and a good 
explanation.  A fuller account is needed of why he thinks the search for explanation is 
ipso facto the search for strong theories.  In general, making a distinction between 
explanation and theory might be useful in separating the ideas of intuitive satisfaction 
from applicable predictions for science.  However, thinking of explanation as merely 
helpful in satisfying curiosity and not in advancing science is too limiting.  This would 
seem merely to move the difficult questions about causation and essences to the 
discussion of scientific theories. 
 
Salmon (1984) 
 Like Brody and Van Fraassen, Salmon (1984; 1998) also criticizes contemporary 
accounts of scientific explanation.  Like Van Fraassen, Salmon is concerned that 
Hempel’s D-N model does not address the asymmetry problem (1998, p. 101ff).  Like 
Brody, Salmon argues that the D-N model does not, or does not properly, capture the  
causal aspects of explanation.  Salmon supports his claim by quoting Hempel’s own 
remarks.  In “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (1948) Hempel says that the D-N 
model yields “causal” explanations (Hempel, 1965, p. 250), but, Salmon points out, 
Hempel retreats from the claim that the D-N model explanations are causal in his (1965) 
reprint of and commentary on his 1948 essay. 
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 Salmon (1984; 1998) argues that an appeal to causation is fundamental and should 
be a part of all scientific explanations (Salmon, 1984, p. 83).138
 Salmon points out that the crucial elements of Aristotle’s concept of scientific 
explanation can be understood in terms of all three categories.  Aristotle’s explanations 
are deductive syllogisms, so they exhibit characteristics of the epistemic conception.  The 
modal conception is exhibited by Aristotle’s second of two requirements for scientific 
knowledge: the first requirement is knowing that B is the explanation of A, and the 
second is knowing that A cannot be otherwise, i.e. knowing why it is necessary that A is 
the case.  Finally, Salmon claims, Aristotle’s account of scientific explanation exhibits 
the ontic conception in the necessary conditions Aristotle gives for a scientific 
  To understand where 
Salmon’s criticisms and proposed solutions lie in relation to other theories of scientific 
explanation, first consider how Salmon (1984) categorizes theories of scientific 
explanation  on the basis of three ‘conceptions’: (1) the epistemic conception—“the 
event-to-be-explained was to be expected by virtue of the explanatory facts.  The key to 
this sort of explanation is nomic expectability” (p. 16); (2) the modal conception—this 
gives the “nomological necessity of the fact to be explained”, i.e. “given the explanatory 
facts it had to occur”; (3) the ontic conception—“to explain an event—to relate the event-
to-be-explained to some antecedent conditions by means of laws—is to fit the 
explanandum-event into a discernible pattern . . .to explain an event is to exhibit it as 
occupying its (nomologically necessary) place in the discernable patterns of the world” 
(p. 18).  
                                                 
138 Salmon is careful to point out that the subject being considered is scientific explanation and that his 
requirements for scientific explanations do not apply to all types of explanation.  
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explanation, such as that the explanans be causally prior to and more knowable than the 
explanandum. 
 Those elements of Aristotle’s account that Salmon thinks should be incorporated 
into contemporary models are the elements that place Aristotle’s account in the ontic 
conception category.  These are also the elements of Salmon’s proposal to improve 
covering law models that are relevant to this discussion.  I do not consider the details of 
Salmon’s probabilistic causal-relation model.  Instead, I am concerned generally with the 
potential pitfalls of reintroducing elements of Aristotle’s theory of explanation into 
contemporary models.  Salmon describes how his preference for the ontic conception is 
different from Hempel’s D-N model of explanation.  Salmon (1984) summarizes the 
difference between his view and Hempel’s as follows: 
 
The ontic conception is the one for which I shall be arguing.  In Salmon 
(1977: 162), I offered the following characterization: ‘To give scientific 
explanations is to show how events…fit into the causal structure of the 
world.’  Hempel summarizes the import of his major monographic essay, 
‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’ (1965a: 488), in rather similar terms: 
‘The central theme of this essay has been, briefly, that all scientific 
explanation involves, explicitly or by implication, a subsumption of its 
subject matter under general regularities; that it seeks to provide a 
systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit 
into a nomic nexus.’  I find this statement by Hempel in almost complete 
accord with the viewpoint I shall be advocating; my suggestion for 
modification would be to substitute the words ‘how they fit into a causal 
nexus’ for ‘that they fit into a nomic nexus’. (p. 82; emphasis original) 
 
In short, Salmon (1984) is arguing that his model is very close to Hempel’s, but that 
Hempel’s model would be improved if explanations revealed details about the causal 
relationships among phenomena being explained including how new phenomena fit in the 
 
 225 
scheme of all previously explained phenomena.  Explaining phenomena in terms of how 
they fit into the broadest causal picture is the feature of Aristotle’s model of scientific 
explanation that Salmon believes should be present in contemporary models. 
 Salmon (1984) is well-aware of the potential difficulties of trying to give causal 
explanations. 
 
In view of well-known Humean problems associated with causality, it 
might seem desirable to try to avoid reference to causal laws in dealing 
with scientific explanation.  Nevertheless, I shall try to show that we need 
not purge the causal notions; indeed, I shall argue that they are required 
for an adequate theory of scientific explanation (p. 83; emphasis original). 
 
Salmon (1984) argues for the ontic conception, and ultimately for a probabilistic theory 
of causality (p. 43).  He argues that adding a causal relation component to statistical 
relevance models could solve some of the problems of contemporary models of scientific 
explanation such as the asymmetry problem that is dealt with by Aristotle.139,140
 
  
5.4  These Criticisms of the Standard Model Are Due to Galileo 
 There are, however, some difficulties with adopting a theory of scientific 
explanation that falls under Salmon’s ontic conception, and some of these problems 
parallel the difficulties associated with implementing Brody’s suggestions.  Recall that 
Galileo does not reject all causal explanations, but he focuses on the ‘proximate’ cause 
                                                 
139 See discussion of asymmetry problem in the Van Fraassen section, above. 
140 Salmon believes that causation is needed to correct the problems with Hempel’s models because 
identifying general laws does not guarantee that one has captured causation.  Salmon (1984) points out that 
the ‘general law’ that night follows day follows night, etc., fails to establish a causal relation because we do 
not think that day causes night or night causes day (p. 135). Hempel would argue that this is not a problem 
because the law still works. 
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and rejects Aristotle’s idea of causation.  Salmon tries to reconcile these differences by 
taking Aristotle’s idea of causation and changing it to make it probabilistic. 
 Despite adding an element of probability, Salmon’s interest in determining 
causation still represents a meaningful departure from Galileo’s concept of scientific 
explanation.  This is because even Salmon’s probabilistic models of causation require a 
substantial reliance on non-empirical factors such as intuition, although perhaps not as 
dramatically as in the case of Brody’s model.  Brody and Salmon are aware that the 
notion of causation they are trying to put into their models requires capturing the essence 
of the thing being explained.  I will show below why the determination of essences relies 
on what I will argue is too strong a component of intuition.  As demonstrated throughout 
the history of science, intuitions, particularly very strong intuitions, can inhibit scientific 
advancement.  For example, we have strong intuitions that the Earth is not moving, and 
only through empirical science have we demonstrated that this intuition is incorrect.  
Relying too heavily on intuition as the final judge to determine the right explanation is 
problematic because breakthrough scientific explanations are frequently in contradiction 
with some apparently fundamental intuitions. 
 In contemporary philosophy of science, one way to characterize the search for 
natural laws is as the search for regularity (e.g., Salmon, 1998; Hempel, 1965).  This 
search for regularity may be directly tied to the shift in science that Galileo makes from 
searching for Aristotle’s causes to searching for laws (Drake, 1980).141
                                                 
141 See chapter 4.3 – for Galileo, searching for ‘laws’ includes searching for the ‘proximate’ cause. 
  Galileo says that 





  Galileo’s account of scientific explanation, which is perfectly consistent 
with covering law models, is focused on identifying regularity, which in itself does not 
provide a means for dealing with the asymmetry problem.  Thus, Galileo is, in part, 
responsible for the asymmetry problem that Brody, Van Fraassen, and Salmon point to in 
contemporary covering law models.  
5.5. Why Some Proposed Resolutions of these Criticisms May Be Undesirable 
 One purpose of this thesis is to show that an examination of the changes in 
accounts of scientific explanation from Aristotle to Galileo could be used to create a 
framework within which one may evaluate the criticisms of contemporary models of 
scientific explanation, such as Hempel’s covering law models, as well as evaluate the 
proposed solutions to the problems identified by these criticisms.  To show that the 
investigations in chapters 2, 3, and 4 can be helpful in understanding the types of 
criticisms exemplified by Brody (1972), Van Fraassen (1980a), and Salmon (1984), I 
apply my framework and show that implementing some of the solutions offered may lead 
to a reduction in empirical rigor of scientific explanations that is inconsistent with a 
reasonable empiricism.  What follows is only a sketch of how such an analysis might 
proceed, and further development is needed to reach more definitive conclusions. 
 The focus of this thesis’s treatment of Galileo is on precisely how he was able to 
provide an improved model for scientific explanation by rejecting certain elements of 
                                                 
142 See Galileo’s discussion of the connection between understanding and mathematical regularity in The 
Assayer (Drake, 1957, p. 240-241) and his discussion of free fall in the Dialogue, “Second Day” (Drake, 
1981, p. 236). 
 
 228 
Aristotle’s approach.  He implemented these changes in large part to increase the 
applicability and efficacy of science.  The most significant differences between Galileo’s 
and Aristotle’s models of scientific explanation, relevant to criticisms of contemporary 
models of scientific explanation are: first, in generating universals from empirical 
observations Galileo requires empirical verification of a particular type (i.e. 
experimentation) for his hypotheses that Aristotle does not require for his own.  And 
second, Galileo refrains from making higher order hypotheses that cannot be empirically 
tested while Aristotle continues to reason from first order universals to higher and higher 
order “explanatory” principles.  Specifically, Galileo argues that science should not deal 
in empty ‘formal’ explanations of the Aristotelian type because they do not really explain 
anything.  Galileo rejects making those inferences that would be required for the kinds of 
assertions about Aristotelian causes and essences that Brody (1972) and Salmon (1984) 
claim are components of proper scientific explanations. 
 Brody (1972), Van Fraassen (1980a), and Salmon (1984) have different criticisms 
of, and proposed improvements to, the standard scientific explanation models.  However, 
although none of them specifically states it, their basic criticisms as discussed here 
amount to an attack on Galileo’s contributions to scientific explanation.  Next, I explain 
why accepting the kind of improvements proposed by Brody and Salmon may require 
that we sacrifice some of what was gained by Galileo.   
 Brody and Salmon attempt to solve the asymmetry problem they identify in 
covering law models by supplementing contemporary models with conditions that are 
intended to capture the causal relations between the explanans and the explanandum in a 
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manner similar to Aristotle’s model of causation.  This sense of Aristotelian causation 
that Brody and Salmon propose requires that the essential attributes of the explanandum 
be identified.143
 If Van Fraassen is right about the minimum metaphysical commitment necessary 
to adopt these proposed solutions, and if they are indeed inconsistent with a reasonable 
empiricism, then these solutions should be rejected.  For Van Fraassen’s argument to be 
convincing, we have to show, first, that the types of explanation that Brody and Salmon 
want entail a commitment to modal realism, and second, that this form of modal realism 
is inconsistent with a reasonable empiricism.  To show that searching for essential 
attributes, in the manner suggested by Brody and Salmon, requires adopting modal 
  Van Fraassen argues that the proposed solutions come at too high a price 
for empiricism.  He determines that requiring that scientific explanations capture essences 
entails: (i) a strong form of ‘modal realism’ because searching for essences implies the 
metaphysical commitment to there being such things as essential attributes; and (ii) that 
we could discover these essential attributes through scientific investigations.  Van 
Fraassen’s objection stems from the notion that making determinations about essences is 
inconsistent with a reasonable empiricism.  I argue that making essentialist claims is 
incompatible with a reasonable empiricism because statements about essential attributes 
cannot be empirically tested or falsified, and are thus inconsistent with a reasonable 
empiricism.  
                                                 
143 According to Aristotle, in order to qualify as a scientific explanation the deduction must capture the 
cause of the explanandum. His conditions require that the cause of the explanandum being captured explain 
an essential attribute of the explanandum because there are not universal causal principles of accidental 
attributes.  Thus, it is not possible to give a scientific explanation that uses Aristotle’s sense of causation 
unless one commits to the existence essences and to our ability to correctly identify essences. (See chapter 
2.2) This commitment to essences is acceptable and perhaps desired by Brody and Salmon and it is what I 
am arguing violates a reasonable sense of empiricism.  
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realism, first I show that Aristotle’s approach to the asymmetry problem relies on 
determining the causal relations between the explanans and the explanandum through the 
essential attributes of the subject of the explanandum.  Second, I show that we cannot 
determine cause and essence without a commitment to modal realism. 
 Aristotle’s account of scientific explanations solves the asymmetry problem by 
not allowing deductions to qualify as scientific explanations if they do not capture the 
causal relations between the explanans and the explanandum primarily by identifying   
the essential attributes of the subject of the explanandum.  That the way Aristotle deals 
with the asymmetry problem requires identifying causes and essences can be illustrated 
by the two deductions presented in Posterior Analytics I.13 involving the non-twinkling 
of the planets. 144
                                                 
144 See footnote 136 in this chapter for more discussion of this example. 
  “Planets”, “near”, and “not twinkling”, can be arranged such that they 
produce two different deductions with two different explananda.  First, the explanandum 
“the planets are near” deductively follows from the premises “the planets do not twinkle” 
and “what does not twinkle is near.”  The second explanandum is: “the planets do not 
twinkle.”  Taking the converse of the premise “what does not twinkle is near” yields 
“what is near does not twinkle.”  The second explanandum deductively follows from this 
premise (“what is near does not twinkle”) and the premise “the planets are near.”  
Although both conclusions are deductions, only the second deduction satisfies Aristotle’s 
criteria for a scientific explanation.  The first deduction is not an explanation, according 
to Aristotle, because he does not think it is the case that the planets are near because they 
do not twinkle.  Aristotle claims that the second deduction on the other hand, does 
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capture the cause of its explanandum: the reason ‘why’ the planets do not twinkle is that 
they are near.  It is worth noting that neither deduction captures the cause of the planets’ 
nearness.145  However, the second deduction does capture the cause of the phenomenon 
of the planets not twinkling, and so satisfies Aristotle’s account of scientific explanation, 
and hence has solved the asymmetry problem.146
 Van Fraassen argues that making assertions about Aristotelian causes and 
essences, however, requires the metaphysical commitment of modal realism.  Essential 
attributes are those attributes that are not accidental; that is to say, essential attributes 
cannot be other than they are – they are necessarily the case.  Van Fraassen argues that 
essentialist claims are inconsistent with empiricist methodology.  In principle, what 
empirical scientific methods, i.e. rigorous experimentation, can provide is data that 
suggests generalizations about which attributes of a given substance are universally 
concomitant to the substance and which attributes are not (where universally concomitant 




                                                 
145 The second deduction is a scientific explanation in Aristotle’s judgment, even though the planets’ not 
twinkling does  not seem to be an essential attribute of the planets (i.e. if they were suddenly removed to a 
great distance from Earth, presumably we would observe them twinkling and presumably Aristotle would 
still think they are planets. The problem with this from a contemporary perspective is that the planets’ 
being planets in the descriptive sense of “wanderers” is directly tied to their nearness insofar as they must 
be near in order to orbit around the same star that Earth does. However, for the argument here I assume that 
Aristotle would assume that the planets would retain their apparent behaviors even if farther away. 
  Even though these generalizations are susceptible to the induction problem, 
they are nevertheless consistent with empiricism because they suggest how they can be 
tested; further these kinds of generalizations make clear just what empirical data could 
146 Aristotle says that sometimes negative facts can be causes of phenomena, e.g., the ship foundered 
because the pilot was missing. 
147 In fact, this is a role that experimentation plays by design insofar as experiments isolate variables testing 
and measure correlations.  
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falsify the generalizations.  Van Fraassen argues that in order to make generalizations 
about essential attributes, however, it must be possible to distinguish from among the set 
of universally concomitant attributes those that are universal and essential from those that 
are universal and accidental.  Following Brody (1972) who cites Aristotle, Van Fraassen 
(1980a) accepts that essential attributes are necessary attributes (though the converse 
does not hold).  Hence, in Aristotle’s account, that there be necessary attributes is a 
necessary condition of there being essential attributes.  Van Fraassen points out that if 
one reduces the problem of differentiating essential attributes from accidental attributes 
to the problem of differentiating necessary attributes from contingent attributes, the same 
empirical problem remains: there is no clear empirical test by which we could distinguish 
from among the universally concomitant attributes those attributes that are universal and 
necessary from those that are universal and contingent. 
  Going beyond making generalizations that claim what is the case in nature to 
making generalizations about what is necessarily the case in nature entails modal realism.  
Simply put, claiming about an attribute of a natural kind that it cannot be otherwise is 
making a modal realist determination.  The commitment to modal realism is evident in 
Aristotle’s account of scientific explanation because explanada that hold only 
contingently cannot be matters of scientific knowledge.  To be an object of scientific 
knowledge for Aristotle, the explanandum must hold necessarily.  The necessity of the 
explanandum is ensured by knowing the essence and cause of the explanandum; i.e., 
knowing that you have the essence and cause of the explanandum means knowing that 
the explanandum could not have failed to be as it is.  
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 Having established that modal realism is an inherent prerequisite for accepting 
those elements of Aristotle’s system that solve the asymmetry problem, Van Fraassen 
explains why he thinks adopting modal realism is inconsistent with a reasonable account 
of empiricism.  Van Fraassen (1980a) argues that if there is ‘physical necessity’ in the 
world then, “it must be possible to conceive of three distinct eventualities”: 
 
1. law X holds (X is necessarily the case in the world, the world is subject 
 to X) 
2. law X does not hold, and is in fact violated 
3. law X does not hold, yet is never violated. 
It must be possible, in other words, to conceive of distinct possible worlds 
which are exactly alike with respect to their inhabitants and what happens 
to them – in the one with necessity, in the other accidentally. (p. 41) 
 
Here Van Fraassen illustrates why modal realism is a problem for empiricism.  The 
experimental and observational methods of contemporary empirical sciences can only ask 
questions that can be answered by empirical data.  The distinctions one must draw among 
phenomena that modal realism requires are inherently beyond what can be determined by 
empirical methods, and thus assertions about essences are lacking empirical content. 
 Van Fraassen claims that the only way one could empirically make sense of the 
notion of ‘necessary’ attributes would be if one were to define necessary attributes 
strictly in terms of universally concomitant attributes.  Hence, ‘universally concomitant 
contingent’ would simply not be a category in this scheme because what it means to be a 
necessary attribute would be cashed out in terms of universal concomitancy.  If one 
rejects this understanding of ‘necessary’ attribute (as Brody does) then Van Fraassen 




If a world without a necessary connection between two things, is simply 
one in which the two do not always go together – then the two are 
necessarily connected if, and only if, they are connected in fact.  And so, a 
universal proposition would be necessary if and only if it were true.  The 
distinction collapses.  Similarly if we could only know that two things are 
not necessarily connected by seeing them separate in fact, the empirical 
investigation of necessities seems indistinguishable from an inquiry into 
mere regularities. (p. 41) 
 
Here Van Fraassen is arguing that if modal realists try to give empirical content to 
statements of ‘physical necessity’ by reducing them to statements about universally 
concomitant attributes then they would have to show how their pursuit is anything other 
than the search for physical regularities.  Comprehending physical regularities is the aim 
of covering law models and this aim is precisely what Brody claims is inadequate.  
 Brody (1972) anticipates Van Fraassen’s objection that adopting elements from 
Aristotle into contemporary models requires accepting metaphysical commitments that 
are not empirically justifiable.  Brody (1972) says: 
 
The trouble with this objection is that it just assumes, without any 
arguments, that claims about the essences of objects would have to be 
empirically undecidable claims, claims that could be decided only upon 
the basis of metaphysical assumptions.  This presupposition, besides being 
unsupported, just seems false. (pp. 26-27) 
 
 
Here Brody argues that the objection that essentialist explanations require a 
“metaphysical assumption” component, such as intuition, is unsupported and seems false.  
However, given Brody’s (1972) claim that essential attributes are necessary attributes (p. 
25), Van Fraassen (1980a) supports his claims about the metaphysical commitments 
necessary to make assertions about causation and essence by pointing out in the earlier 
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quotation that the world where everything happens without necessity is empirically 
indistinguishable from another world where the same events happen but with necessity.  
Brody offers an initial solution to the problem of how we can come to know which 
attributes are essential to a given body.  Consider again Brody’s test case: one necessary 
attribute of sodium is that it has atomic number 11; another necessary attribute of sodium 
is that it combines with bromine in a ratio of one-to-one (Brody, 1972, p. 25).  Brody 
argues that the atomic structure explanation captures the essence of sodium and that the 
combining attributes explanation does not because: “One can, after all, imagine situations 
in which it would not combine in that ratio but in which it would still be (numerically) 
the same object” (p. 25).  It seems that all one would have to do to refute an argument 
based on imagination, such as Brody’s, would be to imagine a situation in which the 
combining attributes of sodium held but its atomic number was changed and in which it 
remained sodium.148
                                                 
148 The argument here is not about stipulative definitions. Neither I nor Brody wants to claim that atomic 
number 11 is essential to sodium because we have defined sodium to be that element with atomic number 
11. The issue about determining its essence is not about the word “sodium”. Brody is arguing that we can 
get at the essential attributes of that substance that we call “sodium”. 
  Van Fraassen points out that the physical necessity Aristotle is 
talking about does not bind our imagination; it only binds nature (p. 40).  By this Van 
Fraassen means that it is possible to accept Aristotle’s metaphysical commitment to 
‘physical necessity’ while imagining something that is not possible in the actual world: 
“we can imagine that the vine is not necessarily deciduous – while recognizing that 
perhaps it is” (p. 40).  Van Fraassen is making the point that Aristotle did not think that 
imagination was a test that could reveal necessary truths about natural kinds.  
Furthermore, if Brody intends for imagination to be the test that determines essences, 
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then he would have to concede that statements based on imagination/intuition are not 
straightforwardly empirically testable, which is Van Fraassen’s objection.149
 A potential counterargument to Van Fraassen’s objection is found in Kripke’s 
Naming and Necessity (1980), where Kripke claims that essential attributes are 
determined empirically and not a priori (p. 125 ff).  The point being made by Van 
Fraassen, which I support, is that among the empirically discovered attributes of natural 
kinds that are universally present, the determination of which universal attributes are the 
essential ones is not one that can be made on the basis of empirical testing such as 
experimentation.  Of course it is the case that all of the attributes that we know of were 
determined empirically.  For instance, in the case of sodium, the fact that sodium turned 
out to be the element with atomic number 11, that it has the position it does on our 
periodic tables, that sodium combines with bromine in a ratio of 1:1, etc., and in fact all 
of sodium’s universally concomitant attributes were determined empirically.  The point 
being made here is that the determination of which empirically-discovered attributes are 
essential and which are not essential cannot be made empirically. 
  They are 
also in an obvious way subjective. 
 To reconcile the competing ideas of Brody and Van Fraassen, I propose an 
alternative way to think about ‘essential’ attributes which has the advantage of giving 
essentialist claims empirical content, but with the disadvantage that this reduction of 
essentialism will not be intuitively satisfying to die-hard essentialists, such as Brody, who 
                                                 
149 Brody later claims about essences that it is simply a fact that we know which attributes are essential 
even though we do not know how we know them (p. 30). However, Brody’s assertion that we do know the 
essential attributes fails his model of explanation.  
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insist that human intellect is able to identify essences even if the epistemology of such 
identification cannot be explained.  I propose that we could think of what Brody would 
call ‘essential’ attributes as those universally concomitant attributes that are more general 
(i.e. apply to a larger class of phenomena) in their explanatory scope than the other 
universally concomitant attributes of a given phenomenon.  The advantage to adopting 
this notion of essence is that we could use empirical methods for determining essence.  
For example, through experimentation we can show that the atomic structure of sodium is 
a universally concomitant attribute of sodium.  Likewise, we can show that another 
universally concomitant attribute of sodium is that it combines with bromine in a ratio of 
one-to-one.  We call these attributes of sodium universal because if we had a test sample 
in which either one of these attributes was not detected, we would conclude that the test 
sample was not sodium.  If all the universally concomitant attributes of a given body 
were considered to be its essential attributes, then sodium’s combinative attributes would 
be essential attributes. 
 In the generality conception of essence we can identify the atomic structure 
attribute of sodium as providing a unifying explanation in the sense that the atomic 
structure attribute might also explain other attributes.  Redefining ‘essence’ this way 
could lead to strange sounding locutions; for instance, on this approach one could say that 
the atomic structure attribute is more essential than sodium’s combinative attributes 




 The benefit of making essentialist claims about natural phenomena seems to be 
greater intuitive satisfaction.  However, Feynman (1965) points out that the more general 
physical laws become the more mathematically complex and less intuitively satisfying 
they become, e.g. laws of quantum electrodynamics (p. 39).  Galileo claims that 
Copernicus’ genius was that he was able to make reason conquer sense (Dialogue, p. 
381).  Galileo is arguing that science must accept even intuitively unsatisfying 
explanations, such as Copernicus’ and Feynman’s in order to advance.  I argue that one 
important lesson we can take from Galileo is that, although one’s metaphysics, such as 
expressed by intuition, plays a fundamental role in empirical science, e.g. in influencing 
which questions one thinks need answering (see chapter 4.6), one’s metaphysics should 
not be used as the final judge in theory building: empirical justification is more reliable 
  However, Brody (1972) rejects thinking of ‘essence’ in terms 
of explanatory generality.  He asks rhetorically: “why should laws that explain more 
explain better?” (p. 21).  Brody claims that there is no necessary connection between 
generality of explanatory power and getting at essences.  If ‘essence’ cannot be 
understood in terms of greater generality then I argue that we have not adequately solved 
the problem, identified by Van Fraassen, that searching for ‘essences’ and ‘causes’ would 
pose for a reasonable empiricism.  
                                                 
150 This proposed redefinition of ‘essence’ in terms of empirically determinable attributes is consistent with, 
but does not goes as Causey (1977) in terms of defining a clear empirical hierarchical relation among 
attributes.  Causey is able to eliminate essentialist language altogether by explaining the increases in our 
understanding that come from realizations such as that atomic attributes of sodium seem to encapsulate its 
combination attributes, in terms of  “microreductions”.  Mircoreductions allow for the above proposed 
generality relation of ‘essential’ attributes but are much broader.  Causey proposes that possible 
microreductions might include whole groups of theories instead of merely looking at attributes of 
substances; e.g. biology to chemistry and physics, thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (p. 49). 
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than justification based on metaphysical commitments.  For this reason, I propose the 
following rubric, which I discuss in chapter 4 as the necessary dialectic between 
experience and theory: theoretical framework (including intuition) → experimental 
observations → revised theoretical framework → new experimental observations → etc.  
And further that, given good experimental method, robust results, etc., we resist adding 
non-empirical claims to the data based on the condition of intuitive satisfaction.  
 Cartwright (1983) claims that there are two different goals for scientific theories: 
(i) knowing what is the case in nature and (ii) knowing how to explain it.  Aristotle 
counsels us to, “like archers who have a mark to aim at,” let the goal of any inquiry 
determine the method for achieving that goal.151
 
  Hence, with respect to the second of 
Cartwright’s goals, we should further consider what the goal of scientific explanations 
ought to be.  If the goal is, like Galileo’s, to generate useful predictive models by finding 
laws of nature, then I argue that my preliminary framework suggests that we are better off 
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